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INTRODUCTION
by Michael J. Lightfoot*
Last year, this Law Review took on the formidable task of surveying
many of the Ninth Circuit's significant 1975 rulings in the area of
criminal law and procedure. Starting with this issue, that task has been
continued in an even more ambitious fashion. As the reader will ap-
preciate after reading the following pages, all criminal law and proce-
dure developments- resulting from 1976 Ninth Circuit opinions are sur-
veyed and analyzed in this volume. It is the intention of the editors
that this comprehensive survey will serve as the benchmark for issues
to. come in the years ahead.
One has only to contemplate recent federal legislation in areas such
as speedy trials and the rules of evidence, in addition to expected stat-
utory changes in fields like grand jury reform, to appreciate the
need for a thorough analysis of the Ninth Circuit's expected interpreta-
tions in these areas. Fourth amendment concerns, long principal focal
points of the criminal bar's daily practice and newly rekindled by Su-
preme Court decisions in the last few terms, are but other examples
of a real need for the type of excellent, comprehensive treatment
contained in this issue.
Too often, continuing surveys of court decisions, while originally
setting a bold and ambitious goal, tend to fall short of the breadth and
depth of analysis promised the reader. If this volume's survey is a fair
indication of things to come, the impact of its wide-ranging analysis will
become increasingly more valued among the ranks of the practicing de-
fense lawyers and prosecutors in the federal system as its reputation
spreads.
Hopefully, it will eventually become an indispensable part of the
library of each member of this circuit's criminal bar.
* A.B., 1960 (Fordham University); LL.B., 1964 (University of Virginia); United
States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (1964-68); Assistant United States
Attorney, Central District of California (1968-71); Chief Deputy Federal Public De-
fender, Central District of California (1971-73); Professor of Law, Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles.
I. ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that the people will be protected from unreasonable governmental inva-
sions of their reasonable expectations of privacy.1 In Katz v. United
States,2 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the fourth amend-
ment prescribed "constitutionally protected areas."3  The Katz Court
enunciated a twofold requirement for determining when an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.4 The test requires "first that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable." 5 The Supreme Court6 and the Ninth Circuit
7
have both held that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a search
is determined by examining the facts of each case.
The primary focus of fourth amendment protection is on people, not
places.8 In applying the two-pronged test for determining reasonable
expectations of privacy, the Ninth Circuit has taken many situations out
of the scope of fourth amendment protection by finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in specific fact situations.' The Ninth Circuit
has tended to focus on the second prong, finding that a defendant must
demonstrate that his subjective expectation of privacy in the given fact
1. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. Id. at 350 (the correct solution of fourth amendment problems is not necessarily
promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected area.").
4. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Id.
6. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
7. United States v. Friesen, 545 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1976), holding that, "What appears
clear from. . . Cooper . . . and Preston . . . is that searches are to be measured for
their reasonableness *n the factual context in which the trier of fact must apply Fourth
Amendment protections." Id. at 673.
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351 ("It]he fourth amendment protects people,
not places.").
9. See notes 11-16 infra and accompanying text.
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construct is reasonable as measured by whether society would assume
a right of privacy in the same situation.10 It has been held that a person
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the visible contents of an
airplane on a public runway," in the movements of a vehicle on a pub-
lic road,1 2 in articles of personal property properly subpoenaed from
an attorney,'8 in boxes left near a fence on private land,' 4 in his hand-
writing or his fingerprints,'" or in the odors outside his trailer.' 6
The fourth amendment protects individuals against unreasonable
searches by the government, not private parties.' 7  In a recent Ninth
Circuit case, United States v. Sherwin, 8 the court' found that even
though a trucking terminal manager had made an unreasonable search
10. Id.
11. United States v. Coplen, 541 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct,
810 (1977). The government agent discovered marijuana debris when he used his flash-
light to look in the airplane windows.
12. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533
(1976). Government agents had attached a "beeper" to the defendant's pick-up truck
so that the truck could be more efficiently followed. The court reasoned that since the
agents could have followed the defendant's truck, it was no invasion of the defendant's
privacy to follow him with the aid of a beeper.
13. United States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1976). The defendant had
given his attorney items. purportedly purchased with proceeds from the robbery with
which the defendant was charged. The court held, "We do not explore the issue of a
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, because the use of a properly limited sub-
poena does not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amend-
ment." Id. at 1281-82. Cf. United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1976)
(affirming defendant's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1505 by submitting a false
document in response to a subpoena issued by the Internal Revenue Service).
14. United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976). The court held that the
"open fields" doctrine (see Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)) is no longer
viable: "[O]pen fields are not areas in which one traditionally might reasonably expect
privacy." 545 F.2d at 1223. An earlier Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Pruitt, 464
F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972) handled the open fields doctrine in a similar manner. The
defendants had cached boxes and duffel bags in the underbrush. The court reasoned
that any casual passerby could have examined the boxes; defendants therefore had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their contents.
15. Whitnack v. United States, 544 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar).
16. United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (police dogs' intrusion into
area open to the public reasonably tolerable in our society).
.17. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). The Ninth Circuit followed
this rule in United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 987 (1974).
18. 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976).
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of the defendant's property, the defendant's fourth amendment rights
were not violated because there was no governmental involvement in
the search.19
Searches and seizures are "reasonable" only when the government's
need to search and/or seize outweighs the inconvenience to the individ-
ual whose right to privacy is violated.2" A particular search is constitu-
tionally valid only if the degree of intrusion is no greater than necessary.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Grummel,21 approved the actions
of federal agents who, after arresting the suspect in his home, secured
the premises by waiting in the house with the suspect's mother until
a search warrant was obtained.2 2 In United States v. One 1970 Pontiac
GTO, 2-Door Hardtop,23 the court sanctioned the forfeiture of an auto-
mobile in which a heroin sale occurred, reasoning that forfeiture is not
limited solely to vehicles transporting contraband but includes all ve-
hicles which facilitate the sale of contraband.24
Searches and seizures must be based on probable cause. An arrest
(or a "seizure" of the person) may be made without a warrant when
a misdemeanor is committed in the arresting officer's presence,2 5 or
when an officer has probable cause to believe a felony was committed
in a public place.26 The Ninth Circuit has held that warrantless arrests
19. The court delineated the circumstances that would give rise to a fourth amend-
ment violation in a private party search. The court stated:
[E]vidence discovered in a private search is not subject to exclusion for failure to
obtain a search warrant or otherwise comply with the requirements of the fourth
amendment.
A private person cannot act unilaterally as an agent or instrumentality of
the state; there must be some degree of governmental knowledge and acquiescence.
In the absence of such official involvement, a search is not governmental.
Id. at 5-6. See also United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1976) (no
violation when telephone company employee turned over the results of electronic sur-
veillance to F.B.I. agents).
20. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (government's need to protect police
officers outweighs the invasion of a "pat-down" search); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966) (blood tests taken on suspected drunk drivers are reasonable
to identify and deter drunk driving).
21. 542 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 763 (1977).
22. Id. at 791.
23. 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 65-66.
25. Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
840 (1952).
26. The circumstances of the arrest largely determine whether or not a warrant is re-
quired. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Pugh, the Court summarized
that it "has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the
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are valid where (1) the arrest was made in the hallway of a defendant's
apartment building,27 (2) the officers had probable cause to arrest at
least two hours before the arrest and did not obtain a warrant,28 and
(3) the defendant was arrested while traveling on a public highway.
20
A warrantless entry into a defendant's home was criticized by the court
in United States v. Grummel,30 but the court found the subsequent search
valid on other grounds.3
The "probable cause" requirement for a valid arrest has been dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in several contexts. Most of the decisions
focus on the informant problem and related concerns. 2 The Ninth
Circuit held in United States v. Jackson8 that since the Supreme Court
standards for probable cause were not entirely clear, the court could
use a totality of the circumstances test in deciding whether an inform-
ant's tips were sufficient to supply probable cause.8" The court also
upheld a warrantless arrest where the officers' stop of a car was based
on founded suspicion and corroborating evidence was discovered in a
search subsequent to the defendant's arrest."5 An arrest was invali-
officers failed to secure a warrant." Id. at 113, quoted with approval in United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1976). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 102 (1959) (recognizing propriety of warrantless arrest).
27. United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United States
v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976).
28. United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1976). In Wysong, the court
did not consider the validity of the defendant's arrest on the merits because he failed
to raise the issue at trial.
29. United States v. Edwards, 539 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1976).
30. 542 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 763 (1977).
31. Id. at 791.
32. See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) (arrest invalid since bulletin broad-
cast to arresting officers was not corroborated by sufficient information on part of of-
ficer who issued the bulletin to constitute probable cause); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98 (1959) (arrest invalid because all of defendant's activities observed by police
were innocent on their face); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (probable
cause requirement satisfied when the informant gave information sufficiently detailed to
indicate an aura of reliability).
33. 544 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1976).
34. The Jackson court wrote:
The informant here was untested, so there was no previous experience to qualify
her. Prior dealing is not the only basis for establishing reliability, however. We
may consider the underlying circumstances, including those portions of the informa-
tion verified by the police, and other factors supporting the informant's reliability
and the probable truthfulness of the information given.
Id. at 410.
35. United States v. Bates, 533 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) (probable cause estab-
lished when experienced customs officers observed vehicle and suspected transportation
of contraband). The court also noted that "whether the arrest preceded the search or
vice versa is immaterial as the requirement for the existence of probable cause is man-
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dated by the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that theinaccuracies in the
affidavit alleging probable cause were substantial.36 Even if probable
cause exists, an arrest cannot be made as a pretext for a subsequent
search.
3 7
B. The Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court, in Weeks v. United States,8 held that the fourth
amendment required suppression of evidence in a federal prosecution
obtained during an illegal search or seizure. 9 The Court extended this
ruling to include evidence unlawfully procured in a state (or nonfed-
eral) case in Mapp v. Ohio.4" In Mapp, the Court enunciated its
rationale for requiring suppression of illegally obtained evidence in both
state and federal courts. First, the evidence cannot be used against
a defendant whose constitutional rights were violated because allow-
ance of such evidence will encourage violations of the fourth amend-
ment.4 Second, the Mapp Court recognized that the need for "judi-
cial integrity" requires the application of the exclusionary rule.
42
Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed his disenchantment with the
exclusionary rule in Coolidge v. New Hampshire43 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents. 44 Then, in 1975, the Court declined to apply
the exclusionary rule and admitted evidence obtained in a warrantless
search made by a border guard.45 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
dated to justify either." Id. at 468. See also United States v. Portillo-Reyes, 529 F.2d
844, 848 (9th Cir. 1975).
36. United States v. Esparza, 546 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 1976) (cumulative effect
of inaccuracies was substantial).
37. McCusker v. Cupp, 541 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding no pretext). See
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) ("an arrest may not be used as
a pretext to search for evidence") and Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265
(9th Cir. 1961) for an exposition of the rule in the Ninth Circuit.
38. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
39. Id. at 398.
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41. Id. at 656.
42. Id. at 659.
43. 403 U.S. 443, 493 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
44. 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice wrote:
I do not question the need for some remedy to give meaning and teeth to the con-
stitutional guarantees against unlawful conduct by government officials. . . . But
the hope that this objective could be accomplished by the exclusion of reliable evi-
dence from criminal trials was hardly more than a wistful dream. Although I
would hesitate to abandon it until some meaningful substitute is developed, the his-
tory of the suppression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and
practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective.
Id. at 415.
45. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
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Marshall, vigorously dissented, objecting to what he viewed as the be-
ginning of the demise of the exclusionary rule.
46
The Ninth Circuit discussed the rationale and limitations of the
exclusionary rule in United States v. Winsett." The Winsett court
noted that "[tihe judicially created remedy was designed not to com-
pensate for the unlawful invasion of one's privacy but to deter unlawful
police conduct .... ,,48 The Winsett rule was extended in 1976 so
that the exclusionary rule will not bar the admission of unlawfully
seized evidence in a defendant's trial for perjury allegedly committed
during grand jury investigations.49
The Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Ryan50 further indi-
cates reluctance to exclude relevant but "tainted" evidence. In Ryan,
government agents had enlisted the aid of a Mr. Mizera, inducing him
to act as a government informant in exchange for a promise that he
would not be prosecuted. The defendants argued that their due
process rights were violated by the manner in which government agents
persuaded Mizera to act as an informant.51 The court noted that in
United States v. Russell,52 Justice Rehnquist had stated: "[W]e may
someday be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law en-
forcement officials is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to ob-
tain a conviction."5' 3 The Ryan court held: "On the basis of the
applicable legal standards derived from Russell, . . . we find that this
treatment of Mizera does not violate appellants' due process rights."
' 4
46. Id. at 551-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975).
48. Id. at 53 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1969)).
49. United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1976). The court explained:
"The purpose of the rule would not be served by forbidding the Government from using
the evidence to prove the entirely separate offense of perjury before a grand jury occur-
ring after the illegal search and seizure and suppression of the evidence in the state
court." Id. at 857. See also United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 667 (5th Cir. 1976).
50. 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977).
51. The court found that the following statements had been made to Mizera by the
Government agents:
(1) Repeated assertions to Mizera that he would go to jail for 10 years if he re-
fused to cooperate; . . . (2) Admonitions to Mizera not to get an attorney or his
"usefulness" to state agents would be over; (3) Prophesies that his health would
suffer irreparably if he went to jail; (4) Assurances that his friends, Wilson and
Zeldin, would be kept "out of it"; and (5) Reminders that if he did not help obtain
sufficient evidence against Ryan, he himself would be indicted.
Id. at 789.
52. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
53. Id. at 431-32.
54. 548 F.2d at 789.
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The Supreme Court, in a case"s decided one year before the exclu-
sionary rule was made applicable to the states,56 held that evidence il-
legally seized by state police could not be used in a subsequent federal
prosecution. 57  The demise of the so-called "silver platter" doctrine
was halted somewhat by a 1976 case58 in which evidence seized uncon-
stitutionally by the Los Angeles police was held admissible in a federal
civil case. 9 The Ninth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's trend
regarding the applicability of the silver platter doctrine. In United
States v. Hall, 0 the district court had declined to exclude wiretap evi-
dence, obtained legally by federal standards6 but illegally by California
state standards. 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that "the fed-
eral court is not compelled to exclude the seized material merely
because of a violation of state law."6 8
A court can avoid applying the exclusionary rule if it finds that the
defendant does not have standing to litigate the legality of a search and
seizure. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)"4 provides that a
defendant must have been "aggrieved by the seizure ' in order to have
standing. The Supreme Court defined the situations in which a litigant
could be aggrieved in Brown v. United States." In Brown, the Court
held that
there is no standing to contest a search and seizure where . the de-
fendants: (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested
search and seizure; (b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in
the premises; and (c) were not charged with an offense that includes, as
55. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
56. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. 364 U.S. at 223.
58. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
59. The Court reasoned that since the evidence was obtained in a search that while
technically illegal was undertaken in good faith, there would be no deterrent value in
excluding the evidence. Id. at 447-54.
60. 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 814 (1977).
61. See Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
62. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West Supp. 1977).
63. 543 F.2d at 1232. The dissent criticized this holding:
[l]t endorses a novel variation on the sort of illegal trade-off repudiated by the Su-
preme Court in Elkins v. United States. . . , while simultaneously submerging the
"imperative of judicial integrity" keynoted in that decision. . . . More funda-
mentally, it unduly warps established legal principles, enabling it to ride roughshod
over both state and federal law. Id. at 1237.
64. FED. R. C iM. P. 41(e).
65. Id.
66. 411 U.S. 223 (1973). See also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
1977]
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an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evi-
dence at the time of the contested search and seizure.
67
In United States v. Young," the Ninth Circuit found that the defend-
ants did have standing to challenge the admissibility of certain evidence
because possession of a controlled substance was an element of two of
the crimes charged.69
The Ninth Circuit applied the Brown test in two 1976 cases, finding
in each that the defendants did not have standing to move to suppress
evidence on fourth amendment grounds. In United States v. Pret-
zinger,70 the court reviewed the test for standing and then concluded
that the defendant did not fall into any of the three categories.7'
In United States v. Williams,72 the court held that the defendant's
affidavit was not sufficient to establish standing.73 The court ex-
plained, "Appellant's assertion that he had used or intended to use the
hangar and van, possessed keys to both at some point, and had an ex-
pectation of privacy in them are vague and conclusory.
' 74
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine7 1 is a judicially-created ex-
tension of the exclusionary rule which excludes evidence obtained as
a result of other evidence formerly seized in an illegal manner. Courts
frequently avoid application of this doctrine by finding "attenuation."
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Caceres,6 rejected the defend-
ant's argument that information obtained from a tape recorded face-
to-face conversation with an IRS agent, a procedure called "monitoring,"
must be suppressed because the application for authorization was based
on previous unauthorized monitorings. The court wrote, "[lit is clear
that the information in the application for authorization was based upon
67. 411 U.S. at 229.
68. 535 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1976).
69. Id. at 487. The court likewise found that "Young does not have standing with
respect to the importation count since possession was not an element of that offense."
Id. at 487.
70. 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 520.
72. No. 75-1566 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 1976).
73. Id., slip op. at 5.
74. Id. The court added that "[tlhe affidavit names neither the lessee nor the owner
of the premises, from one of whom the appellant necessarily acquired whatever pro-
prietary or possessory interest he asserted." Id.
75. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); Silverthome
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
76. 545 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976).
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the agent's independent recollection of the meetings .... not upon the
recordings themselves."77
The trend is clear. Courts, including Ninth Circuit panels, are find-
ing ways of limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule. Perhaps Jus-
tice Brennan was correct in his Peltier dissent,78 suspecting that "when
a suitable opportunity arises, today's revision of the exclusionary rule
[evidence need be suppressed only when the officer knew the search
was unconstitutional] will be pronounced applicable to all search-and-
seizure cases." 79
C. Search Warrants and Probable Cause
The fourth amendment sets forth the conditions under which a
warrant can issue."' A valid search warrant is issued within the para-
meters of the fourth amendment if several requirements developed by
the Supreme Court are met. First, the affidavit presented to the
magistrate must allege facts sufficient to enable the magistrate to con-
clude that probable cause exists. Affidavits must satisfy the two-
pronged test established in Aguilar v. Texas8l and Spinelli v. United
States.82  The affidavit must first set forth facts which enable the
magistrate to evaluate the reliability of the information; second, the
affidavit must allege facts which permit the magistrate to evaluate the
credibility of the informant.88
The Ninth Circuit, in 1972, explained the manner in which a previ-
ously untested informant's reliability could be established.84 The court
held that "[tlhe magistrate is entitled to look to the underlying circum-
stances, including those portions of the information independently veri-
fied by police, and to other factors supporting the probable truthfulness
of the information." ' In United States v. Jackson, 6 the Ninth Circuit
cited their holding from 1972 and reinforced the circuit's position that
77. Id. at 1188. See also United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1976).
78. 422 U.S. at 551-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 552.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
81. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
82. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
83. Id. at 413.
84. United States v. Wong, 470 F.2d'129 (9th Cir. 1972).
85. Id. at 131.
86. 544 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1976).
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there are many ways in which a court can determine the reliability of
the untested informant.87
The Supreme Court has held that affidavits must be interpreted in
a commonsense manner.8 This directive gives the court latitude in de-
termining the reliability of an- informant. The Ninth Circuit has
recently held various affidavits sufficient where defendants had at-
tempted to convince the courts that the warrants were issued without
probable cause. For example, in United States v. Toral,89 an affidavit
giving no evidence of the underlying circumstances justifying the in-
formant's conclusions and giving no corroboration was held sufficient
to establish probable cause because it contained "sufficient detail." 0
In United States v. Fluker,9 the court upheld a warrant based on an
affidavit which gave no facts of previous police contact with the inform-
ant.92 In United States v. Prueitt9 3 the court concluded that the "veri-
fication of the informer's story provided a 'substantial basis' for conclud-
ing that the informer was reliable."94  In United States v. Bowser,"8
the court upheld a warrant based on a co-conspirator's statement against
penal interest.9 6 Finally, in United States v. Wood,"' the affidavit met
the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test because the information
was based on declarations against the informant's penal interest. 8 It
87. Id. at 410-11.
88. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). The Court explained:
"[W]here these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the
information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should
not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than
a commonsense, manner." Id. at 109.
89. 536 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1976).
90. Id. at 895. The court reasoned that by containing details the affidavit would as-
sure that the judge "is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor." Id.
See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969) and Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
91. 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976).
92. The affidavit did give corroborating evidence from which the magistrate could
'conclude the information was reliable. Id. at 714. See also Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969), holding that independent corroboration of facts given by an in-
formant can provide sufficient probable cause for the magistrate if such corroboration
is extensive.
93. 540 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 1005. See also United States v. Archuleta, 446 F.2d 518, 519-20 (9th Cir.
1971).
95. 532 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1976).
96. The court in Bowser reasoned that the statement contained sufficient detail to
establish probable cause. Id. at 1321.
97. 550 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1976).
98. The court stated, "Such statements against one's own penal interest are a sufficient
indication of reliability by themselves." Id. at 438.
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would appear that the Ninth Circuit perceives the Aguilar-Spinelli test
as requiring verification of the informant's reliability in some manner.
It would also appear that the circuit is willing to find verification in a
variety of situations.
The Supreme Court has held that the degree of probable cause
required for an "administrative inspection" is less than that required for
a routine search and seizure with a warrant.9 9 The Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Goldfine,10 upheld an administrative warrant that was
based on an affidavit which did not disclose that the defendants' activi-
ties were under investigation.1"' The probable cause requirement for
administrative inspections is met simply by alleging a public interest in
maintaining compliance with administrative regulations.'
0 2
A search warrant must be supported by substantial indication that
evidence of criminal activity will be found at the place to be searched.
In addition, the items to be seized and the place to be searched must
be described with particularity.' In United States v. Bowers,104 the
defendant argued that the warrant was invalid because it was supported
by an affidavit which failed to state that the items to be seized were
in his home.10 The court stated that the magistrate need only find
"reasonable ground" to believe the items will be in the designated
place.'06 In United States v. Spearman,1'7 the Ninth Circuit upheld
99. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court held, "If a valid
public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue
a suitably restricted search warrant." Id. at 539. See also See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
100. 538 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. Id. at 818. The defendants argued that the "search" was not an administrative in-
spection, but a search for evidence of criminal activity; therefore, a traditional showing
of probable cause was required in the affidavit. The court rejected this view, stating,
"We reject the proposition that pharmacies as to which there is probable cause to sup-
pose a violation are by that fact rendered exempt from administrative inspection and
subject only to search for evidence of crime."
102. Id. at 819.
103. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 481 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961); Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948).
104. 534 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1976).
105. The court stated, "The magistrate is not required to determine whether in fact
the items to be searched for are located at the premises to be searched, but only whether
there is reasonable ground to believe they are there." Id. at 192. See also United States
v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50, 55 (9th Cir. 1974).
106. 534 F.2d at 192.
107. 532 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Kalama, 549 F.2d
594 (9th Cir. 1976).
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a warrant to search the defendant's car. The defendant argued that
the informant's tip indicated there was cause to search the defendant's
apartment, but that there was no probable cause to believe the defend-
ant's car was involved.' 8 Where defendants have challenged affidavits
on the basis that they do not meet the "particularity" requirement of
the fourth amendment, courts have consistently held that the affidavits
must be tested in a commonsense and realistic fashion. 09
The courts are also faced with an issue, in the area of particularity,
of whether misrepresentations in the affidavit render it insufficient by
fourth amendment standards."10 In United States v. Prewitt,11 the va-
lidity of a warrant was upheld in spite of four inaccuracies in the affi-
davit. The Court found the misrepresentations to be neither material
nor intentional." 2  In United States v. Calhoun,"3 the defendant, rely-
ing on Prewitt,"4 claimed that although the inaccuracies were not inten-
tional, they were material when taken in concert. The court rejected
Calhoun's contentions, stating that "[t]he lack of materiality of each
inaccuracy does not disappear when they are combined.""
5
The third requirement for a valid warrant is that it must be issued
by a neutral and detached judicial officer. In Shadwick v. City of
Tampa, 1 6 the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion held that "an
issuing magistrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral and de-
tached, and he must be capable of determining whether probable cause
exists for the requested arrest or search."' 1 7  The Ninth Circuit was
108. The court reasoned that while "probable cause to believe a person is guilty of
a crime does not always constitute probable cause to search any property belonging to
him," 532 F.2d at 133, the court could uphold the search where there was a "nexus be-
tween the items to be seized and the place to be searched. . . ." Id.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965). A Ninth
Circuit case following this rule is United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir.
1976).
110. See United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1974).
111. 534 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1976).
112. Id. at 202.
113. 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976).
114. 534 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1976).
115. 542 F.2d at 1099. But cf. United States v. Esparza, 546 F.2d 841, 844 (9th
Cir. 1976), in which an arrest warrant was invalidated by the Ninth Circuit because
"[a]lthough each misrepresentation taken alone would not have been fatal to the warrant,
the cumulative effect of the inaccuracies was substantial."
116. 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
117. Id. at 350. The Court upheld a city charter provision authorizing municipal
court clerks to issue arrest warrants for municipal ordinance violations. See also
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971), a plurality opinion in which
the Court discussed the need for a neutral and detached officer.
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confronted with a similar situation in United States v. Banks. 8  The
defendant had argued that the search warrant was deficient because
it was issued by the commander of a military reservation. The court
disagreed, finding the commander competent to issue a search war-
rant.119
Many courts are as reluctant to invalidate search warrants as they are
to exclude relevant evidence. 2 ° Ninth Circuit panels are using the
terms "commonsense interpretation"' 21 and* "totality of the circum-
stances"'122 to uphold the validity of challenged search warrants.
D. Electronic Surveillance
In Katz v. United States,2 ' the Supreme Court stated that physical
penetration into a constitutionally protected area was no longer neces-
sary to invoke the protections of the fourth amendment. After Katz,
Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.124 Although the constitutionality of the Act has not yet been
litigated before the Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has rejected a challenge to the Act's constitutional-
ity.' 25 Recent Supreme Court cases have tacitly assumed that the Act
is constitutional. 26  Title I of the Act defines the standards and regu-
lations for authorized electronic surveillance by agents of the federal
government.'
27
In Alderman v. United States,12 8 the Court noted that only an
"aggrieved person" has standing under the Act to object to an illegal
electronic surveillance. 29  The Ninth Circuit interpreted the require-
118. 539 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1976).
119. The court wrote:
The position of the commanding officer in the instant case, however, is unlike that
of the attorney general in Coolidge . . . . who [was] actively in charge of the in-
vestigation[s] when [he] authorized the warrants. Nothing in the record suggests
the base commander here participated in any way in the investigation or prosecution
of Banks.
Id. at 16.
120. See notes 43-79 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 91-98 supra and accompanying text.
123. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic surveillance of telephone booth).
124. Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
125. United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973).
126. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505 (1974).
127. Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
128. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
129. The Court noted:
In its recent wiretapping and eavesdropping legislation, Congress has provided only
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ments of Alderman'3" to mean that a defendant has standing "only if
he was a party to the intercepted conversation or if it occurred on his
premises."''
In 1973, the Ninth Circuit held that electronic surveillance is valid
without prior judicial authorization if the consent of one party to the
conversation is procured. 32  The circuit continues to adhere to this
rule. 33
Recent Supreme Court cases interpreting the Crime Control Act have
indicated that failure to comply with the warrant requirements means
that any evidence thereafter procured is "illegally intercepted" within
the meaning of the Act. In United States v. Giordano,3 4 the Court
held that title HI of the Act did not permit the Attorney General's
Executive Assistant to authorize a wiretap because he is not an official
authorized by Congress to make the probable cause determination for
a warrant.135 But in United States v. Chavez, 86 decided the same day,
the Court held that a clerical error in the naming of the authorizer did
not invalidate a wiretap where in fact the propfr official had authorized
the warrant.aT Analogously, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court
order suppressing evidence obtained from electronic monitoring which
was authorized by a deputy assistant attorney general. 18  In upholding
the consensual monitoring of non-telephone conversations by IRS
agents, the court noted that the IRS had failed to amend its own regu-
lations to conform to new Justice Department rules allowing such
monitoring with advance authorization of any deputy assistant attorney
general. 13
9
The conflict between the provisions of the federal Crime Control Act
that an "aggrieved person" may move to suppress the contents of a wire or oral
communication intercepted in violation of the Act. . . . The Act's legislative his-
tory- indicates that "aggrieved person," the limiting phrase currently found in Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), should be construed in accordance with existent
standing rules.
Id. at 175-76 n.9.
130. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
131. United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United
States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973).
132. Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1973).
133. United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 965 (1977).
134. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
135. Id. at 523. See also Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).
136. 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
137. Id. at 571.
138. United States v. Caceres, 545 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976).
139. Id. at 1186.
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and more restrictive state wiretap regulations was discussed by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hall.4" The court did not believe
that there was a constitutional violation since the electronic eaves-
dropping activity of federal officials complied with the provisions of the
Federal Act, although not with section 631 of the California Penal
Code.141
The extent to which non-governmental agencies' electronic surveil-
lance is regulated by the Crime Control Act was examined in United
States v. Goldstein.'42 An agent of General Telephone Company had
placed a "peg-count" meter, a device used by the phone company in
investigating "blue-box" frauds, on the defendant's office phone. The
results of the telephone company's investigation were turned over to
the FBI. The defendant argued that section 2511(2)(a) of the Fed-
eral Crime Control Act, which sanctioned such a procedure, was uncon-
stitutional because it was "an impermissible delegation of authority by
Congress to a quasi-governmental agency, granting it authority to
violate telephone subscribers' Fourth Amendment rights."' 43  The
court rejected this argument, finding no governmental invasion of the
defendant's fourth amendment rights.
144
Defendants relying on the exclusionary provisions of the Federal
Crime Control Act can make a "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument
if they establish that subsequent evidence was obtained because of
leads from an illegal wiretap. 4 5  In Gelbard v. United States, 46 the
Supreme Court held that grand jury witnesses could refuse to testify
140. 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 814 (1977).
141. Id. at 1231, 1235.
142. 532 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1976).
143. Id. at 1310.
144. The court wrote, "Although communications carriers may sometimes give the ap-
pearance of governmental agencies, they in fact are private companies which possess
none of the criteria which might make them responsible under the Fourth Amendment
as government bodies." Id. at 1311.
145. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963) for an explanation
of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See also Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 177 (1969) for a summary of the Court's application of this doctrine to elec-
tronic surveillance cases.
146. 408 U.S. 1' (1972). The Court wrote:
The purposes of § 2515 and Title III as a whole would be subverted were the plain
command of § 2515 ignored when the victim of an illegal interception is called as
a witness before a grand jury and asked questions based upon that interception.
Moreover, § 2515 serves not only to protect the privacy of communications ....
but also to ensure that the courts do not become partners to illegal conduct: the
evidentiary prohibition was enacted also "to protect the integrity of court and ad-
ministrative proceedings."
Id. at 51 (footnote omitted).
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where the substance of their testimony was discovered by illegal elec-
tronic surveillance. The Ninth Circuit, in Whitnack v. United States,147
affirmed the contempt conviction of a grand jury witness who refused
to give the grand jury fingerprint samples or a handwriting exemplar,
distinguishing Gelbard as applying only to testimonial evidence.
148
Ninth Circuit panels have followed the Supreme Court's lead in
looking to provisions of the Crime Control Act rather than to traditional
fourth amendment analyses to determine whether the fruits of the elec-
tronic surveillance are admissible against a defendant. There is little
willingness by either the Supreme Court 49 or the Ninth Circuit' " to
invalidate electronic searches based on colorable compliance with the
demands of the Crime Control Act.' 5 '
E. Warrantless Searches Based on Probable Cause
1. Search Incident to Arrest
Historically, the dual purpose for allowing a search incident to arrest
has been to protect the police officer and preserve the evidence.
15 2
The modem rule establishes three basic elements. First, a court must
consider whether the arrest was proper.'5 8 Second, a lawful search in-
cident to arrest may extend only to a search of the person and the area
147. 544 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1976).
148. Id. at 1246. The Ninth Circuit held that "when the grand jury asks for finger-
prints or handwriting samples that are not otherwise precluded by some rule of law, the
consequences of contempt cannot be avoided simply because the recalcitrant witness be-
lieves that somebody's telephone may have been the object of illegal electronic sur-
veillance." Id. at 1247.
149. See United States v. Donovan, 97 S. Ct. 658 (1977), where the Supreme Court
used a restrictive reading of statutory exclusionary provisions in the Crime Control Act
to hold that the government's violation of the Act in not complying with the notice re-
quirements did not require suppression of the evidence.
150. See notes 138-44, 147-48 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 124 supra.
152. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1969). See generally Note,
Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 COLUM. L. Rev. 886 (1969).
153. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973). See United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1975) (lawful arrest
makes body search valid); United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1974)
(search of sock which disclosed evidence valid after proper arrest); United States v. See,
505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974) (search of wallet valid). If the arrest was improper or
the court finds that the search of the defendant Was not incident to arrest, evidence dis-
covered during the search will be suppressed. See United States v. Easley, 505 F.2d 184
(9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (arrest pursuant to invalid warrant but independent prob-
able cause justified arrest and subsequent search).
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within his immediate control.'54 Third, a full body search is considered
reasonable even in cases involving crimes, such as traffic violations,
where there is no further evidence of the illegal conduct. 55 Although
much of the current controversy in this field has focused on the scope
of a suspect's area of immediate control, 56 the issue has not received
great attention in recent Ninth Circuit decisions. In United States v.
Flores,5 7 federal agents, during the course of making an arrest, chased
a heroin suspect into his home, seized a packet of heroin in the kitchen
where the suspect was handcuffed, but refrained from seizing further
evidence until they returned the following day with a search warrant.
In United States v. Masterson,'58 the police arrested a bank robbery
suspect in his home, searched his bedroom and closet, seized clothes
which resembled those in a bank surveillance photo, and then allowed
the suspect to enter and get dressed. The validity of the search incident
to arrest was questioned in neither of these cases. Instead, the focus was
on the hot pursuit doctrine.'59
2. Warrantless Vehicle Searches
The traditional rule authorizes warrantless vehicle searches where
there is probable cause to believe the car contains contraband or other
instrumentalities of crime and exigent circumstances justify the
search.160 The rationale for finding exigency is provided by the ve-
hicle's mobility and the ease with which it can be moved out of the
jurisdiction.' 6 ' Probable cause is the more difficult requirement to
154. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
155. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-36 (1973).
156. For a discussion of various theories and tests developed by the lower courts in
applying the Chimel standard, see Comment, The Permissible Scope of a Premises
Search Incident to Arrest under Chimel v. California: Divergent Definitions of "Imme-
diate Control" Plague the Lower Courts, 9 LoY. L.A.L. RaV. 350 (1976).
157. 540 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1976).
158. 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2231 (1976).
159. See text accompanying notes 172-89 infra.
160. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925).
161. 267 U.S. at 151. Warrantless searches of vehicles have been upheld in a wide
variety of circumstances. See United States v. Lovenguth, 514 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam) (odor of marijuana and view of plastic bags in camper); United States
v. Westover, 511 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1975) (attempted flight from customs agent);
United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975)
(suspects got in car and drove away). But warrantless vehicle searches may also be
justified without a showing of probable cause or exigent circumstances on a number of
theories. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (search of vehicle up-
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prove. In United States v. Valenzuela,18 2 informants had advised po-
lice and federal agents that appellant and two other suspects were
trafficking in marijuana. Police surveillance of the house revealed that
there was a continuous stream of people entering and leaving. In a
subsequent stop and search of one party's car, the officers discovered
marijuana. Shortly thereafter, when appellant Valenzuela emerged
from -the same house and loaded his trunk with boxes, police searched
the car and arrested him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his narcotics con-
viction. In so holding, the court reiterated that, individually, an inform-
ant's information or police surveillance does not constitute probable
cause. However, in combination, "the total effect was to produce a
reasonable belief that a crime was being committed."'
'68
3. Emergency or Exigent. Circumstances
The Supreme Court made reference long ago to the possibility that
a warrantless dwelling search might be upheld upon a showing that
there was a need for immediate action. 0 4  Traditionally, however, the
Court has been more protective of homes' 65 than of moving vehicles,
to which a general exigency rule is applied."6 Lower courts have justi-
fied various warrantless searches upon a finding of probable cause,
where immediate action is necessary to prevent removal 0 7 or destruc-
tion8 8 of evidence or to protect the safety of officers.'0 9 In United
States v. Valenzuela, 70 for example, the following exigent circumstan-
ces were found to validate a warrantless vehicle search: (1) surveil-
held in non-criminal setting where car seized for parking violation and routine police
inventory of impounded automobile disclosed marijuana in glove compartment); Cady
v. Dombrowsky, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (warrantless search which disclosed murder
weapon in trunk of car justified because rural police had to leave car unguarded when
it was towed after accident); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (car seized at
time of arrest and kept in police custody pending forfeiture proceedings).
162. 546 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1976).
163. Id. at 275.
164. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1961); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
165. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
166. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See also Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
167. United States v. Smith, 503 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1124 (1975) (suspects believed to possess contraband about to board flight).
168. United States v. Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant possibly re-
turning to destroy evidence and officers in danger).
169. Id. at 72.
170. 546 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1976).
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lance had revealed movable items being transported; (2) the arrest oc-
curred in broad daylight and accomplices could have been in the area;
and (3) delay could have resulted in loss of the evidence.
171
4. Hot Pursuit
Police may enter premises to arrest and search without a warrant
when they are in hot pursuit of a suspect. This rule is rationalized on
the grounds that any delay might result in the destruction of evidence
or added danger to the lives of officers and others."12  These reasons
are recognized as the exigent circumstances which justify warrantless
entry,"13 but they deserve special mention because a recent Supreme
Court expansion of the hot pursuit doctrine has far-reaching implica-
tions.
In United States v. Santana, 74 a heroin suspect was standing on her
front porch when the police arrived to arrest her. The defendant ran
into her house and the police followed in hot pursuit. The Court de-
cided that a "porch" is a public place, and therefore the defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy. In addition, the police reason-
ably expected that the suspect ran into her house to destroy evidence.
The Court had recently held that the warrantless arrest of a person on
probable cause in a public place does not violate the fourth amend-
ment. 175  Thus, the Court reasoned, the defendant's act of running into
her home could not thwart an otherwise proper arrest. Once the sus-
pect was arrested, a search incident thereto, which produced narcotics,
was clearly justified under Robinson'7 6 and Chimel.1
77
This opinion may render superfluous the rationale of two Ninth Cir-
cuit cases, United States v. Flores178 and United States v. Masterson.17
Flores and Masterson applied the hot pursuit doctrine to facts previ-
ously described.' 8 0  However, the reasoning exhibited in these cases
differs from that applied in Santana. For example, the Flores defend-
ant argued that the arresting officer could not be in hot pursuit because
171. Id. at 274.
172. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
173. Id.
174. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
175. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
176. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
177. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
178. 540 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1976).
179. 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2231 (1976).
180. See text accompanying notes 158-59 supra.
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he stopped to comply with requirements of the knock and announce
statute. 181 It is obvious that the seizure of evidence was permissible
if the officer's warrantless entry was justified.182  The officer's presence
was permissible because he did "knock and announce."' 188 After San-
tana, it seems unnecessary to apply this multistep analysis.184 If the
officer is in hot pursuit, he may enter the premises to make an arrest
and conduct a search incident thereto. 85
5. Seizure of Items in Plain View
Police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant where
there is prior justification for the intrusion such as hot pursuit or search
incident to arrest, and the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent. 186
This concept is usually applied summarily, and any dispute which arises
typically involves the inadvertence of the discovery of evidence or the
justification for the officer's presence. 87  The federal agents in
Flores88 chased a suspect into the kitchen of a home to arrest him,
where they seized heroin in plain view. In Masterson8" the police offi-
cers, in hot pursuit of a bank robbery suspect, entered the suspect's
bedroom. Since the officers' presence was legal, they were justified
in the seizure of incriminating clothing which was in plain view.
6. Investigative Detention
A police officer may conduct a carefully limited search of a suspect's
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970) provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any-
thing therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and pur-
pose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person
aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
182. 529 F.2d at 31. As noted, hot pursuit and exigent circumstances can justify an
exception to the search warrant requirement.
183. 540 F.2d at 435.
184. Instead, if for any reason the entry is legal, the search incident to arrest or
seizure in plain view is valid.
185. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
186. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971); Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
187. The warrantless search of a car under the plain view doctrine was held unlawful
in United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974) because the car was sub-
ject to forfeiture two months before its seizure, when police had probable cause to be.
lieve it contained contraband. On the other hand, in United States v. Nunez-Villalobos,
500 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1690 (1974), the warrantless search
of a truck was justified when the officer saw marijuana in plain view after a lawful stop.
Id. at 1024.
188. 540 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1976).
189. 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2231 (1976).
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outer clothing, although probable cause does not exist, if the offi-
cer reasonably concludes in light of his experience that the suspect
may be armed and dangerous. 9 ' Until recently the Supreme Court
had not specifically enunciated the constitutional basis of a permissible
stop. It is now clear that an officer's "reasonable suspicion" will justify
the stop. 9' The belief required for a stop-and-frisk need not be based
on the officer's personal observation. Instead, an informant's tip may
be sufficient if it carries some indicia of reliability, even though the un-
verifed tip is not sufficiently reliable to constitute probable cause for
an arrest or search warrant.
192
The Ninth Circuit, during the past decade, has developed the
doctrine of "founded suspicion.' 9 3 This doctrine has merged with and
been acknowledged as identical to the Supreme Court's "reasonable
suspicion" standard. 9 4  As a result of its decisions in this area, the
Ninth Circuit has established a number of tests and factors which should
facilitate application of the new Supreme Court rule.
In its seminal case on founded suspicion, the Ninth Circuit held that
the police activity will be upheld if the detention was not arbitrary or
harassing. 95 The validity of a stop, Judge Hufstedler wrote in 1973,
is tested against two criteria: whether the stop was justified in its in-
ception and whether the scope of the action is reasonably related to its
initial justification. 96
United States v. Hill' 97 provides a straightforward example. There,
a police officer was summoned to the scene of a bank robbery. The
appellant Hill, who was walking near the bank, was stopped and asked
if he had seen anyone matching the robber's description. While they
were talking, the officer noticed a large bulge at Hill's waist. He sus-
pected it might be a gun. Therefore, the officer lifted the shirt and
discovered rolls of currency stuffed into Hill's waistband. The appel-
lant claimed that the officer had insufficient reason to believe he was
190. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See also LaFave, "Street Encounters"
and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 39 (1968).
191. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
192. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
193. See generally Weisgall, Stop, Search and Seize: The Emerging Doctrine of
Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 219 (1974) and cases cited therein.
194. "inhere is no substantial difference between the doctrine of 'founded suspicion'
used by this court, and the 'reasonable suspicion' test announced in Brignoni-Ponce."
United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476, 477 (9th Cir. 1975).
195. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966).
196. United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973).
197. 545 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1976).
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armed or dangerous and that raising the shirt was overly intrusive.
The court concluded, however, that an officer at the scene of an armed
bank robbery had reasonable grounds for suspicion that persons nearby,
shortly after the crime occurred, could present a threat. A bulge in
one's clothing is consistent with the presence of a weapon, and a limited
intrusion solely to discover if the weapon exists is clearly justified
under the circumstances.198
United States v. Casimiro-Benitez99 is typical of the situation where
reasonable suspicion will "blossom into"200 probable cause for arrest
and search. Border patrol agents found appellant within a mile of the
Mexican border at 4:30 a.m., crouching in the bushes in a place well
known for concealing illegal aliens. In accordance with an established
line of cases, 2°1 the court noted that experienced officers could con-
clude that such behavior is inconsistent with innocent activity. The of-
ficers are entitled to consider all the circumstances and the reasonable
inferences that could be drawn therefrom.202
A more difficult issue is presented in United States v. Robinson,20 3
which reversed a conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen car
on the grounds that founded suspicion cannot be based solely on the
officer's receipt of a radio dispatch ordering him to stop the described
vehicle. This case is distinguishable, however, in that the government
failed to call the police radio dispatcher or his source 2°4 to testify.2 5
Otherwise, the result might have been different.20
198. Id. at 1192-93.
199. 533 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976).
200. United States v. Blackstock, 451 F.2d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 1971).
201. United States v. Martin, 509 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 967
(1975) (innocent series of acts which could arouse suspicion of experienced agents);
United States v. Patterson, 492 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974) (superficially innocuous events
indicated to prudent person that an innocent course of conduct was substantially less
likely than a criminal one); Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966) (immaterial that a circumstance taken by itself ap-
pears innocent).
202. 533 F.2d at 1123-24.
203. 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976).
204. The source was an inspector at the state border who saw the car.
205. As Judge Hufstedler's majority opinion stated:
The fact that an officer does not have to have personal knowledge of the evidence
supplying good cause for a stop before he can obey a direction to detain a person
or a vehicle does not mean that the Government need not produce evidence at trial
showing good cause to legitimate the detention when the legality of the stop is chal-
lenged.
536 F.2d at 1299-330.
206. See United States v. Lovenguth, 514 F.2d 96, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1975) (per cu-
riam), where the court upheld an officer's founded suspicion for stopping a vehicle in
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7. Consent Searches
Law enforcement officers do not need probable cause to conduct a
search where the search is consented to.2°0 The prosecution bears the
burden of proving, however, that consent was freely and voluntarily
given 208 and not the result of duress or coercion, whether express or
implied. 209  The voluntariness of the consent is determined from the
totality of the circumstances. 210  The Ninth Circuit has therefore con-
cluded that the trial courts are obligated to make specific findings of
fact regarding the circumstances.2" In a 1976 decision, Tremayne v.
Nelson,21 2 the circuit held that state courts are capable of protecting
constitutional rights and that the state method of testing voluntariness
was sufficient. Federal district courts are thereby freed from the obli-
gation of making independent findings in considering habeas corpus
petitions.
The Supreme Court held in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 3 that an in-
dividual who was not in custody did not have to be informed of his right
to refuse consent, and that his knowledge of that right was only one
factor in determining voluntariness. 214  Also, no Miranda warning
need be given as a prerequisite to voluntary consent.2 18
8. Border Searches
The federal government, pursuant to its authority to exclude aliens
response to a radio dispatch that described the vehicle less accurately than the call which
promoted the stop of the car driven by Robinson. 536 F.2d at 1299.
207. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
208. Bumper v. North Carolina, .391 U.S. 543, 548 (1960).
209. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
210. Id. at 229. See, e.g., United States v. Agosto, 502 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam) (police threat to obtain search warrant does not preclude a finding of
voluntariness; remanded for determination of voluntariness).
211. See United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970, 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 908 (1974).
212. 537 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1976).
213. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
214. Id. at 248-49. The Ninth Circuit has also gone along with several other circuits
in extending the Schneckloth "totality of the circumstances" test to include custodial ar-
rest situations, regardless of whether the defendant has been informed of his right to
refuse consent. See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 510 F.2d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 411
(1976).
215. Tremayne v. Nelson, 537 F.2d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1976). This is consistent with
the view of other circuits. See, e.g., Weeks v. Estelle, 509 F.2d 760, 766 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1974).
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and conveyances crossing United States borders,210 can conduct full
searches217 based upon little or no suspicion.21 8 It is clear, however,
that the permissible scope of any such search must be reasonable under
the fourth amendment.2 9 For instance, searches involving serious in-
vasions of personal privacy and dignity, such as body cavity searches,
must be based upon a clear indication or plain suggestion that contra-
band is located in the cavity to be searched. 220  Furthermore, once that
determination is made, the fourth amendment still requires that govern-
ment officials use reasonable means to retrieve concealed contra-
band.22' In United States v. Cameron,222 the Ninth Circuit continued
to insure the vitality of the requirement that reasonable means be used
in conducting body cavity searches. In that case, the court invalidated
a search in which the defendant was subjected to two digital probes of
his rectum, two enemas, and was forced to ingest a liquid laxative.223
These procedures were conducted without procuring a warrant, despite
the fact that the defendant was legally in custody for violation of bond
and therefore no emergency required instant seizure of the evidence.
In response to attempts by Congress and the executive branch to in-
crease the physical boundaries within which border searches may be
conducted,22 4 the Supreme Court has ruled that searches unsupported
by probable cause are permissible only at a border 225 or its functional
216. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). This au-
thority finds its basis in the need for national gelf-protection. Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (dictum).
217. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (dictum) (search of
vehicle); United States v. Barclift, 5-14 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975) (search of mail entering United States from foreign
country).
218. Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973).
219. Id.
220. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
945 (1967). See also United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1974)
(clear indication of heroin in vagina). Cf. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805,
809 (9th Cir. 1967) (no clear indication of contraband in vagina; search violated fourth
amendment).
221. See United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970).
222. 538 F.2d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1976).
223. Id. at 256-57.
224. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)
(1970) (provides for warrantless searches of automobiles or other conveyances for aliens
within reasonable distance of United States boundaries); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (1977)
(provides for reasonable border search anywhere within 100 miles of border).
225. See United States v. Tutwiller, 505 F.2d 759, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1974) (search
near border permissible when- supported by probable cause).
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equivalent.2 26 In United States v. Homburg,27 the Ninth Circuit clari-
fied previous opinions 228 dealing with the revocation of consent to a
search in airport boarding areas. The court held that a passenger who
has gone through an initial screening and is in the airport's secured
boarding area may still revoke consent to additional searches and leave
the boarding area. 29
The Ninth Circuit had previously held that the search of a vessel,
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (a), 23 0 may be conducted at a domestic
port without probable cause as the functional equivalent of a border
search.23' In 1976, the Ninth Circuit clarified its previous evidentiary
requirements. The court indicated that "where there are articulable
facts to support a reasonably certain conclusion by the customs officers
that a vessel has crossed the border and entered territorial waters" it
is not necessary for the evidence to support a finding that the vessel
actually came from international or foreign waters.282
In United States v. Stanley,2 3 a case of first impression," 4 the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a vessel leaving the United States by sea is analogous
to a car crossing the border. Therefore, the validity of the stop and
search of a vessel is not predicated on the existence of probable cause.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Ortiz,235 adopted the Ninth
Circuit's view236 that searches at fixed checkpoints removed from the
226. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). See also
United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1975) (area where a vessel is
anchored in a domestic port is functional equivalent of the border). But cf. United
States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (checkpoint 65 miles
north of the Mexican border on interstate highway not functional equivalent of border).
227. 546 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1976).
228. See United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Moore, 483 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1973).
229. 546 F.2d at 1352.
230. 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (a) (1970) provides in relevant part that "[ainy officer of the
customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United
States or within the customs waters . . . and examine the manifest and other documents
and papers and examine, inspect and search the vessel or vehicle. .. ."
231. United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1975).
232. United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976).
233. 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976).
234. Prior cases involved defendants crossing the border while entering the United
States. See, e.g., United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975); Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1973).
235. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
236. See United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), af 'd
1977]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
border were sufficiently analogous to roving patrol searches to warrant
the application of Almeida-Sanchez23 7 requirements. In 1976, the
Ninth Circuit determined that Ortiz did not require retroactive applica-
tion,2 38 thereby avoiding the invalidation of searches conducted from
the date Almeida-Sanchez was decided until the time the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the Almeida-Sanchez formulations to fixed checkpoint
searches.
23 9
In 1975, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Peltier240 that
Almeida-Sanchez was to be given only prospective application, thus
overruling the Ninth Circuit's retroactive application. 41 The Supreme
Court felt that federal agents had reasonably relied upon pre-Almeida-
Sanchez cases which construed a statute that was validly enacted.
Retroactive application would not serve the deterrent effect sought to
be achieved through use of the exclusionary rule.242 Last year in
United States v. Torres-Rios,2 3 the Ninth Circuit adopted the same ap-
proach used by the Supreme Court in Peltier and denied retroactivity
244
to the rationale of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.24  The Supreme
Court in Brignoni-Ponce held that "officers on roving patrol may stop
vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion
that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country."'24"
The Ninth Circuit has also clarified two questions left unanswered
in Brignoni-Ponce. In United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz,2 47 the court re-
affirmed its previous position2 48 that the "reasonable suspicion" stand-
ard is not substantially different than the doctrine of "founded suspi-
on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916 (1975) (search at fixed checkpoint 49 miles from Mexi-
can border held invalid).
237. 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973). See text accompanying notes 225-26 supra.
238. United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, No. 74-1118 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1976) (en
banc).
239. The Ninth Circuit invalidated fixed checkpoint searches not based on probable
cause in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), aff'd
on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
240. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
241. United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted,
419 U.S. 993 (1974).
242. 422 U.S. at 542.
243. 534 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1976).
244. Id. at 867.
245. 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), aff'd, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
246. 422 U.S. at 884.
247. 528 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1976).
248. United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476, 477 (9th Cir. 1975).
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cion" as applied in the Ninth Circuit. The court also indicated in
United States v. Hernandez-Lopez, 49 by way of dictum, that a lesser
degree of suspicion may be permissible to allow questioning of occu-
pants of a vehicle that has been stopped for some other legitimate
purpose.
2 50
The Ninth Circuit has determined that the discrepancy between land
monuments and parallel 31O20 north, designated by the Gladsden
Treaty of 1853 as the established boundary between Mexico and the
United States, is governed by the monuments. Therefore, the peti-
tioner, who had plead guilty to an offense committed in the area of
disparity, was deemed within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.25'
F. Identifications
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Wade252 that an ac-
cused has a right to the presence of counsel at a post-indictment
lineup.25 The Court has refused, however, to extend this right to a
photographic identification procedure..2 4  The basis given for this dis-
tinction is that a photo spread, unlike a lineup, is not a confrontation-
type setting. The need for counsel to prevent overreaching by the prose-
cution and to facilitate an accurate reconstruction of the identification
procedure at trial can be satisfied at the trial itself through confrontation
of the witnesses and a recreation of the photo spread. 215  The Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Higginbotham,250 held that the defendant
was not denied his right to counsel although the photo display was lost,
making reconstruction at trial impossible. 5 ' In reaching its conclusion,
the court emphasized that such a safeguard is insured not by counsel's
249."538 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976).
250. Id. at 285. The court did not feel compelled to address this specific question,
however, since in the court's opinion the standards of Brignoni-Ponce had been met.
251. Alkins v. United States, No. 74-2619 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1976).
252. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
253. Id. at 236-37.
254. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
255. Id. at 315-16. The Ninth Circuit took this position even before Ash. See
United States v. Fowler, 439 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1971) and United States v.
Williams, 436 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1970).
256. 539 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1976).
257. The Court stated in Ash that if accurate reconstruction of the identification pro-
cedure is possible, then the opportunity to cure its defects at trial renders the identifica-
tion confrontation no longer "criticar' for purposes of the right to counsel. 413 U.S.
at 315-16.
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presence but by the ethical conduct of the prosecution. 2; 8
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments also
provide a basis for challenging a pre-trial identification session where
the procedure is "unnecessarily suggestive. ' 259  The test for resolving
such a challenge requires the court to look to the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" and determine whether the procedure was conducive to
"irreparable mistaken identification" 260 or created a "very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 61  In making this deter-
mination, the court pays special attention to the necessity for using the
particular identification procedure,262 the ability of the witness to ob-
serve the defendant at the scene of the crime, the witness' degree of
attention, prior description and level of certainty, and the length of time
between the crime and identification. 203  The court in Higginbotham
258. 539 F.2d at 21. The court's decision was facilitated by the fact that the photo
display was lost by state authorities, not the federal prosecutor, and that the witness
testified that his in-court identification of the defendant was based on his observation
of the defendant at the scene of the crime. Id.
259. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967) (defendant was not deprived of
due process in being brought to hospital to be identified by critically injured victim).
260. Id. at 302.
261. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384-86 (1968) (photo display was ac-
ceptable since there was little suggestiveness in photographs shown, need for their use
was great, and all witnesses positively identified suspect).
262. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 302; McNeary v. Stone, 482 F.2d 804, 806 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1071 (1973).
263. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972) (rapist identified by victim in
single showup seven months after crime). Biggers suggests that the analysis should focus
on the unreliability of the witness' in-court identification and the prejudice at trial, rather
than on the suggestiveness or reliability of the identification procedure used. Id. at 198-
99. See Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's
Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1097, 1116 (1974). The Ninth Circuit em-
ploys this same analysis, placing increased emphasis on the necessity for employing the
particular identification method. United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 172 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 801 (1973) (immediate action needed to locate suspect and wit-
nesses' adequate opportunity to observe suspect, followed soon after by photo display
in which they were shown numerous photos before and after single photo of suspect,
resulted in proper identification).
The court in Higginbotham did not apply this due process analysis in assessing the
validity of the photo display. It focused instead on the prosecutor's lack of culpability
and the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant. 539 F.2d at 21-22.
Although the court may have been correct in concluding that the defendant's constitu-
tional rights were not violated, its analysis confuses the issue. As noted above, Ash
holds that the defendant's attack on a photo display may be adequately presented by re-
construction of the display at trial. 413 U.S. at 324. It would seem that if the photo-
graphs are unavailable at trial the defendant can only challenge the identification session
through the cross examination of the witnesses, as was done in Higginbotham. This
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followed this approach in holding that the identification procedure em-
ployed therein was not impermissibly suggestive.
264
In United States v. Pheaster,265 the circuit ruled that due process
standards for visual identifications apply to auditory identifications as
well. 20  The court further held that even an "undeniably suggestive"
exposure to a tape recording would not render the subsequent identifi-
cation at trial defective, since the necessity for the particular procedure
was great and the reliability of the subsequent identification was
clear. 67 Such an approach appears to weaken the previous Ninth
Circuit rule regarding per se exclusions of testimony resulting from a
suggestive procedure.268
An accused may also be identified by comparing handwritten items
used in connection with the crime with a handwriting exemplar taken
from him after he is in police custody. This procedure does not neces-
sarily violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination since
that privilege protects only testimonial or communicative matter.2 9
in itself might constitute a violation of due process. See Supreme Court Review 1973,
64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 428, 433 (1974).
More disturbing, however, is the court's reliance on the ethical responsibility and good
faith of the prosecution in determining whether a due process violation occurred. The
court relied on a District of Columbia Circuit discovery case, United States v. Bryant,
439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), to support its holding and ignored the Supreme Court
line of discovery cases which has uniformly held that whether suppression of evidence
by the prosecution constitutes a violation of due process depends not on the good or bad
faith of the prosecution but on whether the suppression results in an unfair trial for the
defendant. United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959).
264. 539 F.2d at 23 (showing of photo displays twice with arguably suggestive com-
ments after defendant had already been arrested, followed by trial testimony that showed
independent basis for the in-court identification, was not violative of defendant's rights).
265. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
266. Id. at 369.
267. Id. at 370-71. An officer who testified at trial that he had known the accused
for fifteen years and that his in-court identification was not based on the pre-trial identi-
fication session was asked if the voice on a tape recorded ransom request was that of
the accused.
268. See United States v. Fowler, 439 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1971). The court in
Pheaster stated that Fowler was not persuasive authority since the opinion suggested that
a per se rule of exclusion would not apply where the facts demonstrated an independent
basis for the courtroom identification, not tainted by the pre-trial identification session.
544 F.2d at 371 n.10. It then held that the officer's identification was independent, de-
spite the fact that the pre-trial identification method was undeniably suggestive. Cf.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967) (if counsel was denied at lineup, sub-
sequent in-court identification would have to have independent basis and prosecution
would have to establish such basis by clear and convincing evidence).
269. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967). A handwriting exemplar
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I. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
A. Grand Jury
For the most part, cases presented to the grand jury are initiated and
prepared by the Justice Department.27 ° The individual who conducts
the proceedings need not be a United States Attorney. Instead, he may
be specially appointed by the Attorney General.2
While the fifth amendment's proscription against compulsory self-
incrimination is applicable in a grand jury setting272 and compelled pro-
duction of documents is within the ambit of the privilege,273 one's abil-
ity to invoke the privilege in refusing to produce subpoenaed docu-
ments is limited by the Supreme Court's opinion in Fisher v. United
States274 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Fred R. Witte Center
Glass No. 3.275 In the context of enforcing a documentary summons,
Fisher emphasized the fifth amendment's limited application to a situa-
tion in which the accused is compelled to make testimonial communica-
tions of an incriminating nature. 278  Thus, if subpoenaed papers of the
defendant's accountant are supplied, their production need not violate
the fifth amendment if the defendant is not compelled to affirm the
truth of their contents.277
In In re Witte, the Ninth Circuit held that even when a party is the
legal owner of subpoenaed papers, the broad principle of Fisher applies
and no fifth amendment privilege attaches when the party is not other-
is a device used to isolate and identify particular physical characteristics, like a per-
son's voice or some bodily feature. Id. In United States v. Pheaster, the court stated
that even though an exemplar was used to show spelling mistakes (instead of written
characters) similar to those in the ransom note, thereby identifying the accused as the
author of the note, the exemplar was still not of a communicative nature for purposes
of the protection against self incrimination. 544 F.2d at 372.
270. 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTnCE 6.02, at 9-10 (2d ed. 1976).
271. 28 U.S.C. f" 515(a) (1970) (permits special appointment of attorneys to conduct
any kind of legal proceeding which a United States Attorney may conduct). See United
States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976)
(government prosecutors properly before the grand jury); United States v. Zuber, 528
F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (a "strike force" prosecutor appointed under
§ 515(a) is an "attorney for the government" within the meaning of FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(d), which dictates who may appear before the grand jury).
272. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
273. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632-34 (1886); United States v. Cohen,
388 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1967).
274. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
275. 544 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1976).
276. 425 U.S. at 394-96.
277. Id. at 409-10.
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wise compelled to authenticate the incriminating information .2 1 This
ruling represents a reversal of the previous law of this circuit which es-
tablished as a general rule that the privilege permits a person in posses-
sion of potentially incriminating papers to decline to produce them in
response to a subpoena.279 The privilege has never been successfully
employed to avoid compliance with a subpoena directed towards cor-
porate records.28 °
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mandujano2s
seemingly foreclosed argument on the issue of whether a putative de-
fendant, appearing before the grand jury is entitled to full Miranda
warnings. In Manduiano, the defendant's perjury conviction was
based upon testimony given before a grand jury. He had been in-
formed of the self-incrimination privilege, the consequences of lying,
and his limited right to consult with counsel outside the grand jury
room.2 82  The plurality held that the rationale of Miranda in protecting
an accused from the intimidating circumstances of custodial interroga-
tion by the police was not applicable to the judicial setting of the grand
jury.283 Moreover, the plurality reasoned that a witness before the
grand jury has no absolute right to silence but only a limited ability to
decline to answer those questions which invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. 28 4 No absolute right to counsel attaches at the grand
jury stage of the criminal proceedings. 8 5
All of the justices agreed in Mandujano that the fifth amendment
278. 544 F.2d at 1028.
279. See United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1967), where the
court stated that documents which the defendant rightfully obtained from his accountant
were protected by the privilege against self-incrimination from compelled production in
response to an IRS summons. Id. at 472. The court in In re Witte overruled Cohen
to the extent that it is contrary to Fisher. 544 F.2d at 1028.
280. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 94 (1974); United States v. Lococo, 450
F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1971); accord, Coson v. United States, 533 F.2d 1119, 1120
(9th Cir. 1976) (order holding party in contempt for refusal to produce corporate docu-
ments in response to a grand jury subpoena affirmed). In Coson the court also rejected
the claim that service of the subpoena by IRS agents resulted in service by a real party
in interest. id. at 1120.
281. 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
282. Id. at 580-81.
283. Id. at 580.
284. Id. at 580-81.
285. Id. at 581. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the iudgment, felt that some
guidance of counsel is required at the grand jury stage. Id. at 605-06. However, the
present rule in, the Ninth Circuit is that a witness is not entitled to the presence of
counsel while testifying before the grand jury. Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d
520, 523-24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
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cannot be used to shield a witness against perjury committed during
testimony given before the grand jury.280 The Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Raftery,28 7 was similarly unwilling to permit constitutional bar-
riers to stand in the way of a prosecution for perjury. In Raftery, the
court held that drug manufacturing equipment, which was inadmissible
at a state trial, could be used in the perjury trial of a defendant who
had falsely testified before a grand jury after the illegal seizure of the
equipment. 28
A defendant is not precluded from demonstrating that the indictment
and investigation processes of the grand jury have been abused. How-
ever, in order to avoid the delay caused by a frivolous claim, the alleged
victim is required to make a preliminary showing of impropriety.28 9
Similarly, a fear that material presented to the grand jury might be used
by government agencies in other investigations and legal actions is not
sufficient to support a protective order precluding the Internal Revenue
Service from access to subpoenaed documents. 9 °
B. Indictments
1. When Required
An indictment by the grand jury is constitutionally mandated for all
286. 425 U.S. 583; id. at 584 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 609
(Stewart & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
287. 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
288. Id. at 856. The defendant was granted use immunity as a grand jury witness
and he perjured himself when questioned about his involvement with drug manufactur-
ing. The court emphasized the exclusionary rule's well recognized limitations and its
previous rejection as a license to commit perjury. Id. at 857.
289. United States v. Dixon, 538 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
383 (1976) (defendant's claim of past IRS abuses of grand jury process was not suffi-
cient to establish abuse in the present inquiry).
The aversion to delay in grand jury proceedings also supports the rule that a recal-
citrant witness may not delay the proceedings to litigate the question of the validity of
governmental electronic surveillance, United States v. Canon, 534 F.2d 139, 140 (9th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976), where the surveillance was
conducted without a court order, the government concedes a failure to conform to stat-
utory requirements, or the surveillance was held to be unlawful in a prior judicial hear-
ing. In re Gordon, 534 F.2d 197. 198-99 (9th Cir. 1976) (witness' contention that
techniques other than electronic surveillance were available for use by the government
not a proper objection to permit witness to litigate the issue). The Ninth Circuit
specifically follows the approach which was outlined by the Second Circuit in In re
Persico, 491 F.2d 1156, 1162 (2d Cir. 1974).
290. Coson v. United States, 533 F.2d 11192 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1976) and In re Fred
R. Witte Center Glass No. 3, 544 F.2d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 1976) (IRS agents' special
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capital offenses or infamous crimes.291 Rule 7 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure further defines an infamous crime as one
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard
labor.29 2  In United States v. Ramirez,293 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that a youthful offender who faces a possible six-year confinement
under section 5010 of the Federal Youth Corrections Act294 is entitled
to have the prosecutor proceed by indictment. 93 The court noted,
after engaging in an historical analysis of the fifth amendment's indict-
ment clause, that infamous crime is presently defined in terms of, and
equated with, infamous punishment. 96 In today's society, subjecting a
youthful offender to confinement for more than one year constitutes
infamous punishment.29 7 It is of no consequence that the offender was
to receive "treatment" in lieu of imprisonment and that the substaptive
offense was a misdemeanor. 29 s  The court specifically refused to adopt
the rationale and rule of the District of Columbia Circuit which does
not demand an indictment for proceedings conducted pursuant to the
Youth Corrections Act.
299
2. Statute of Limitations
When an indictment is required it must be issued within the requisite
statute of limitations, 00 unless the person named in the indictment is a
fugitive fleeing from justice.30 1 In United States v. Wazney,302 the Ninth
Circuit adopted a view held by the First, Second and Fifth Circuits that
in order to establish an accused was fleeing from justice, for purposes of
knowledge in examining corporate records held to be a legitimate resource in aiding the
United States Attorney's grand jury investigation and an order denying them access to
the subpoenaed documents was properly denied).
291. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
292. FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(a).
293. No. 75-1395 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1976).
294. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1970).
295. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] CRlm. L REP. (BNA) at 2088.
296. Id. at 2087 (citing Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885)).
297. ld. at 2088.
298. Id. The defendant was charged with a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970)
(possession of a controlled substance) and the maximum punishment for an adult is one
year imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. In addition, if the offender was an adult, he
would not be entitled to be proceeded against by indictment.
299. See note 295 supra; Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971), where the court refused to focus on the de-
fendant's status or to consider the ultimate length of confinement in determining the in-
famy of the crime. Id. at 678-82.
300. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970).
301. Id. § 3290.
302. 529 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1976).
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tolling the statute of limitations, the prosecution must affirmatively
prove the accused concealed himself with the intent to avoid arrest and
prosecution.303
If an indictment filed within the prescribed time period is dismissed
after the statute has been tolled, the prosecutor may refile within six
months.3"' In United States v. Charney,0 5 the court stated that a
second indictment may be filed after the statute has run so long as
the same facts are alleged and an almost identical offense is charged.
00
Even if the original dismissal was based on the legal defectiveness
of the indictment and not on irregularities in the grand jury proceed-
ings, a second indictment could still properly be returned.307
3. Sufficiency
An indictment should consist of a plain, concise and definitive state-
ment of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.300 It should
not mislead the defendant, but should inform him of the nature of the
charges which he must be prepared to meet.309 An indictment is suffi-
cient if it sets forth the essential facts constituting a crime in the lan-
guage of the statutory offense, or if the indictment refers directly or
by implication to the essential elements.310 In determining whether
303. Id. at 1288-89 (evidence established that defendant concealed himself to avoid
prosecution). The District of Columbia Circuit and eight other circuits hold that the
mere absence from the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred is sufficient to toll
the statute of limitations. Id.
304. 18 U.S.C. § 3288 (1970).
305. 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 528 (1976).
306. Id. at 354 (citing Mende v. United States, 282 F.2d 881, 883-84 (9th Cir.
1960)).
307. 537 F.2d at 355 (second indictment proper where it omits related charge that
was determined to be faulty).
308. Hamling v. United States, 481 F.2d 307, 312 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S.
87 (1974); FED. R. CRim. P. 7(c).
309. See Russel v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962); United States v. Ander-
son, 532 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 111 (1976) (wording which
closely follows the language of the statute sufficiently informative); United States v.
Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 995 (1976) (indictment
which stated that the conspiracy's object was for one or more of the conspirators to sell
firearms was not insufficient for failing to state that defendant was supposed to sell).
Cf. United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
130 (1976) (surplus language in indictment regarding state of mind necessary for
mail fraud was not misleading or prejudicial to the defendant since he was represented
by counsel who was chargeable with knowledge of the state of mind necessary to prove
fraud under the statute).
310. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 111 (1976). See also United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 351-52 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 528 (1976) (material misrepresentation adequately alleged where
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certain elements of an offense are essential, the court's construction of
the relevant statute and the allegations contained in the indictment are
determinative.3 11 If the court concludes that a certain element is a re-
quired component of the crime, then the failure to plead that element
results in an indictment which must be dismissed.312
In United States v. Charney, 13 a challenge to an indictment's failure
to state a securities law violation gave the Ninth Circuit an opportunity
to broadly interpret the substantive offense. In so doing, the court
concluded that the activities alleged by the Government were actually
within the penumbra of the statute.
When a party delays in objecting to an indictment, the Ninth Circuit
has stated that the reviewing court will liberally construe the indictment
in favor of its validity and will imply all necessary allegations from the
language of the indictment.3 14  In United States v. Pheaster,31 '5 the
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position that an indictment charging a con-
spiracy is to be very liberally construed. Therefore, even failure to
allege a necessary element of the substantive offense will not necessar-
ily result in dismissal for insufficiency. "
The substantial rights of a defendant are affected by variance
between the charge in the indictment and the proof offered at trial,
the indictment described defendants' activities and omissions; failure in another count
to allege specific intent to defraud was not fatal since the intent could be inferred from
an allegation that defendants knowingly operated a scheme in a deceitful manner);
United States v. Bunker, 532 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1976) (language in indictment
alleging knowledgeable and intentional importation of aliens could be read to apply to
their illegal status; therefore, there were sufficient allegations of the federal offense).
311. See United States v. Hamel, 534 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1976) in which the defend-
ant was convicted of violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707
(Supp. V 1975) by selling a species after it became "protected" by the Act. Even
though the indictment failed to allege that the bird was taken after the effective date,
and a number of older decisions held this to be error, the court stated that the failure
to make such an allegation does not warrant the dismissal of the indictment. Id. at
1355-56. See United States v. Crum, 529 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1976) (statute di-
rected at those preparing false tax returns encompassed more than just those who do
the physical preparation and, as such, the indictment charged an offense against the de-
fendants); United States v. McNulty, 528 F.2d 1223, 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 972 (1976) (indictment for felony tax avoidance properly alleged intent and there-
fore did not constitute a misdemeanor charge).
312. See United States v. Morrison, 536 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir. 1976) (indictment
alleging conversion was defective since it failed to allege a mens rea, an essential ele-
ment of the offense charged).
313. 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 528 (1976).
314. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1976).
315. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
316. Id. at 360-61 (citing Stein v. United States, 313 F.2d 518, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1962),
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if the variance operates to hamper his efforts to prepare a defense,
causes surprise or exposes him to double jeopardy.317 A variance which
has none of these effects is considered harmless.3 18
C. Guilty Pleas
A defendant's plea of guilty operates as a waiver of various constitu-
tional rights and results in a conviction. 1 9 Such a plea also constitutes
a break in the chain of criminal procedure, cutting off the defendant's
ability to successfully challenge constitutional violations which occurred
prior to entering the plea and which are unrelated to it.3 20  To ensure
that the accused makes the plea knowingly and voluntarily, with an un-
derstanding of the consequences and the rights waived, and that, by
the plea, factual and legal guilt is established, certain inquiries must
be made and satisfied.
3 2
1
which held that an indictment alleging conspiracy to traffic in illegally imported nar-
cotics was not fatally defective when there was no allegation that defendant knew the
narcotics were illegally imported). In Pheaster, the indictment stated that the defend-
ants conspired to kidnap and hold the victim for ransom, their having wilfully trans-
ported him in interstate commerce following the kidnaping. The court stated that a
common sense interpretation of the charge indicated that the object of the actual con-
spiracy was to kidnap and transport the victim in interstate commerce, and therefore it
properly alleged a federal offense. 544 F.2d at 359-63.
317. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 111 (1976). This same statement of the law was first made in Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935).
318. See FED. R. Crm. P. 52(a); United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d at 1227-28. In Anderson the court
ruled that jury instructions stating that the amount of the subject stolen securities must
have had an aggregate value of $5,000 did not operate to amend the indictment. The
indictment had alleged a value of $401,000. Allegations of any amount over the stat-
utory requirement of $5,000 were mere surplusage. Id. at 1228.
319. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969).
320. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (constitutional challenge to
jury selection barred after guilty plea); United States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1237
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 386 (1976) (claim that pre-indictment and post-indict-
ment delays violated defendant's right to speedy trial and due process of law improperly
raised after entering plea); Mayes v. Pickett, 537 F.2d 1080, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 27 (1977) (phrasing the argument that plea was involuntary
since it was the result of an unconstitutionally obtained confession does not circum-
vent rule barring constitutional challenges after entering guilty plea).
321. The requirements for determining a valid guilty plea are set forth in FED. R.
CRim. P. 11. The rule was recently amended, effective December 1, 1975. Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 3, 89 Stat.
374 (1975). The former rule and the amended rule will be designated as such both
in the text and footnotes, with all citations to the amended rule.
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1. Constitutional Inquiries
In Boykin v. Alabama322 and McCarthy v. United States,323 the
Supreme Court suggested that a plea could not be accepted as voluntary
if the record did not reveal that the defendant relinquished his privilege
against self-incrimination, right to a jury trial and right to confront his
accusers.3" 4 But the Ninth Circuit has held that no particular ritual is
required under either the federal rules325 or state procedures320 in ex-
plaining to the accused the rights he waives by pleading guilty, so long
as the record demonstrates that he voluntarily and knowingly pled. As
amended, however, federal rule 11 now requires that the judge specifi-
cally inform the accused of the rights he waives prior to accepting the
plea.
3 27
In United States v. Pricepaul,3 21 the defendant argued that a prior con-
viction could not be used to establish the violation of a federal statute
which prohibits the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.3 29  In
Pricepaul, the Ninth Circuit held that a conviction which was obtained
in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights and which necessar-
ily affected the guilt-determination process could not be used to prove a
violation which included a prior felony conviction as one of its
elements.33 While adhering to its position that the accused need not
322. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
323. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
324. 395 U.S. at 243-44; 394 U.S. at 467. McCarthy, interpreting former rule 11,
stated that a waiver of these rights was a "consequence of the plea" of which the
accused must be advised before the judge could accept it.
325. Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 256
(1976) (failure to specifically advise accused of fact that his plea waives his rights to
confrontation and compulsory process not in violation of rule 11). Cf. United States v.
Nixon, 545 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1148 (1977) (where
defendant pled not guilty and with counsel filed statement of constitutional rights to-
gether with stipulation of facts, judge need not specifically advise him of his rights to
cross examination and confrontation before accepting stipulation); United States v. Sher-
man, 474 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1973) (accused entering guilty plea under rule 11
need not be advised eo nomine of his right against self-incrimination).
326. Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974) (Boykin does not require
specific articulation of these rights in state proceeding).
327. FEtD. R. Cinm. P. 11(c). McCarthy required strict compliance with former rule
11, 394 U.S. at 426-27, as had the Ninth Circuit after Heiden v. United States, 353
F.2d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1965).
328. 540 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1976).
329. Id. at 421-22. Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1970)
(furnishing false statements to obtain firearm) and 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (effective
June 19, 1968) (possession of firearm by convicted felon).
330. 540 F.2d at 420-22. The court distinguished United States v. Liles, 432 F.2d
18, 21 (9th Cir. 1970) in which a firearm violation was upheld even though the defend-
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be specifically informed of the rights which are waived by his plea, the
court established a new rule for the circuit by holding that a record
which does not affirmatively indicate the waiver of those rights articu-
lated in Boykin shifts the burden to the Government to prove that the
plea was voluntary and intelligent.3al However, the court stated that
the Government need only show that the plea complied with Ninth Cir-
cuit standards, despite the fact that under the state law governing the
prior conviction the plea might be invalid.1
32
2. Consequences
Rule 11 formerly required that the accused have an understanding
of the "consequences of the plea. '333  The Ninth Circuit has long given
a narrow reading to this requirement and requires disclosure of conse-
quences only where it can be objectively concluded that the accused
must possess the knowledge in question to make an intelligent plea.
The court has mainly addressed itself to factors which necessarily affect
the term of imprisonment 34  In Fruchtman v. Kenton,"3 ' the circuit
held that an alien need not be advised that his conviction subjects him
to deportation proceedings on the grounds that this consequence is
merely collateral to the plea and constitutes something over which the
ant's prior conviction was subsequently reversed on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
540 F.2d at 420-21. It did not, however, reach the issue of whether all prior convictions
which were constitutionally defective were barred from supporting subsequent violations.
Id. The rationale of the decision, though, would appear to support such a rule. See
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1969), cited in Pricepaul, 540 F.2d at 421-22.
331. 540 F.2d at 423-24.
332. Id. at 424. The defendant's prior plea was made in a California court and was
clearly invalid under In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 130, 460 P.2d 449, 455, 81 Cal. Rptr.
577, 583 (1969) (record must contain direct evidence that accused was expressly made
aware of the three federal rights and that he voluntarily waived them).
The Ninth Circuit has refused to overrule or distinguish Pricepaul. United States v,
O'Neil, 545 F.2d 85, 86 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant's uncontradicted testimony that at
time of his 1948 plea he was not advised of his right to counsel, informed of the charges
or the consequences of his plea, invalidates conviction for purposes of establishing fed-
eral firearms violation).
333. See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 173 (1969).
334. United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant in
state custody pleading to federal offense should have been told sentence would not begin
to run until he was received in federal custody); McClure v. United States, 389 F.2d
279, 280 (9th Cir. 1968) (failure to advise defendant he could be sentenced as a youth
offender was error, although harmless in this case); Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d
356, 361 (9th Ci. 1964) (one who pleads without understanding that he will not be
eligible for parole or probation does not plead guilty with understanding of the conse-
quences).
335. 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 256 (1976).
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judge has no control. " " In United States v. Harris,37 the court did,
however, find that the accused must be informed of a special mandatory
parole term appended to his sentence 8 Still, the judge need not ex-
plain in detail the nature and consequences of this particular sanc-
tion.339
Rule 11 as amended requires only that the judge specifically inform
the accused of the mandatory minimum and possible maximum penalty
for the offense before accepting his plea of guilty.34 0 The Ninth Cir-
cuit applies its own standards in assessing the challenge to a plea made
in state court. Thus, where the state judge fails to inform the accused
of the maximum potential sentence, the plea is not "intelligently given"
and hence it is improper. 4 1  However, since this is merely a prophy-
lactic device to aid a reviewing court in making the ultimate determina-




Rule 11 continues to require that the court ascertain that the plea
is voluntary. 3 3 The Supreme Court has recognized that the normal
pressures present in the context of acceptable plea bargaining do not
336. Id. at 948-49. The court adopted the Second Circuit approach of excluding de-
portation as a "consequence." See Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d
Cir. 1974). The defendant would presumably be deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(11) (1970) (Attorney General can order alien convicted of violating drug control stat-
utes deported). But see Judge Browning's contention that a failure to advise an accused
that his plea subjects him to deportation "would drain the substance from the require-
ment that a guilty plea may be accepted only if made 'with full understanding of the
consequences.'" Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70, 74 (9th Cir.) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968).
337. 534 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1976).
338. Id. at 141-42. The Fourth Circuit suggested a somewhat different approach in
Bell v. United States, 521 F.2d 713, 715-16 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918
(1976) (failure to explain mandatory parole term is harmless error when final sen-
tence imposed does not exceed maximum sentence specified at arraignment).
339. Johnson v. United States, 539 F.2d 1241, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1976) (sufficient
for judge to simply state that special parole was mandatory for two years).
340. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
341. Pebworth v. Conte, 489 F.2d 266, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1974). Cf. Bellew v. Gunn,
532 F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976) (failure of court to
explicitly inform defendant of potential sentence prior to .1943 plea not improper in light
of explanations given by defendant's counsel).
342. Yellowwolf v. Morris, 536 F.2d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1976) (case remanded to
determine if under totality of circumstances, including failure to inform defendant of the
maximum sentence, plea was freely and knowingly given).
343. FED. R. CirM. P. 11(d).
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necessarily produce an involuntary guilty plea. 344  Hence, misinforma-
tion by counsel as to the maximum sentence does not make a plea bar-
gain induced thereby coerced or involuntary. 345 Nor does the fact that
the accused was unaware of a potential fourth amendment defense
render the plea involuntary.346 The cases indicate that it is very diffi-
cult to establish that the plea was not knowingly or freely given where
the accused was represented by counsel.347
4. Other Rule 11 Requirements
Rule 11 also requires that the court be satisfied there is a factual
basis for the plea 348 and that the accused be informed of and understand
the nature of the charges.3 49  As amended, rule 11 now sets forth a
more formal procedure for negotiating, accepting and rejecting plea
bargains. 350
5. Competency to Plea
A plea cannot be accepted as a binding determination of guilt if the
344. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755-57 (1970).
345. Micklus v. United States, 537 F.2d 381, 382 (9th Cir. 1976). The court rea-
soned that if Brady upheld a plea induced by fear of the death penalty, which penalty
was subsequently held to be invalid, then, a fortiori, pleading guilty in reliance upon
incorrect advice from defense counsel as to the maximum length of sentence does not
render such a plea involuntary. Id. However, the court did grant the defendant a hear-
ing on his claim that he was induced to plead by promises from the Assistant United
States Attorney which he alleged were not fulfilled. Id. at 382-83.
346. Johnson v. United States, 539 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1976) (failure of de-
fendant's counsel to disclose facts which would have revealed potential fourth amend-
ment defense did not produce an involuntary plea absent showing of incompetency of
counsel).
347. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-68 (1973) (when defendant pleads
guilty on advice of counsel, voluntariness looked at in reference to competence of coun-
sel). See also Johnson v. United States, 539 F.2d at 1243; Micklus v. United States,
537 F.2d at 383; Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d at 1291. But see Alschuler, The Supreme
Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. Rav. 1 (1976), in
which the author suggests that the Court has placed too much emphasis on the defense
attorney's presence and advice in determining that a plea is in fact voluntary.
348. FED. R. CRm. P. 11(f). See United States v. Neel, 547 F.2d 95, 96 (9th Cir.
1976) (per curiam) (requirement established since defendant admitted essential facts of
charge); United States v. Zuber, 528 F.2d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (co-
conspirator's guilty plea was without factual basis since he adamantly denied being part
of the "junket"--primary element of the conspiracy prosecution-and only admitted
loaning group money knowing they were equipped with false identifications).
349. FED. R. CraM. P. 11(c) (1). The Supreme Court, in Henderson v. Morgan, 426
U.S. 637 (1976), applied this requirement to the states, holding that a failure to ad-
vise the defendant that intent to cause death was an element of the offense of second
degree murder resulted in an involuntary plea and a denial of due process. Id. at 645-
47.
350. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e).
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person entering the plea is not mentally competent.35' A person is not
competent if he is under the influence of drugs, and the court must
establish that drugs are not affecting his competency before accepting
the plea.3"'
The Ninth Circuit requires a higher standard of competency for a
guilty plea than that necessary to stand trial.3 a The test is whether
a mental illness has substantially impaired the ability of the accused to
rationally choose between the alternatives available to him, and to un-
derstand the consequences of his plea and the gravity of the decision
with which he is faced.
354
This rule was both affirmed and clarified in De Kaplany v. Eno-
moto,3'5 in which the court tempered the rule's effect by holding it is not
error if a court taking the plea fails to specifically determine the defen-
dant's competency to plead guilty.356 A retroactive hearing on the com-
petency to enter the plea is an appropriate method of granting relief .
57
In Makal v. Arizona,355 the court on appeal applied retroactive review
of the defendant's competency to plead guilty to murder and affirmed
the conviction despite the fact no specific competency determination was
made at the time the plea was entered or at a subsequent hearing.350 The
court inferred competency from the record, emphasizing such factors
as the nature of the judge's general inquiry of the defendant, the fact
that the plea was entered with the support of counsel, a report from
two psychiatrists finding the defendant competent to stand trial, and the
fairness of the bargain which possibly induced the plea.360
351. 1 C. WRTr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 172, at 359-60 (1969).
352. See Mayes v. Pickett, 537 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
27 (1977) (heroin addict's admission he had not taken drugs for one month prior to
entering guilty plea coupled with court's observation that defendant did not appear
to be under influence rendered plea competent).
353. Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973). The higher standard
was imposed in recognition of the fact that a guilty plea operates as a waiver of a
number of significant constitutional rights. Id.
354. See Makal v. Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1976).
355. 540 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 815 (1977) (defendant
pled guilty after commencement of trial and interposed insanity defense).
356. Id. at 985.
357. Id. at 985-86. A hearing was held on the habeas corpus petition and the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's decision that defendant was competent. Id. at
986.
358. 544 F.2d ,1030 (9th Cir. 1976).
359. Id. at 1034.
360. Id. at 1034-35. The defendant was being retried after a reversal of his previous.
conviction in which he had been sentenced to death. The court felt that his present
19771
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6. Challenging the Plea
A guilty plea is usually challenged in federal court by a motion at-
tacking the sentence36 ' or a rule 32 motion to withdraw the plea. ' -0
A motion made under rule 32 before sentencing is freely allowed in
the interests of justice, subject to the court's discretion.3 63  After sen-
tencing, however, only a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct
manifest injustice will compel the court to grant the motion.30 4
D. Discovery
In accordance with the Jencks Act,3 05 the defendant in a federal case
is not permitted pretrial discovery of statements made by prospective
government witnesses. 360 The prosecution is, however, required to dis-
close the statement once the witness has testified at trial.30 7 Disclosure
at this point is important if there is to be effective cross-examination of
the declarant3
0 5
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Jencks Act is violated when law
enforcement agents destroy notes taken during interviews with poten-
tial witnesses.36 9  In two separate cases, United States v. Robinson370
plea to one instead of the original three counts of murder was calculated, competent and
a good bargain. Id.
361. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
362. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
363. Id. See United States v. Read, 534 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(no abuse of discretion to deny motion).
364. See United States v. Kay, 537 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) in which
the court construed this provision to apply to a defendant who sought to revoke his plea
prior to actual sentencing, but after he became aware of the sentences meted out to his
co-defendants. Id. at 1078. See United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 141, 141-42 (9th
Cir. 1976) (failure to advise defendant of special parole term entitled him to withdraw
plea; court treated it as § 2255 motion).
365. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
366. Id. § 3500(a).
367. Id. § 3500(b).
368. United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1976).
369. Id. at 1253; United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1976).
Several circuits have ruled that notes taken by a government agent during an interview
with the defendant and written summaries of an accused's oral statements are discover-
able under FED. R. CraM. P. 16. See United States v. Johnson, 525 F.2d 999, 1003-
04 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976); United States v. Fallen, 498 F.2d
172, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Krilich, 470 F.2d 341, 351 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 900
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967). Consistent with this holding, the Ninth
Circuit has held that rule 16 requires the preservation of notes taken by the police during
the course of an interview with a potential witness. United States v. Robinson, 546
F.2d at 312; United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976).
370. 546 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1976).
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and United States v. Harris,3 " the Government had argued that destruc-
tion of the notes was proper because the agents had incorporated the
contents thereof into a formal report. The Ninth Circuit held that these
notes and reports, taken during the course of an investigation, are sub-
ject to production at trial if the agent testifies.3 7 2  The practice of
destroying notes is not justified even though the police are acting in
good faith and according to routine department practice.
3 78
The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that the police may not destroy notes
given to them by government informants in situations where the notes
constitute a "statement" pursuant to the Jencks Act.3 74  In a recent
case,3 75 the court had to decide whether an informant's diary was a
"statement." The informant had made entries in the diary regarding
certain illegal activity and had then turned the diary over to law en-
forcement agents. An agent had incorporated the contents of the diary
into his report and then had shredded the diary. The Ninth Circuit
held that the diary was a "statement" within the meaning of the Jencks
Act and that the destruction thereof, although arguably in good faith,376
was improper.3
77
371. 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976).
372. Id. at 1248-49. See also United States v. Johnson, 521 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th
Cir. 1975); United States v. McSweaney, 507 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1975). Hand-
written notes taken by the police during a criminal investigation are "statements" under
the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1970). United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247,
1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 430-31 n.25 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
373. United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1976). Although some decisions have criticized
the police practice of destroying notes, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d '180,
201-02 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); United States v. Thomas, 282 F.2d
191, 194 (2d Cir. 1960), several circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have approved the
practice. United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 909 (1975); Wilke v. United States, 422 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 1970). For
this reason, the rule that police notes must be preserved will not be applied retroactively.
United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d at 312.
374. United States v. Carrasco, 537 F.2d 372, 376 (9th Cir. 1976).
375. Id.
376. In Carrasco, the court stated that whether or not the agent's conduct in destroy-
ing the diary was routine, "it was manifestly unreasonable in light of the expressed Con-
gressional intent, and is no less a violation of the Jencks Act because it was pursued
in good faith." 537 F.2d at 376. See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 431-
32 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Perry, 471 F.2d 1057, 1062-66 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
In Ogden v. United States, 323 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973
(1964), the Ninth Circuit had expressly left open the question of whether sanctions are
to be imposed if a statement which is producible is destroyed in good faith. Id. at 820-
21.
377. 537 F.2d at 375-76. Cf. Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 101-03 (1976)
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When a defendant seeks disclosure of the name and whereabouts
of a government informant, the court must perform the difficult task
of balancing the defendant's ability to prepare his defense against the
public interest in protecting the undisturbed flow of information.378 In
Roviaro v. United States,3 71 the Supreme Court held that the Govern-
ment can be compelled to disclose the identity of an informant only
if the informant's testimony would be sufficiently "relevant and help-
ful. 3s 0 The Ninth Circuit adheres to the Roviaro rule.3 81
The Ninth Circuit does, however, endorse the use of in camera
proceedings to determine the relevancy and helpfulness of the in-
formant's testimony.82 The judge may interview the informant during
the hearing to determine the significance of his testimony.38 3 Mere
speculation that the informant's testimony might help the defendant's
case is insufficient to overcome the public interest in protecting infor-
mants.3 8 4  The burden of proof is on the defendant to show the need
for disclosure.
38 5
(Jencks Act only applies to discovery of "statements" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(e)).
The Ninth Circuit also held in 1976 that a "tape recording" is a statement "made by
the defendant" within the meaning of FED. R. Caim. P. 16(a)(1). United States v.
Walker, 538 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1976). In so holding, the court accepted the pre-
cedent established by other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. James, 495 F.2d 434,
435-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d
642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Davis v. United States, 413 F.2d 1226, 1231 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Isa, 413 F.2d 244, 248-49 (7th Cir. 1969).
378. United States v. Bigelow, No. 75-3845, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1976).
379. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
380. Id. at 60.
381. United States v. Bigelow, No. 75-3845, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1976);
United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Kelly,
449 F.2d 329, 330 (9th Cir. 1971).
382. United States v. Bigelow, No. 75-3845, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1976);
United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5, 7 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984
(1974).
383. United States v. Bigelow, No. 75-3845, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1976).
In Bigelow, the defendant had offered facts which tended to show that the informant
was present during the alleged criminal event. The court held that if the Government
could not demonstrate a legitimate interest in keeping the informant's identity confiden-
tial, then the defendant's showing amounted to a prima facie case, and the informant's
identity would have to be disclosed. Id. at 5. The Bigelow court distinguished United
States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923
(1976) and United States v. Alvarez, 472 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 921 (1973), on the grounds that these earlier cases had concerned informants
whose testimony was relevant only to motions to suppress, not to the determination of
guilt.
384. United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1976).
385. Id. See also United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975),
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The discovery by a defendant of the names and addresses of percipi-
ent government witnesses is governed by rule 16.386 Discovery under
rule 16 is within the judge's discretion and his decision will not be dis-
turbed without showing clear abuse of discretion. 8 7 The defendant must
make a showing that the information requested is "material" to the prep-
aration of his defense and that the request is "reasonable."3 s8 "Mate-
riality" means that the evidence would permit the accused to substan-
tially alter the quantum of proof in his favor.3"9 "Reasonableness"
means that the request is not burdensome to the Government and that
it is framed in specific language, stating precisely what information is
needed.3 90
In United States v. Miller,39' the defendant was convicted of prepar-
ing false income tax statements for his clients. Although the defense
attorney had made a request for all "Brady materials, ' 392 the prosecu-
tion had suppressed a statement by a Mr. Mills, an employee of the
defendant, that he (Mills) had prepared some of the tax returns. The
Government did disclose the statement just prior to the end of defen-
dant's case. The court stated that the issue was not non-disclosure
under Brady,393 but the appropriateness of the timing of the disclo-
sure.39 4  The Ninth Circuit held that, although disclosure should have
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Alvarez, 472 F.2d 111, 113 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973); United States v. Estrada, 441 F.2d 873, 879
(9th Cir. 1971); Gaylor v. United States, 426 F.2d 233, 234-35 (9th Cir. 1970).
386. FED. R. CalM. P. 16.
387. United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1976). See also
United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 870 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950
(1975); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 175 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 940 (1974); Mullins v. United States, 487 F.2d 581, 589 (8th Cir. 1973); Holt
v. United States, 272 F.2d 272, 276-77 (9th Cir. 1959).
388. United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 391 (1976).
389. United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir.' 1976).
390. Id. Accord, United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1975).
391. 529 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976).
392. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme Court held that sup-
pression by the Government of evidence favorable to an accused upon his request vio-
lates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irre-
spective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. See also United States v.
Valdivia, 492 F.2d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
393. In Brady, there was complete suppression by the prosecution of exculpatory evi-
dence.
394. The Miller court stated that the issue was "whether the lateness of the disclosure
so prejudiced appellant's preparation or preservation of his defense that he was prevented
from receiving his constitutionally-guaranteed fair trial." 529 F.2d 1125, 1128 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976). See also United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d
455, 459 (9th Cir. 1972).
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been made earlier, there was no prejudice to the defendant under the
facts of the case. 95
E. Right to Jury Trial
The United States Constitution guarantees trial by jury in criminal
cases.3 96 While defendants accused of serious crimes must have the
opportunity to elect a jury trial, defendants accused of "petty offenses"
do not have this right.397 Defining the scope of this right thus requires
a determination of what constitutes a serious as opposed to a petty
offense.398
In United States v. Sanchez-Meza,30 9 petitioner had been convicted
of conspiracy to elude examination by immigration officers by making
false and misleading representations, an offense with a maximum po-
tential sentence of six months.4 00 The district court judge had denied
defendant's motion for a jury trial, relying upon the legislative deter-
mination that the crime charged was subject only to a six month maxi-
mum potential sentence and therefore should properly be classified as
a "petty offense."40' The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that con-
spiracy was an indictable and serious offense at common law,10' and
therefore the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for a jury trial
was improper and required reversal of defendant's conviction.403
III. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. Right to Counsel
1. The Right to Appointed Counsel
When a person is charged with a crime and is financially unable to
395. 529 F.2d at 1128-29. See also United States v. Diaz-Rodriquez, 478 F.2d 1005,
1008 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 964 (1973).
396. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
397. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Frank v. United States,
395 U.S. 147, 148 (1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1968);
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557
(1888).
398. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. at 69 n.6 (court will look both to na-
ture of offense and maximum potential sentence); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282
U.S. 63, 73-74 (1930) (malum in se offense gives rise to right to jury trial).
399. 547 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1976).
400. Id. at 462. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1970) (object of conspiracy a misdemeanor);
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (if object of conspiracy is misdemeanor, punishment for such
conspiracy shall not exceed maximum punishment provided for the objective).
401. See United States v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1976) (by im-
plication) (Carter, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 464. To resolve the "petty" versus "serious" offense issue, the court must
look to see whether conspiracy was triable Without a jury at common law or at the time
the Constitution was adopted. Conspiracy at common law was not a "petty offense."
403. Id.
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retain an attorney, the court must appoint one to act in his behalf.40
The problem is for a court to determine which defendants are financi-
ally disabled.405 In United States v. Ellsworth,400 the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that in order to be entitled to a court-appointed attorney, a de-
fendant must fully complete the court's Financial Affidavit form, CJA
23. A conclusory allegation of poverty will not suffice. One must
prove his indigency with specificity.407
The indigent defendant is not free to choose the particular attorney
who will undertake" his defense.4 8 A corollary of this rule is that,
absent a compelling reason for substitution of counsel, a motion for
a continuance so that a new attorney may be appointed will be
denied. 0 9
Once incarcerated, an indigent prisoner may have a statutory right
to appointed counsel in order to bring a civil action against the police
for alleged wrongful activities leading to his arrest, conviction and incar-
ceration.410 The court may deny the prisoner's request only upon a
finding that the action is either "frivolous" or "malicious."4'' A district
court cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the indigent prisoner's
request. 412 It must make a factual finding with regard to the legitimacy
of that request. If it fails to do so, the appellate court will remand
404. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Although Gideon relied upon the sixth amendment right to counsel, as applied to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court
has also invoked the equal protection clause to guarantee an indigent's right to counsel
on a non-discretionary appeal of right. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Cf. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 609-10 (1974) (holding Douglas inapplicable to a dis-
cretionary appeal).
405. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 720 (1948) (sixth amendment guar-
antees appointed counsel to one unable to hire a lawyer). 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970)
provides for each United States District Court to promulgate rules to determine who is
"financially unable to obtain adequate representation."
406. 547 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2636 (1977).
407. Id. at 1098. See also United States v. Schmitz, 525 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir.
1975) (conclusory affidavit of poverty does not fulfill burden of proof necessary to ob-
tain free trial transcript under Criminal Justice Act).
408. See People v. Hughes, 57 Cal. 2d 89, 367 P.2d 33, 17 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1961)
(court not obliged to appoint private attorney requested by accused in place of the public
defender).
409. See United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 1103 (1977). Cf. Lofton v. Procunier, 487 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1973) (de-
fendant cannot be coerced into accepting attorney who cannot serve effectively).
410. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970).
411. Id.
412. Cancino v. Sanchez, 379 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1967).
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the case back to the trial court with instructions to make such a find-
ing.
4 13
2. Critical Stages-The Scope of the Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court has interpreted the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee of the assistance of counsel for an accused to apply to any critical
stage of the criminal proceedings against him.414 A problem area has
been the determination of what constitutes the initiation of an adversary
proceeding as opposed to mere investigation.415 In United States v.
DeVaughn,4 1 6 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant who was baited
into making incriminating statements by a government informant after
charges against him had been dropped did not have a right to receive
"right to counsel" warnings.41 7 The court reasoned that the defendant
was not under indictment at the time of the conversation and that suffi-
cient evidence might never have been obtained to indict him after his
first dismissal.
418
The Supreme Court has held that the constitutional right to counsel
applies to misdemeanor prosecutions.41 9 Prior to the enactment of the
413. See Alexander v. Ramsey, 539 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United
States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1965).
414. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (preliminary hearing a
critical stage); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1968) (sentencing a critical
stage) White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (initial appearance before magis-
trate a critical stage since non-binding plea could subsequently be used as evidence
at defendant's trial). Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975) (judicial deter-
mination of probable cause following arrest may be made without adversary hearing or
participation by defense counsel).
415. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (post-indictment line-
up entails right to counsel); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966) (de-
fendant has right to counsel after taken into custody and charged); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (suspect who is focus of investigation, and who has been
taken into custody, has sixth amendment right to counsel); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (right to counsel applies after defendant federally indicted).
Cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (pre-indictment line-up may not con-
stitute initiation of adversary proceeding).
416. 541 F.2d 808 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 97 . Ct. 501 (1976).
417. Id. at 809. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966) (law en-
forcement officers have no duty to halt investigation when they have minimum evidence
to establish probable cause); United States v. King, 472 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) (defendants did not have to be warned of their right to
counsel before talking to federal informant since they had not been indicted or taken
into custody).
418. 541 F.2d at 810.
419. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 7 (1972) (no person may be imprisoned
for any offense, no matter how classified, unless represented by counsel).
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Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 this right did not extend to American
Indians appearing before a tribal court.42 While an Indian now has
the right to the assistance of counsel if retained at his own expense,421
in Tom v. Sutton422 the Ninth Circuit found that the "due process"
clause of the Ac4 2 3 did not give the defendant a right to appointed
counsel in criminal proceedings before the tribal court.
42 4
3. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The constitutional right to counsel implies some degree of compe-
tency on the part of defense counsel. The Supreme Court has rarely
had occasion to examine this question, but has generally stated that a
defendant has a right to "effective assistance of counsel. ' 425 It has left
the test for assessing the effectiveness of counsel primarily to the lower
courts.42 6
The different judicial circuits are divided on the proper test.427 The
Ninth Circuit has for the most part taken the position that a court should
not "reverse a judgment of conviction unless a defendant's representa-
tion has been so inadequate as to make his trial a farce, sham, or
mockery of justice. ' 421 Occasionally the court has stated the test in
420. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). See Settler v. Tamur, 507 F.2d 231, 241 (9th Cir.
1974) (Indian did not have right to counsel prior to Act when appearing before
tribal court). Accord, Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (fifth amendment
inapplicable to Cherokee Nation).
421. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1970).
422. 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976).
423. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970).
424. 533 F.2d at 1105-06.
425. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942); Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
426. [D]efendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of
competent counsel. Beyond this we think the matter, for most part, should be left
to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that [they]
should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys .. repre-
senting defendants in criminal cases ....
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
427. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (extensive discussion
of other cases in various circuits). See also Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Repre-
sentation as a Ground for Post Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv.
289 (1964); Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present and Future, 49 VA. L. Rv.
1150 (1963).
428. United States v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033
(1975) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 677 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974); United States v. Ortiz, 488 F.2d 175,
177 (9th Cir. 1973); Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir. 1963); Stan-
ley v. United States, 239 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir. 1956).
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terms of whether counsel has rendered "reasonably effective" assis-
tance.4 29  The difference, however, appears to be more one of label
than of substance inasmuch as the court has sometimes cited both lines
of cases at the same time.
430
Applying the aforementioned test(s), the Ninth Circuit rejected all
attempts last year to overturn convictions on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel.4 31  It appears that for such an objection to suc-
ceed there must be a total failure of the defense attorney to present
critical defenses.4 3 - It is difficult to carry this burden of proof.
A tangential problem arises where a defendant is represented by the
same attorney as his alleged co-conspirator, and subsequently tries to
overturn the conviction by charging that the conflict of interest between
himself and the co-conspirator rendered the attorney's assistance inef-
fective.4 33  In United States v. Kutas,434 defendant failed in such an
attempt since she could not show that a conflict actually existed which
429. United States v. Elksnis, 528 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Smith, 446 F.2d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 915 (1974); Bru-
baker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
Another line of cases phrases the test as whether the circumstances show a denial of
fundamental fairness. See United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); Mengarelli v. United States, 476 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir.
1973).
430. See Gardner v. Griggs, 541 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974) (uses
the mockery test, but cites Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963)). But cf. DeKaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 987 (9th
Cir. 1976) (en banc) (acknowledges there are different standards being used within cir-
cuit).
431. Corum v. Gunn, 545 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Gardner v. Griggs,
541 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 845, 848-49 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1103 (1977) (using fundamental fairness test court
found failure to raise defense of duress did not constitute ineffective assistance of coun-
sel given facts presented in trial transcript); DeKaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 986-
87 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (trial tactic of going straight to insanity phase of the
trial so jury would not be exposed to photographs of torture inflicted upon the victim by
defendant was valid tactical measure to avoid jury prejudice); Founts v. Pogue, 532 F.2d
1232, 1234-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976) (appellant's alibi defense
shown to be properly handled by trial counsel).
432. See Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1973). Cf. Lofton v. Procunier, 487 F.2d 434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1973) (held: a
defendant cannot be coerced into accepting designated counsel when that counsel cannot
serve effectively in case where new public defender appointed ten minutes before trial).
433. See United States v. Nystrom, 447 F.2d 1350, 1351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 993 (1971),
434. 542 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 810 (1977).
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prejudiced her rights. 35 Defendants who insist on joint representation
before trial, and fail to object to the supposed conflict of interest at the
time of that trial will have a difficult time sustaining this objection on
appeal. 43
6
4. The Right to Proceed Pro Se
Recently the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal
action has an independent constitutional right of self-representation and
can thereby elect to conduct his or her own defense.4 37  In United
States v. Kelley,138 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position that the
right to proceed pro se does not include the right to be represented
by a non-lawyer.43 9
B. Bail
In Magisano v. Focke,440 the defendant argued that he should be
released on bail pending his appeal of the denial of a writ of habeas
corpus.441  The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not err
in refusing to permit release on bail, given "the indication . . . that
the appellant . . . would undertake to flee from reapprehension if
given the opportunity .... -442
435. Id. at 529. See also United States v. Nystrom, 447 F.2d 1350, 1351 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971); Davidson v. Cupp, 446 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir.
1971); Carlson v. Welson, 443 F.2d 21, 22 (9th Cir. 1971).
436. See United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 810 (1977); Davidson v. Cupp, 446 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1971) (burden lies
with petitioner).
437. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
438. 539 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 393 (1976).
439. Id. at 1203. See also United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1191-92 (9th Cir.
1975).
440. 545 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1976).
441. Defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus to prevent his extradition to Canada.
442. 545 F.2d at 1230. The district judge is given great discretion in this area. The
following provisions illustrate the scope of that discretion:
Pending review of a decision failing or refusing to release a prisoner in [a habeas
corpus] proceeding, the prisoner may be detained in the custody from which re-
lease is sought . . . as may appear fitting to the court or justice or judge rendering
the decision, or to the court of appeals or to the Supreme Court, or to a judge or
justice of either court.
FED. R. App. P. 23(b) (emphasis added).
A person . . .who has been convicted of an offense [who] . .. has filed an appeal
should be treated in accordance with the provision of section 3146 unless the court
...has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably
assure that the person will not flee . . . . If such a wish of flight . . . is believed
to exist. . . the person may be ordered detained.
18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1970) (emphasis added). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1)-(5) (1970)
(all-inclusive list of conditions that judge may employ when he releases defendant in
non-capital case prior to trial).
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C. Right to Speedy Trial
1. Pre-accusatorial Delay
a. When Does the Speedy Trial Right Vest?
The right to a speedy trial is not violated by delay between offense
and indictment, although it may be violated by an inordinate delay in
the return of the indictment after the arrest is made.4 43  The statute
of limitations is a device which affords protection to the defendant
against prosecutorial delay.444  In United States v. Clardy,44" the court
held that two prisoners who had attacked a fellow inmate had not been
arrested when they were placed in segregated confinement.44*  Thus,
the defendants right to a speedy trial had not been violated.
"Ordinarily the right to speedy trial means speedy trial on an exist-
ing charge, so successive prosecutions, as such, do not violate it."'447 In
United States v. Poll,448 the Ninth Circuit applied this rule where the
initial conviction of a defendant was reversed449 and the Government,
instead of pursuing the remand, secured a new indictment on a differ-
ent charge. The court held that the substantial passage of time be-
tween the original and subsequent indictments did not violate the
speedy trial provision of the Constitution.
450
The Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar problem in United States
v. Cordova.451  In Cordova, fourteen months had elapsed between de-
443. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (putative defendant must
become an accused for speedy trial right to vest); United States v. Andros, 484 F.2d
531, 533 (9th Cir. 1973) (right vests after defendant is indicted or held to answer);
United States v. Erickson, 472 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1973) (right to speedy trial
comes into play when formal complaint is lodged); United States v. Griffin, 464 F.2d
1352, 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972) (post-indictment delay before
arrest not shown to'be prejudicial).
444. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 323 (1971); United States v. Poll,
538 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 486 (1976).
445. 540 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1976).
446. Id. at 441 (segregated confinement not de facto arrest). Cf. Dillingham v.
United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (sixth amendment right to speedy trial vests when
one is arrested). Generally, prisoners in jail for the conviction of another offense have
standing to allege a speedy trial violation. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434
(1973).
447. 21 AM. Ju. 2D Criminal Law § 245 (1965) (footnote omitted). Cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(e) (Supp. V 1975) (retrial must commence sixty days from date of mistrial).
448. 538 F.2d 845 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 486 (1976).
449. United States v. Poll, 521 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975).
450. 538 F.2d at 848.
451. 537 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 385 (1976).
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fendant's arrest on a state charge and his subsequent indictment by a
federal grand jury on charges stemming from the same transaction.
The court ruled that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial on
the federal charge was not activated until the indictment was re-
turned.452
b. Due Process
Undue delay in the filing of charges, after a case has been fully
investigated, may interfere with a defendant's ability to defend himself
and thereby constitute a denial of due process under the fifth amend-
ment.4.3  Pre-accusatorial delay may be viewed as a violation of due
process if the defendant can show either that he suffered substantial
prejudice on account of the delay or that the government deliberately
delayed to gain a tactical advantage.454 Therefore, the defendant must
show a specific example of prejudice or tactical advantage, or the objec-
tion will fail.4 55 Reflecting the difficulty in carrying this burden of
proof, the Ninth Circuit refused to overturn several convictions attacked
on this ground in 1976.456
In a related area, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant waives all
due process objections to pre-accusatorial delay when he enters a valid
guilty plea.457
452. Id. at 1075. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) is not applicable
to the state arrest because this was a different charge brought by a different sovereignty;
an application of the general rule that a substantial interval between successive prosecu-
tions does not per se violate one's right to a speedy trial.
453. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). The Court held that,
absent a showing of actual prejudice, the defendant's "due process claims . . . [were]
speculative and premature." Id. at 326.
454. See United States v. Manning, 509 F.2d 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Andros, 484 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Erickson, 472
F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1973).
455. United States v. Griffin, 464 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972).
456. See United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1976) (three year
delay between commission of narcotics offense and commencement of prosecution held
not to violate defendants' due process rights despite death of witnesses and subsequent
loss of physical evidence); United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1976)
(given good reasons for delay, witnesses' lack of memory will not constitute actual pre-
judice); United States v. Poll, 538 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 486
(1976) (no allegation of prejudice or tactical advantage).
457. United States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 1976) (waiver of
right to speedy trial). See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 288 (1975) (free and
intelligent guilty plea bars all later constitutional challenges to pre-trial proceedings).
But cf. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (guilty plea does not waive double
jeopardy protection of fifth amendment).
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2. Post-accusatorial Delay
a. Sixth Amendment Protection
The right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment is
relative, and each case must be judged on an ad hoc basis." 58 In
Barker v. Wingo,459 the Supreme Court formulated a balancing test
which should be used in determining whether a defendant's speedy trial
rights have been violated. The trial court should consider four factors:
(1) the length of delay; (2) the Government's justification for the de-
lay; (3) whether the defendant made an assertion of his right; and (4)
any prejudice incurred by defendant as a result of the delay.4 0 These
factors are interrelated and "must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have
no talismanic qualities; courts must . . . engage in [this] difficult . . .
balancing process . . .with full recognition that the accused's interest
in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution.
4 0 1
The Ninth Circuit, in reliance upon the Supreme Court's language
in Barker,40 2 has analyzed the length of delay factor as the mechanism
that triggers the initial inquiry into alleged violations of the petitioner's
right to a speedy trial.463  In United States v. Simmons, 4 4 the court
held that a six-month delay between indictment and trial raised a pre-
sumption of prejudice and triggered inquiry into the other factors in
the balancing process.40 5 It is important to note that consideration of
the length of the delay is only used to determine whether further judi-
458. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S.
77, 87 (1905); Stuart v. Craven, 456 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1972).
459. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
460. Id. at 530-32. See also Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 957 (1976); Stuart v. Craven, 456 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1972).
Prejudice to a defendant is assessed according to the three interests which the right
to speedy trial is designed to protect: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarcera-
tion; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting of the
possibility that the defendant's defense is impaired. 407 U.S. at 532.
461. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973) (per curiam) (quoting Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972)).
462. 407 U.S. at 530.
463. See United States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1975).
464. 536 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1976).
465. Id. at 831. Accord, United States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1976)
(delay of twelve months between indictment and trial warranted further inquiry); Paine
v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1976) (ten month delay sufficient to trigger
judicial scrutiny); United States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1975) (six year
delay sufficient to trigger inquiry).
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cial scrutiny is justified. The length of the delay is not dispositive of
the speedy trial issue.466
In Simmons, the district court found a violation of the defendant's
speedy trial rights and dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court had abused its
discretion in dismissing the action. 67 Applying the Barker balancing
test, the court stated that although the delay was occasioned by the Gov-
ernment's own negligence, this deficiency was counterbalanced by the
defendant's failure to assert his right to speedy trial. More importantly,
the delay did not result in serious prejudice.46 Consequently, the case
was reversed and remanded for trial.469
In United States v. Graham,470 it was decided that a twelve-and-one-
half month delay occasioned by the Government's negligence did not
violate the petitioner's right to a speedy trial.4 71 The court emphasized
that it was relying heavily upon the absence of any showing that there
was impairment of the petitioner's defense. 72 Although the test is not
solely one of prejudice,473 the court clearly indicated that it considers
this factor "by far the most important variable" when applying the
Barker balancing test.474
b. Statutory Protection
In United States v. Carpenter,475 the defendant was arrested and
466. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (passage of nineteen
months between arrest and hearings not violative per se of one's right to speedy trial);
Stuart v. Craven, 456 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1972) (thirteen-month delay not per se
violation of right to speedy trial).
In Barker v. Wingo, the length of the delay was greater than five years. This par-
ticular delay was held not sufficient to constitute a speedy trial violation since it ap-
peared from the trial court record that Barker did not really want a speedy trial. 407
U.S. at 536.
467. 536 F.2d at 832.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 838.
470. 538 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1976).
471. Id. at 266.
472. Id. at 265. See note 460 supra, describing those interests which the right to a
speedy trial is designed to protect.
473. See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973) (per curiam) (state court ruled that
showing of prejudice is necessary to establish speedy trial claim; Supreme Court reversed
and remanded case to lower court to consider other factors).
474. 538 F.2d at 266. See Note, The United States Courts of Appeals: 1974-1975
Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 64 GEo. L.J. 167, 571 n.2610 (1975) (reference
to other circuits emphasizing prejudice as most important factor in applying balancing
test).
475. 542 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1976).
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charged with a federal offense. He was released on bail and placed
in state custody to await parole revocation proceedings initiated because
of his arrest on the federal charge. The federal trial was scheduled
for February 17, 1976 but a delay until April 6 was necessitated by
the crowded court calendar. The defendant had been arrested on Oc-
tober 23, 1975. The district court dismissed the case in reliance upon
the Speedy Trial Act. 70  The Ninth Circuit, finding the Speedy Trial
Act inapplicable, reversed and remanded the case for trial.
477
Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was utilized
to support the dismissal with prejudice of an indictment by the district
court in United States v. Simmons. 478 The Ninth Circuit stated that
"under Rule 48(b) it is within the court's inherent power to dismiss
a case with prejudice for want of prosecution, whether or not there has
been a Sixth Amendment violation. '479  The court decided that such
a dismissal "should be utilized with caution, and only after a forewarn-
ing to prosecutors of the consequences. '480  The court held that since
476. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975).
477. 542 F.2d at 1134.
The Speedy Trial Act, which took effect ninety days from July 1, 1975, provides
some protection to persons who are being detained solely because they are awaiting
trial. The Act provides that if such person is not brought to trial within ninety days,
that person must immediately be released from confinement for the entire remaining
period pending that trial. 'See United States v. Tirasso, .532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.
1976). The reason for the delay is irrelevant, so long as it is not caused by the ac-
cused or his counsel. Id. at 1299. The statute is clear and unambiguous; the defen-
dant must be released in spite of the likelihood that he will flee the jurisdiction. Id. at
1300-01. See also United States v. Masko, 415 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Wis. 1976). Cf.
Moore v. United States, 525 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1975) (in determining the ninety day
limit, judge may exclude time consumed in determining defendant's mental competency
to stand trial; during that period defendant is not being held solely because he is await-
ing trial).
It is now clear that the period of delay excluded by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (Supp. V
1975) also applies in computing the ninety day imprisonment-to-trial period mandated by
section 3164. See United States v. Masko, 415 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
Section 3164 of the Speedy Trial Act was not applicable in Carpenter since the de-
fendant was released from custody and charges against him were dismissed. 542 F.2d
at 1134. Dismissal of charges is not one of the sanctions that may be imposed under
the section. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c) (Supp. V 1975). The only other section of the Act
that could have applied is section 3161(g). However, the relevant part of this section
will not go into effect until July 1, 1979. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(g), (c), 3162(a) (2),
3163(c) (Supp. V 1975).
478. 536 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1976). "[I]f there is unnecessary delay in bring-
ing a defendant [who has been held to answer in district court] to trial, the court may
dismiss the indictment .... ." FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
479. 536 F.2d at 833-34.
480. Id. at 836.
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"the United States Attorney was not forewarned that dismissal with
prejudice might result," 81 the district court had abused its discretion




The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona
48 3
requires the government to warn all suspects of certain rights prior to
any custodial interrogation.484 The suspect must .be informed of his
right to remain silent, of his right to the assistance of counsel, and he
must be told that any statement he makes may be used against him.48 5
It is not necessarily an error if the warning fails to inform the suspect
of his right to have an attorney actually present during the interroga-
tion.48 6  While statements obtained in violation of the Miranda warn-
ings may not be used against a suspect at his subsequent trial,4 7 com-
pliance will not assure admissibility if under -the totality of circum-
stances the confession was involuntary.48 8
Miranda places the burden on the government of proving that the
warnings were given and that a knowing waiver of these rights was ob-
tained .48  This burden is not carried by mere repetition of the warn-
ings; neither is it met by waivers given at distant times 9.49  However,
481. Id. at 837-38. Defendant argued that the "Western District of Washington Plan
for the Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases" fulfilled the necessary warning require-
ment to the United States Attorney. Id. at 836. The argument failed since § 4
of the Plan did not properly inform the prosecution that a violation of the Plan would
result in a dismissal of the action with prejudice. Id. at 837 & n.51.
482. Id. at 837-38.
483. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
484. Id. at 467-73.
485. Id.
486. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 365-66 (9th Cir. 1976) (such an omis-
sion is not fatal in that defendant interrupted the warnings to state he was aware of
his rights). But see Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 163 (9th Cir. 1969) (warnings held
inadequate because defendant was not informed he had right to presence of an attorney
and that an attorney could be appointed to represent him prior to any questioning).
487. 384 U.S. at 479.
488. Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969). 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970) lists some
of the factors to be considered in determining a confession's voluntary character. Con-
fessions were held not to have violated the voluntariness test in United States v. Ed-
wards, 539 F.2d 689, 691 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant who had been arrested 125 miles
from nearest magistrate confessed after six hours of confinement) and United States v.
O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1976) (district court's finding that statement was
voluntary will not be reversed in absence of clear error).
489. 384 U.S. at 479.
490. United States v. Womack, 542 F.2d 1047, 1050-51. (9th Cir. 1976).
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a waiver may be implied from the circumstances and may occur despite
an earlier demand to speak with an attorney.49' While the question
of whether a confession is involuntary must initially be decided by the
trial court,492 the Supreme Court has not established whether such a
preliminary determination is required to demonstrate compliance with
Miranda. The Ninth Circuit in United States v. McDaniel493 held that
before the jury can decide whether a defendant received proper warn-
ings, a preliminary determination of that fact must be made by the trial
judge.49 4
A. When Miranda Warnings are Required
Under the Miranda decision, a suspect is required to be advised
of his rights "when [he] is first subjected to police interrogation while
in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way. ' 9 5  The Supreme Court, in Beckwith v. United
States,4 96 clarified this requirement by holding that the warnings do not
attach in a setting of non-coercive questioning by agents of the Internal
Revenue Service, even though the suspect may be the "focus" of the
government's investigation. 497  The compulsiveness of the situation
(generally judged by the nature of the custody) is the triggering device
for the warnings.498  Although the Supreme Court has not yet provided
a clear standard for determining at what point general questioning is
considered custodial questioning, 49 the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its
491. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1976).
492. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 395-96 (1969).
493. 545 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1976).
494. Id. at 644. The case was reversed and remanded so that the government agent
who claimed to have given the warnings could be sufficiently cross-examined. After the
cross-examination the trial judge must rule on whether adequate warnings were given.
495. 384 U.S. at 477.
496. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
497. Id. at 345. In Beckwith the defendant was being questioned by IRS agents in
his home regarding his federal tax liability. The Ninth Circuit had already taken the
position that "Miranda clearly abandoned 'focus of investigation' as a test to determine
when rights attach in confession cases." Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1396
(9th Cir. 1969).
498. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976). See United States v.
Walker, 538 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (Miranda warnings not re-
quired because defendant, who was free on bail, was not in custody when he voluntarily
met with government agents in United States Attorney's office).
499. Miranda did not criticize the common police practice of general "on-the-scene"
inquiries; Miranda warnings are necessary once the suspect is placed in formal custody.
United States v. Casimiro-Benitez, 533 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1976) (Government
conceded that once suspect was placed in police car he was in custody for purposes of
Miranda).
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position that, at least in international border encounters, Miranda warn-
ings need not be given an individual entering the United States until
customs agents have probable cause to believe the person to be ques-
tioned committed an offense.
5 00
A further narrowing of what is to be regarded as a custodial interro-
gation was created by the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Mandujano,510 in which the Court refused to apply Miranda to a
"putative defendant" who was testifying as a witness before a grand
jury and who was subsequently convicted for the false statements made
while so testifying.50 2  The Court reasoned that a grand jury setting
provided adequate safeguards not present during a police custodial in-
terrogation, and that since the witness had been advised of his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and of his limited sixth
amendment privilege to consult with counsel, the witness' rights had
been protected. 508
B. Compliance with Miranda and the Right to Consultation
Once a suspect invokes his right to silence or counsel, "the interroga-
tion must cease." 5 4  But as the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Michigan v. Mosley5°5 illustrated, such an action on the part of the sus-
pect will not automatically prevent a subsequent interrogation. 0 6 In
500. United States v. Golden, 532 F.2d 1244, 1246 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
This subjective approach is contrary to the objective test for determining if an individual
is in custody, which has been stated-as follows:
[W:hether or not the police have probable cause for arresting the suspect, has no
relevance as to when the person's right to receive warnings attaches.
W hether a person is in custody should not be determined by what the
officer or the person being questioned thinks; there should be an objective stan-
dard . . It is the officer's statements and acts, the surrounding circumstances,
gauged by a "reasonable man" test, which are determinative.
Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1964). Perhaps the unique
situation encountered at border crossings explains these different approaches taken by
the Ninth Circuit, although a purportedly objective standard was employed in United
States v. Luther, 521 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) in holding that ques-
tioning at the secondary 'inspection office in San Ysidro need not be prefaced with a
Miranda warning.
501. 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
502. Id. at 578-79. Accord, United States v. Kelly, 540 F.2d 990, 992-93 (9th Cir.
1976) (defendant, having been advised of his fifth amendment rights, was not required
to have been given complete Miranda warning before testifying in front of grand jury).
503. 425 U.S. at 579-80. The Court did not pass on whether any warnings should
have been given. Id. at 582 n.7.
504. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 473-74 (1966).
505. 423 U.s. 96 (1975).
506. Id. at 103-06.
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Mosley, the defendant, after asserting his right to silence, was later
questioned by a different police officer about a completely different
crime. The Court upheld the admissions made at the subsequent inter-
rogation session, choosing to construe Miranda as only requiring that
a suspect's "'right to cut off questioning' [be] 'scrupulously hon-
ored,' -507 and finding that the circumstances of the case indicated com-
pliance with this standard.508
In two significant footnotes 509 the Mosley Court distinguished the
defendant's situation from a situation in which a defendant is asserting
his right to counsel. The Court suggested that when a suspect requests
the presence of counsel, all interrogation must cease until counsel is
present.5 10 The Ninth Circuit has also recognized this distinction. In
United States v. Womack,5 1' the court held that incriminating statements
elicited after the defendant twice requested c6unsel were obtained in
violation of Miranda, citing the Mosley decision.512 In United States
v. Flores-Calvillo,51 a a different panel concluded that Mosley required
the adoption of a per se rule requiring the exclusion of incriminating
statements obtained in a renewed interrogation after the suspect re-
quested the presence of counsel.514  The fact that Miranda warnings
were given before the subsequent interrogation session will not be suf-
ficient to remedy the violation.51 5 A later opinion in United States v.
507. Id. at 104.
508. Id. at 104-07. The Court relied on the fact that after the defendant chose to
remain silent the interrogation immediately ceased; the suspect was not questioned until
two hours later on another matter, at which time he was again given Miranda warnings;
and that it was not an attempt to wear down the defendant by repeated interrogation
sessions.
509. 423 U.S. at 101 n.7, 104 n.10.
510. "Mhe Court in Miranda ... distinguished between the procedural safeguards
triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney and directed that
'the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present' only '[i]f the individual states
that he wants an attorney.'" Id. at 104 n.10 (citations omitted).
511. 542 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1976).
512. Id. at 1050-51. The defendant at his hearing for suppression stated that he did
not repeat his request for counsel a third time because "'every time I asked for one,
I never got one, so I gave up on the fact.'" Id. at 1051.
513. No. 75-3785 (9th Cir. July 14, 1976).
514. This same approach was followed in United States v. Kinsman, 540 F.2d 1017,
1018-19 (9th Cir. 1976) (confession suppressed after defendant testified that he re-
quested and was denied presence of counsel three times, citing United States v. Wo-
mack, 542 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1976)).
515. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Calvillo, No. 75-3785 (9th Cir. July 14,
1976); United States v. Womack, 542 F.2d 1047, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Kinsman, 540 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Pheaster5 16 obfuscated the distinction by relying on Mosley's flexible
standard to - admit the defendant's statements even though the state-
ments had been made after the defendant had twice requested coun-
sel.517  The court held that the defendant had impliedly waived his
Miranda rights by choosing to speak to the government agents after he
was told of the extensive evidence against him.51 The court did not
discuss the earlier Ninth Circuit cases or the per se rule used in the
past.519  Whether a defendant has a constitutional right to consult with
counsel of his own choice was a question the Ninth Circuit declined
to decide.
520
C. Use of Invalid Confessions
While Miranda purported to establish the rule that unless the
requisite warnings are given, no evidence obtained as a result of an
interrogation is admissible, 21 failure to give proper Miranda warnings
does not automatically exclude all statements for all purposes. In
Chapman v. California,522 the Supreme Court held that even constitu-
tional errors might be considered harmless if they did not contribute
to defendant's conviction or substantially affect his rights.528 This same
516. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
517. Id. at 367.
518. Id. at 368. The court stated that a "key distinction" in the case was the fact
that the defendant was not questioned, but rather he was informed of the available evi-
dence against him. Id. at 366. But the same opinion also states that the defendant was
asked several times about the whereabouts of the kidnap victim. Id. at 365, 368 n.9.
Whether measured by an objective or subjective standard, the defendant was the subject
of a custodial interrogation, and the agents did elicit the incriminating responses from
him.
519. See notes 511-514 supra and accompanying text. One underlying reason for the
relaxation of Miranda in this decision was related to the justifiable concern on the part
of the government agents for the kidnap victim whose location and condition were un-
known at the time of the defendant's arrest. 544 F.2d at 368 n.9. Cf. People v. Dean,
39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974) (failure to give kidnapping suspect
Miranda warnings prior to questioning him about condition and location of victim does
not render responsive statements inadmissible in that basic concern for victim's safety
overrides warning requirement).
520. United States v. Kinsman,. 540 F.2d 1017, 1018 (9th Cir. 1976). The district
court had ruled that the Government's refusal to allow the defendant to see the attorney
he requested rendered the defendant's-subsequent confession invalid. The court of ap-
peals affirmed.
521. 384 U.S. at 479.
522. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
523. Id. at 24-26. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970); FED. R. Clum. P. 52. In Chap-
man, the prosecution's comments on the defendant's failure to testify were determined
not to be harmless error. 386 U.S. at 24-26.
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standard has been applied to uphold a conviction even though incrimi-
nating statements obtained during an interrogation not preceded by
Miranda warnings were used at trial. 24
It is well-established that under certain circumstances voluntary
statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible to impeach
the maker even though they would not be admissible in the prosecutor's
case-in-chief. 5 It is clear after the Supreme Court's decision in Doyle
v. Ohio526 that the requirements of due process prevent the use of the
defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings for impeachment
purposes.527 The Court reasoned that such silence is ambiguous and
that its use after the defendant is informed of his constitutional right
to be silent would be fundamentally unfair.528
The Government is generally not permitted to use a defendant's
admissions obtained because of an illegal arrest or detention unless
the circumstances demonstrate that the admissions were the result
of circumstances "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint."52 9  In Brown v. Illinois5 10 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the mere recitation of Miranda warnings following an
illegal arrest is not sufficient to make subsequent incriminating state-
ments admissible."a1 While purporting to follow Brown, the Ninth
524. United States v. Casimiro-Benitez, 533 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (9th Cir. '1976)
(overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt sufficient to conclude that Miranda error
was harmless).
525. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (statement obtained after defen-
dant was given full warnings but after he had requested counsel properly used for im-
peachment since statements were trustworthy); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-
26 (1971) (statements made by defendant who was given no warnings were admissible
to attack credibility of defendant's trial testimony). Accord, United States v. Cervantes,
542 F.2d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 1976) (admissions obtained after non-compliance with
Miranda properly used to impeach defendant because no objection was made as to state-
ments' involuntary character).
526. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
527. Id. at 619. In Doyle the defendant, after testifying to an exculpatory story,
was asked on cross-examination why he had not told the story at the time of his arrest.
Id. at 614.
528. Id. at 617-18. But see United States v. Haro-Portillo, 531 F.2d 962, 963-64 (9th
Cir. 1976), decided prior to Doyle, in which the court permitted a government agent
to testify as to his conversation with the defendant (after the defendant had been given
Miranda warnings), which included the explanation that the defendant had terminated
the conversation by refusing to answer any more questions.
529. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). Accord, United States
v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974) (arrest without sufficient probable cause
rendered subsequent inculpatory statements invalid).
530. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
531. Id. at 603. Other factors to evaluate before deciding if a confession was ob-
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Circuit in United States v. O'Looney'3" speculated that even if there
were an illegal detention in the defendant's case, the statements obtained
from the defendant while being questioned at a police station could
be admissible. The court stressed the facts that the flagrancy of the
violation was minimal and that the statement followed proper Miranda
warnings.53 z
V. TRIALS
A. Elements of Crimes
1. In General: Criminal Intent
Criminal intent is an essential element of virtually every crime.534
The level of intent necessary may vary according to the crime and de-
termination of the requisite intent requires that "each material element
of the offense must be examined and the determination made what
level of intent Congress intended the government to prove, taking into
account constitutional considerations . . as well as the common-law
background, if any, of the crime involved." 535
Traditionally, criminal intent has been of two types: general and
specific. General intent crimes require the prosecution to prove that
the defendant knowingly performed the illegal act. Intent is established
where the prosecution shows that the defendant acted voluntarily and
consciously and that his illegal conduct was not inadvertent or acciden-
tal.536  A specific intent crime, on the other hand, requires more than
general intent to do an act. It requires that the defendant have a par-
ticular mental set or purpose in performing that act.53 ' In other words,
tamined by the exploitation of an illegal arrest include the proximity of the arrest and the
confession and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. at 603-04. Cf.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (if official action was pursued in good
faith, the deterrence objective of excluding the evidence loses much of its force).
532. 544 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1976).
533. id. at 390-91.
534. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (requirement of intent is the
rule rather than the exception); United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 73 (6th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967) (intent is an essential element of every
felony). Failure to allege the requisite intent in an indictment will result in dismissal
of the complaint. United States v. Morrison, 536 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Pollack, 503 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1974).
535. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
536. United States v. McDaniel, 545 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1976). In this case,
conviction of defendant for aiding and abetting the illegal transportation of firearms was
reversed because the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury that the prosecution
had to prove the defendant knew she was doing the illegal act.
537. Attempted definitions of "specific intent" have generally been confusing and
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his specific mental intent while performing the act is an element of the
crime. Perhaps the best example of a specific intent crime is assault
with the intent to commit murder. To convict a person of this crime,
it must not only be shown that he knowingly did the act of assaulting,
but that he so acted with the specific intent to kill his victim.
As was noted above, the requisite intent which is an element of a
crime may be determined by examining the intent of Congress.58 8 In
United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga,58 9 the Ninth Circuit interpreted
the term "willfulness," when used in a federal statute, to require that
the prosecution prove that the defendant committed the prohibited act
with the specific knowledge that his action was illegal. Citing the Su-
preme Court decision of United States v. Bishop,5 40 the court stated that
the term "wilfully" "connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty."5 41 Since the prosecution did not prove the element
of specific intent, the court reversed the appellant's conviction.542
vague. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 431 F.2d 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1970) ("A person
who knowingly does an act which the law forbids, or knowingly fails to do an act which
the law requires, intending with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law, may
be found to act with specific intent."). Accord, United States v. Thornton, 498 F.2d
749, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Dissatisfaction with such standards has led the American Law Institute to abandon
the traditional two-level approach to criminal intent and propose in its place four levels
of culpability from which to evaluate criminal conduct: purposely, knowingly, recklessly
and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Off'l Draft, 1962).
538. See text accompanying note 535 supra.
539. 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976).
540. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
541. 541 F.2d at 828 (quoting Bishop, 412 U.S. at 360).
542. Id. at 829. Lizarraga seemingly conflicts with United States v. Thomas, 531 F.
2d 419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 996 (1976). These decisions, just six months
apart and both written by Judge Barnes, can, however, be distinguished. In Lizarraga,
the defendant attempted to enter Mexico in a truck concealing ammunition which was
prohibited from exportation by regulations passed pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970).
See 22 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1977). Since these regulations also prohibited the export of
seemingly innocuous items which could be innocently exported, the court reasoned that
Congress must have intended that violation of the regulation required knowledge of the
specific prohibition. In Thomas, the court held that knowledge of the specific prohibi-
tion against possessing unregistered firearms was not required. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)-
(e). Since a firearm is a "dangerous and deleterious" material, the "probability of regu-
lation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulations." 531 F.2d at 421 (quoting
United States v. International Mineral & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)).
The rationale of Thomas providing for a presumption of knowledge of the regulation
of dangerous materials would seem to apply to the ammunition in Lizarraga. The dif-
ference between the two is that the prohibition against the ammunition included
innocuous items. To require general intent for purposes of exporting ammunition would
require general intent for the other items regulated. For those items the dangerous-
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Elsewhere the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position that while a
robbery which is used as the basis for a felony murder charge requires
specific intent, simple robbery is a general intent crime. 543  The signif-
icance of this distinction is that voluntary intoxication, because it
destroys the defendant's capacity to form specific intent, will be a de-
fense to a robbery resulting in a felony murder, but it will not be a
valid defense to the underlying crime of robbery.4
As noted, general intent crimes require only that the prosecution
prove that the defendant knowingly committed the prohibited act.545
The requisite intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
5 46
However, even if it can be shown that the defendant did not knowingly
commit the act, he may still be criminally liable if it can be shown
that he consciously avoided learning the truth. In United States v.
Jewell,547 Judge Browning, writing for the court en banc, held that to
act "knowingly" does not necessarily require actual knowledge, but can
be satisfied by a showing that the defendant had "an awareness of the
high probability of the fact in question. When such awareness is
present, 'positive' knowledge is not required. '54 8  Jewell involved a de-
fendant who was paid $100 to drive a car from Mexico to Los Angeles.
Defendant was aware of a secret compartment in the car but claimed
that he did not know what, if anything, it contained.549  He asserted
that since he did not know what was in the compartment, he did not
deleterious rationale does not apply. Another difference is that the statute in Thomas
did not have a "wilfulness" requirement and, in fact, § 5861(d) has been interpreted
as a general intent statute. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (prohi-
bition against receiving and possessing non-registered firearms does not require specific
intent); Warren v. United States, 447 F.2d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1971) (specific intent
not required by 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)). Therefore, Thomas' discussion of "presumption
of knowledge" is misleading since knowledge of the statute is not required.
543. United States v. Klare, 545 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1976).
544. This distinction is justified on the ground that robbery comes under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) (1970) and that Congress did not intend for the prosecution to prove specific
intent under this statute. See United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 490-91 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970). Robbery as the basis for felony murder, however,
falls under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970) and Congress requires specific intent because the
specific intent for the robbery is also the basis for the intent to commit the murder.
United States v. Lilly, 512 F.2d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1975).
545. See note 536 supra and accompanying text.
546. United States v. Cam acho, 528 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) (agreement con-
stituting conspiracy may be inferred from acts of parties); United States v. Kelly, 527
F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976) (intent to distribute hashish inferred from quantity).
547. 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).
548. Id. at 700.
549. Id. at 699. The compartment contained 110 pounds of marijuana. Id. at 698.
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have the requisite intent to "possess" its contents.550 The court re-
jected his contention, holding' that the defendant who avoids the
obvious truth will be held to have actual knowledge.5 51 However, it
did temper its decision by stating that such "willful blindness" will be
recognized only in situations where the defendant's awareness ap-
proaches actual knowledge." 2  For this reason, the doctrine is likely
to have its greatest application in the areas of smuggling and posses-
sion of controlled substances.
2. Conspiracy
Criminal conspiracy is an inchoate offense which consists of (1) an
agreement between two or more parties to commit an unlawful act and
(2) an overt act towards fulfilling that agreement."53 As such, the
agreement to commit the offense is a separate and distinct crime.5"
To sustain a conviction of conspiracy, the government must prove that
the defendant was actually a party to the agreement; mere association
with a person or knowledge of the conspiracy is not enough. 55
"[Tihe crime of conspiracy is complete upon the agreement to
violate the law, as implemented by one or more overt acts (however
innocent such may be), and is not at all dependent upon the ultimate
success or failure of the planned scheme."555  Thus, in United States
v. Sanford,557 the Ninth Circuit upheld the convictions of conspiracy to
transport illegally killed animals in interstate commerce"5 8 even though
550. Id. at 699.
551. Id. at 703-04. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417 (1970) (heroin
dealers not entitled to "practice a studied ignorance"); Greigo v. Unitid States, 298 F.2d
845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962) (where negligence will not suffice for knowledge, willful ig-
norance will). See also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 129-130 Comment 9 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955), quoted in United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 701 n.9.
552. 532 F.2d at 704.
553. United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305, 310 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
834 (1974). It is not necessary for each defendant to participate in each overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy in order to find him a member. .Even if a particular
member has dissimilar motives for being in the conspiracy, a single conspiracy may be
found. United ,tates v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 1976).
554. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-90 (1974).
555. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974). Note, however,
that once a conspiracy is established, only slight evidence is required to connect a de-
fendant to it. United States v. Carpio, 547 F.2d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1266,(9th Cir. 1976).
556. United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305, 310 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
834 (1974).
557. 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976) .
558. See 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1970).
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the completion of defendant's scheme did not result in a crime.559 The
court focused on the circumstances as defendants believed them to be.
Since this would have resulted in a crime, the defendants were treated
as if their scheme had failed and were found guilty of conspiracy.
5 60
In United States v. Rodriguez,56' the Ninth Circuit approached a dif-
ferent question concerning conspiracies. Since a conspiracy is an
"agreement" which requires an overt act in furtherance thereof to con-
stitute a crime, it may be considered an "act . . . constituting a felony"
under 21 U.S.C. § 843 (b). Section 843 (b) makes it illegal to inten-
tionally use a communication facility to facilitate the commission of any
act constituting a felony.562  The court held that a conspiracy was such
an act within the meaning of the statute. 6 3 Thus, in Rodriguez, it was
held that even though government agents initiated the phone calls, de-
fendant's willing participation in the conversations was enough to con-
stitute a violation of 843(b), while at the same time, the use of the phone
constituted an overt act making the conspiracy a crime. 
64
3. Crimes Involving Federal Regulation of Firearms
Congress has broad regulatory powers in the area of firearms5 5 and
559. 547 F.2d at 1091-92. Defendants acted as guides for two federal agents who
were posing as hunters. Since the agents were authorized to do whatever was necessary
to complete their investigation, the animals that they shot were not illegally killed. De-
fendants, themselves, did no shooting. Id. at 1086-87.
560. Id. at 1092. See also United States v. Croxton, 482 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir.
1973) (conviction of conspiracy to import marijuana does not require importation be
accomplished).
561. 546 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1976).
562. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any com-
munication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of
any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter or sub-
chapter II of this chapter. Each separate use of a communication facility shall be
a separate offense under this subsection. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"communication facility" means any and all public and private instrumentalities
used or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of
all kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other means of com-
munication.
Id. (emphasis added).
563. 546 F.2d at 307. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit expressly adopted the analysis
of the Second Circuit in United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1132-33 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). 546 F.2d at 307-08.
564. 546 F.2d at 307.
565. See United States v. King, 532 F.2d 505, 510 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
384 (1976) (Congress may regulate dealings in firearms even in absence of interstate
nexus); Vartomos v. United States, 404 F.2d 1030, 1032 n.4 (1st Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 976 (1969) (Congress has power to prohibit transfer of firearms alto-
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may make simple possession of an unregistered firearm a federal of-
fense.566  In United States v. Akers,567 the Ninth Circuit focused on
the congressional intent behind the statute making it a felony to carry
"a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony."'' 0 8 The
court joined the Second, 569 Fifth,570 Eighth,571 and Tenth572 Circuits in
holding that a violation of this statute required that the act of carrying
the firearm be independently unlawful. 73  Since the Government did
not prove that the defendants unlawfully carried firearms during the
commission of the felony, their convictions were reversed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed another conviction based on federal regu-
lation of firearms in United States v. Isaacs.5 7 4 There, a defendant who
had been charged by information with a felony was found to have
violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1970) making it illegal to make a false
statement in acquiring a firearm. Defendant had answered the ques-
tion of whether he was under an indictment at the time of purchase
in the negative. Although Congress defined "indictment" to include
"information," the court found that that was not the common usage of
the word:
We hold that, if a word has two meanings and if the answer to a question
is literally true under one meaning of a word, the answer cannot be said
to be false because, by some process of interpretation, including the de-
termination of congressional purpose, a second meaning might be given
to the word. 575
gether); United States v. Davis, 314 F. Supp. 1161, 1166 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (Congress
can constitutionally prohibit felons from possessing firearms).
566. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1970). For elements of this crime see United States v.
Thomas, 531 F.2d 419, 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 996 (1976). In United
States v. Lathan, 531 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit distinguished
between possession of a firearm in interstate commerce and receipt of a firearm in inter-
state commerce. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971) ("receiving"
broader than "possessing").
567. 542 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1976).
568. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1970).
569. United States v. Ramirez, 482 F.2d 807, 813-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1070 (1973) (plain meaning and congressional intent support such construction).
570. United States v. Rojas, 502 F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir. 1974) (jury instruction
which does not include unlawful requirement not reversible error in absence of proper
objection).
571. United States v. Howard, 504 F.2d 1281, 1285 (8th Cir. 1974) ("unlawfully"
refers to any prohibition, be it federal, state, or municipal).
572. United States v. Sudduth, 457 F.2d 1198, 1199-200 (10th Cir. 1972) (legislative
history supports this construction).
573. 542 F.2d at 772.
574. 539 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1976).
575. Id. at 688. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Eighth Cir-
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The court again turned to statutory interpretation to strike down a
conviction in United States v. Durcan.57  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
921 (a) (15) (1970) it is illegal for fugitives from justice to transport
firearms. The court held that to be a "fugitive from justice" within the
meaning of the statute, the defendant had to flee from the state in which
he was wanted with the intent of avoiding prosecution. Since defendant
had left the state more than a month before the warrant for his arrest
was issued, he did not fall under the statute's definition of "fugitive." 577
4. Securities Violations
The major Ninth Circuit decision in the area of securities violations
in 1976 was United States v. Charnay.51 8 In that case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed a lower court dismissal of an indictment and held that
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.71 and Securities
and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5 580 applied to attempts to
manipulate the market for purposes of corporate takeovers. Although
there had been very little litigation concerning this particular problem,
the court found that legislative history581 and judicial interpretation 8 2
justified this activity coming within the purview of the rule.58 3  The
court reasoned that rule 1Ob-5 must be interpreted broadly5 4 and can-
not be restricted to the actions of "insiders." Both section 10(b) and
rule 1Ob-5 were designed to prohibit all deceitful practices and market
cuit's approach in Schook v. United States, 337 F.2d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 1964), holding
that congressional purpose governs. 539 F.2d at 688-89.
576. 539 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1976).
577. Id. at 31-32. This is true even if the defendant later learns that he is wanted
in a state and refuses to surrender. Id.
578. 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 528 ('1976). But see, Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977) holding a competing tender-offeror lacks
standing to bring a civil damages action for § 10(b) violations.
579. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
580. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
581. 537 F.2d at 347.
582. Id. at 348. See Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (Section 10(b) must be read flexibly giving the S.E.C. broad
discretionary powers in passing regulations); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507
F.2d 374, 378-81 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (market manipula-
tion to obtain greater exchange ratio prohibited by rule lOb-5); Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970) (Section 10(b) and rule lob-5 designed to prohibit
deceptive practices in sale of securities even where such activities do not constitute
common law fraud).
583. In holding that section 10(b) and rule :10b-5 apply to criminally offensive tender
offers, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the approach taken in a civil case by the First
Circuit in H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 425-26 (1st Cir. 1973)
holding that tender offerors are not "purchasers" or "sellers" and therefore are not
within the purview of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 537 F.2d at 349 n.11. See Piper
v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977).
584. Id. at 349-50.
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manipulations. 5 5 Therefore, when defendants purposely sought to de-
press the market in order to deceive shareholders into selling their
shares, rule lOb-5 provided for criminal actions to be brought against
them.
58 6
5. Income Tax Evasion
In United States v. Miller,587 the Ninth Circuit was confronted with
the issue of whether payments to the sole owner of a close corporation
constituted taxable income.5 8  Defendant asserted that under the In-
ternal Revenue Code s9 and under judicial decisions,00 these payments
must be considered constructive corporate distributions and not part of
his salary. Since the corporation had not made a profit, these payments
could not constitute "dividends" and must be a return of capital.5 9' Re-
turns of capital are not taxable as income. 592  Since he "owed" no
taxes, he could not be found guilty of tax evasion.
The court rejected the defendant's contention and affirmed his con-
viction. There is a significant difference between criminal and civil
tax proceedings. In a criminal proceeding the issue is not how much
the taxpayer owes, but whether he has "wilfully" attempted to evade
payment or assessment of a tax.593 If he has, he has violated the tax
evasion statutes even if the amount "could have somehow been made
non-taxable if the taxpayer had proceeded on a different course. 5 9 4
Therefore, in a criminal tax proceeding where the owner has diverted
585. Id.
586. Id. at 350. The requirements of rule lOb-5 for purposes of criminal violations
are the same as for civil violations. United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 128, 130 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973). The only difference may be in terms of burden of proof. As a conse-
quence, precedents set in civil litigation are equally viable in criminal actions. 537 F.2d
at 348.
587. 545 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1549 (1977).
588. All shares of the corporation were held in the names of defendant's four children
and wife. However, defendant asserted that he was the real owner and operator of the
corporation. Id. at 1209 & n.2.
589. Id. at 1210. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c) and 316(a).
590. 545 F.2d at 1212. See Noble v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir.
1966); Clark v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698, 707 (9th Cir. 1959).
591. 545 F.2d at 1210 & n.5.
592. Id. at n.6.
593. Id. at 1214.
594. Id. Had defendant originally reported this diversion of funds as a return of
capital, a portion of it may not have been taxable. However, since he did not report
the income at all, he had already violated the law and could not attempt to justify it
later. Id.
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corporate funds for his own purposes, such income is taxable regardless
of whether the corporation has sufficient profit to issue a dividend.5 95
6. Crimes Involving the Illegal Entry of Aliens
a. Introduction
Congress, in the Immigration and Nationality Act,596 has provided
a comprehensive scheme for the admission and deportation of persons,
who are neither citizens nor nationals of the United States. A portion
of the Act is devoted to providing criminal penalties for actions which
subvert the goals of Congress. 97 In 1976, the Ninth Circuit decided
several cases involving 8 U.S.C. § 1,324518 which makes illegal the
bringing in or harboring of aliens who are not duly admitted to the
United States. The court was primarily concerned with defining
"not duly admitted" and "harboring" and establishing whether actions
which took place outside of the United States violated this section.
595. Id. In coming to this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit adopted the rationale of the
Sixth Circuit in Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 331, 334-35 (6th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 965 (1956). 545 F.2d at 1212-13. See also Hartman v. United
States, 245 F.2d 349, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1957). This approach has been expressly re-
jected in civil proceedings in the Second and Eighth Circuits. Di Zenzo v. Commis-
sioner, 348 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1965); Simon v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869, 876
(8th Cir. 1957).
596. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
597. Id. §§ 1321-1330.
598. Section 1324 reads:
(a) Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding of-
ficer, agent, or consignee of any means of transportation who-
(1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of transportation
or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to bring into or land
in the United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise;
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing
or having reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States
occurred less than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts to
transport or move, within the United States by means of transportation or other-
wise, in furtherance of such violation of law;
(3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or at-
tempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, in any place, including any
building or any means of transportation; or
(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to encourage or
induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of-
any alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by an immigration officer
or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States under the terms
of this chapter or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens,
shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or
both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs:
Provided, however, That for the purposes of this section, employment (including the
usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to con-
stitute harboring.
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b. Not Duly Admitted
In United States v. Bunker,59 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion of the defendant for aiding the entry of aliens "not duly admitted"
into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1). The
court rejected defendant's contention that this statute only prohibited
the "surreptitious" entry of aliens. 600 Since the aliens that defendant
brought into the country had valid three-day entry permits, they had
entered the country legally. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(a)(19),601 which prohibits entry through fraud, is encompassed within
the "not duly admitted" requirement of section 1324.12 Inasmuch as
the aliens had lied about their intent to return when they obtained the
permits, they entered the country by way of fraud and were "not duly ad-
mitted."603 Section 1324 was designed to cover the more sophisticated
forms of smuggling as well as the surreptitious type.
604
c. Locus of the Crime
For purposes of section 1324(a)(4), a defendant may be prosecuted in
the United States for violations which occur outside its territorial bound-
aries.60 5 To determine this, the court focuses on the intent of Congress
and the nature of the crime involved. 606 Since the effect of aiding the
illegal entry of aliens takes place in the United States, acts which are
done outside of the country for that purpose are illegal and punishable
under section 1324.
d. Harboring
In another case involving interpretation of section 1324(a)(3),10 1 the
primary question before the Ninth Circuit was the meaning of the stat-
ute's use of the term "harbor." The court held that the defendant did
599. 532 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1976).
600. Id. at 1265.
601. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1970) reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens shall
be . . .excluded from admission into the United States: ... ('19) Any alien who
seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or other docu-
mentation, or seeks to enter the United States by fraud, or by willfully misrepre-
senting a material fact.
602. 532 F.2d at 1266.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. United States v. Castillo-Felix, 539 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1976).
606. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
607. United States v. Acosta de Evans, 531 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1976).
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not have to attempt to hide or conceal the alien in order to come within
the statute.6"' All that was required for criminal liability was for the
defendant to give shelter to the alien, no matter how humanitarian the
motive.6 09
B. Severance
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the trial
court to sever a joint trial to prevent prejudice to one or more defend-
ants. 610 A severance motion may be granted although charges against
the defendants arose out of the same act or series of acts. Therefore,
although joinder is proper under rule 8,611 severance is permitted
where the facts of a given case make it unlikely that the jury will reach
a proper verdict.
12
There is substantial public interest in the economic effect of jointly
trying persons accused of crimes arising out of the same series of
acts. 13 The burden is accordingly on the defendant to show that
joinder has resulted in undue prejudice.614 To meet this burden, a de-
fendant must show that under the particular circumstances of his case,
it was not "within the capacity of the jurors to follow the court's admoni-
tory instructions and accordingly to collate and appraise the indepen-
dent evidence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own
acts, statements and conduct; 615 and, that the trial court in refusing
608. Id. at 430.
609. Id. The court recognized the injustice of punishing gratuitous and humane shel-
tering while at the same time exempting employers who act with knowledge. How-
ever, the court stated that this type of injustice was to be cured at the legislative level
and was not a proper question for the court. Id.
610. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 reads as follows:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for
trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant
a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In rul-
ing on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for
the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or
confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in
evidence at the trial.
611. FED. R. CGuM. P. 8(b) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the sam indictment or information
if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants
may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defend-
ants need not be charged in each count.
612. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 898 (9th Cir. 1970).
613. United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 1975).
614. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
615. Id. See United States v. Thomas, No. 75-2679 (9th Cir. June 16, 1976) (jury
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to grant the motion, abused its discretion. 616 As a consequence of this
heavy burden, defendants are rarely successful in having the trial
court's decision overturned.6 17 However, if joinder will violate the de-
fendant's sixth amendment confrontation or fourteenth amendment due
process rights, denial of severance is reversible error.618
Bruton v. United States61 is the leading case illustrating when a
defendant's constitutional rights are violated by the trial court's denial
of a severance motion. Prior to trial, Bruton's codefendant made a con-
fession which implicated Bruton. The confession was admitted into
evidence with clear instructions to the jury that it was to be considered
only in deciding the guilt or innocence of the codefendant.6 20 The Su-
preme Court reversed Bruton's conviction on the ground that the trial
court's refusal to sever the trial had violated his constitutional rights.621
It was unrealistic to assume that the jury could apply the confession
against the codefendant and ignore its implication of Bruton.6 22  As
such, the confession unduly prejudiced Bruton and subjected him to a
conviction based upon incompetent evidence. In addition, Bruton
could not cross-examine his codefendant to test the truthfulness of the
confession since the latter chose not to testify. The Court held that,
under the circumstances, Bruton's sixth amendment confrontation rights
were violated.623
competent to give each defendant fair and impartial consideration as to each count);
United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970) (where few defendants are joined
and few factual issues are involved, jurors are competent to give impartial considera-
tion).
616. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976) (court's discretion
abused only if joinder is so clearly prejudicial that it outweighs public concern for ju-
dicial economy); United States v. Thomas, No. 75-2679 (9th Cir. June 16, 1976) (where
court made every attempt to avoid prejudice in conduct of trial, there was no abuse of
discretion in denying the motion); United States v. Cruz, 536 F.2d '1264, 1268 (9th Cir.
1976) (absent showing that codefendant would testify at separate trial, there was no
abuse of discretion).
617. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
618. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
619. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
620. The codefendant's statement was not admissible against Bruton because it was
hearsay and did not fall within an exception. Id. at 127.
621. Id. at 126.
622. Id. at 129.
623. Id. at 126. In United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth
Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever a trial
in which one defendant made a statement incriminating the other. Unlike the situation
in Bruton, this statement was admissible against both defendants under the co-conspira-
tor exception to the hearsay rule. Therefore, the appellant was not unduly prejudiced
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Applying the Bruton rationale, the Ninth Circuit reversed the convic-
tion of a defendant who had neither objected to joinder nor made a
motion for severance. 624 In United States v. Sanchez,62 5 defendants
Ruiz and Sanchez were jointly tried as co-conspirators in a scheme to
sell heroin. The evidence against Ruiz was thin but there was a strong
case against Sanchez. Sanchez, through his attorney, admitted the con-
spiracy charge in front of the jury but he pleaded entrapment as a de-
fense. Sanchez never testified in his own behalf so Ruiz could not
cross-examine. The jury was never cautioned that the confession was
admissible only against Sanchez.6 28  The combination of a damaging
admission, the lack of appropriate limiting instructions and the defend-
ant's inability to cross-examine Sanchez worked to violate Ruiz's con-
stitutional right to confront the witnesses against him and to have a fair
trial.62 Although a proper motion was never made, the court held that
failure to order a severance under these circumstances constituted
"plain error" justifying reversal.
28
C. Conduct of the Trial
An essential aspect of a fair trial is that its participants conduct them-
selves in a manner befitting the fair administration of justice.
1. Conduct of the Trial Judge
The trial judge has a duty to preside over his court "in such a way
as to promote a fair and expeditious development of the facts unencum-
bered by irrelevancies. ' 29 In fulfilling this duty, he is afforded a great
deal of discretion.63 0  Matters such as the reception of evidence,6 3' the
by the admission of the statement because it was competent evidence as to both defend-
ants.
624. United States v. Sanchez, 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976).
625. 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976).
626. Ruiz's counsel did not object to joinder although the evidence showed that the
codefendants did not know each other prior to their arrest. He also failed to object to
the trial court's instruction regarding the jury's use of the admission and he did not sub-
mit any special instructions on behalf of Ruiz. Normally, these oversights will not pre-
serve the issue for appeal. FED. R. Cim. P. 30.
627. 529 F.2d at 65.
628. FED. R. Cm. P. 52(b) states: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
629. Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1962).
630. Robinson v. United States, 401 F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1968).
631. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1976).
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length 32 and content 33 of closing arguments, and limitations of voir
dire 34 and cross-examination, 3 5 fall within the court's discretionary
powers. The trial judge may even actively participate in the question-
ing of witnesses provided he does not upset his position of neutrality.080
Appellate courts rarely interfere with the exercise of this discretion. A
1962 Ninth Circuit panel explained: "[U]nless [the trial judge's] mis-
adventures so persistently pervade the trial or, considered individually
or together, are of such magnitude that a courtroom climate unfair to
the defendant is discernible from the cold record, the defendant is not
sufficiently aggrieved to warrant a new trial. ' 37
2. Conduct of the Prosecutor
The United States Supreme Court left no doubt that the prosecutor
is held to a high standard of conduct when the Court wrote:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.638
A conviction obtained by a prosecutor who violates his duty as an
officer of justice infringes upon the defendant's due process rights and
requires reversal. 39  The prosecutor, as a member of the executive
branch of the government, has absolute discretion in the determination
of whether or not to prosecute a case.0 40  As a result, his purpose in
632. United States v. Jones, 534 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1976).
633. United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1976).
634. United States v. McGregor, 529 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1976).
635. Id.
636. United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974).
637. Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1962). See United States
v. Pena-Garcia, 505 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1974) (judge's repeated interruption of defense's
cross-examination, intimidation of witnesses and improper threatening of defense counsel
with contempt denied defendant a fair trial because of judge's obvious pro-government
position); United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974) (trial court's excessive
participation in examining witnesses on behalf of the prosecution while imposing strict
restraints upon defense counsel's scope of cross-examination was abuse of discretion).
638. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
639. Id.
640. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). It was primarily this concept
of absolute discretion which compelled the Ninth Circuit to hold that courts cannot force
the prosecution to grant immunity to defense witnesseS. United States v. Alessio, 528
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bringing a particular action is not subject to review in the courts. 641 If,
however, he uses his constitutionally mandated discretion as a device to
deprive the defendant of his constitutional rights, the courts may grant
appropriate relief.
642
Charges against prosecutors are generally articulated in one of two
ways: (1) that the prosecutor was unconstitutionally selective in bring-
ing the charge against the defendant;643 or (2) that the prosecutor ex-
ercised his discretion in a vindictive manner against a defendant who
had successfully asserted his constitutional or statutory rights.644
Selective prosecution involves the bringing of a charge against a
defendant for purposes other than the good faith enforcement of the
law. In order to sustain this "defense," the accused must establish a
prima facie case645 that "others similarly situated generally have not
been prosecuted for conduct similar to that for which he was prosecuted
. . . [and] that his selection was based on an impermissible ground
such as race, religion or his exercise of his first amendment right to
free speech."6 46 As a result of this heavy burden on the defendant,
the selective prosecution defense is rarely successful.
A much more successful doctrine for attacking prosecutorial abuse is
that of "vindictive prosecution. 6 47  Vindictive prosecution normally in-
volves a defendant who has successfully challenged his indictment or
conviction and is subsequently reindicted either for a higher crime or
for additional crimes arising out of the same set of facts. As a conse-
quence of the reindictment, the defendant is subjected to the possibility
F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976). The court stated: "To interpret the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments as conferring on the defendant the power to demand immunity for co-de-
fendants, potential co-defendants, or others whom the government might in its discretion
wish to prosecute would unacceptably alter the historic role of the Executive Branch in
criminal prosecutions." Id. at 1082.
641. Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
930 (1969).
642. Blackledge v. Periy, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
643. United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1975).
644. United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir. 1974).
645. United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975).
646. United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953, 954 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing United
States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975)). Gardiner involved a member
of "The Tax Rebellion Committee" who refused to file an income tax return on fifth
amendment-self-incrimination grounds as well as asserting that he had received no in-
come because he had not received any "constitutional" dollars (dollars redeemable in
gold or silver). As a defense, he asserted that he was being prosecuted for his vocal
opposition to the income tax laws.
647. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (made applicable to prosecutors
in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)).
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of receiving a greater sentence than he would have received had he not
contested the original proceeding. Since such a practice punishes those
who assert their rights, it violates due process. 648
While increasing a defendant's punishment upon retrial does not, per
se, violate due process,6 49 any attempt to seek a heavier penalty arising
out of the same series of acts is "inherently suspect."6 50 The Supreme
Court has held that whenever a prosecutor seeks a heavier penalty on
retrial, he must affirmatively set forth his reasons for doing so;51 he
must either point to some particular conduct of the defendant since the
time of the original proceeding justifying such action, 65 2 or to some
"other circumstances affirmatively appearing that might be an adequate
substitute."
653
Applying this rationale, the Ninth Circuit, in 1976, affirmed one
conviction and reversed another in cases involving vindictive prosecu-
tion. In United States v. Preciado-Gonez,654 the Ninth Circuit found
that the prosecutor was not acting vindictively when, upon reindictment,
he added two extra counts arising out of the same set of facts. Al-
though the prosecutor could not point to any particular conduct of the
defendant since the time of the original proceeding, the court found
an "adequate substitute" in that new evidence justifying the new counts
had been discovered in the interim.6 5
In United States v. Ruesga-Martinez,5 6 defendant's conviction was
overturned because the prosecutor could not meet his "heavy burden
of proving that [the] increase in the severity of the alleged charges
was not motivated by a vindictive motive. 6 57 In that case, the prosecu-
tor could point neither to specific conduct nor to an adequate substitute
justifying the attempted increase.
648. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969).
649. Chaffin v. Styncheombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
650. United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1730 (1976).
651. See note 647 supra.
652. Id.
653. United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
654. 529 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1976).
655. Id. at 940-41.
656. 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976).
657. Id. at 1369. Note, however, that the prosecutor has a right tp bring a heavier
charge on reindictment if the defendant has reneged on a plea bargain. Id. at 1370,
Accord, United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d at 939-41; United States v. Ger-
ard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1974).
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The conduct of the prosecutor at trial is an essential aspect of the
defendant's due process rights. Consequently, the prosecutor must
refrain from conduct which might unduly prejudice the defendant's
case.658 Asking improper questions659 or making comments about
facts or instances not properly before the trier of fact 60 would con-
stitute misconduct on the part of the prosecutor. Whether or not such
conduct will result in a reversal of a conviction depends upon: (1)
whether the prejudice can be cured by a cautionary jury instruction,661
or (2) whether the error is properly deemed "harmless."
662
If the prosecutor's misconduct involves a constitutional error, the
Government must prove that it was "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" for the conviction to stand.663 Thus, in United States v.
Wycoff,6 4 the Ninth Circuit sustained the defendant's conviction even
though the prosecutor had unconstitutionally made reference to the de-
fendant's exercise of his right to remain silent.6 5 The evidence against
Wycoff was overwhelming and curative instructions were promptly
given. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit took this opportunity to express
its alarm and concern about "the increasing attempts by government
counsel in this Circuit to make reference to or elicit testimony regard-
ing an accused's silence at the time of arrest." '66 The court then issued
this admonishment: "In future cases government counsel must scru-
pulously avoid all reference to or use of an accused's assertion of his
right to remain silent or his right to counsel except where permitted
by established rules of law. 667
Passive conduct on the part of the prosecutor may also result in a
denial of due process. A conviction which is based upon false evi-
dence, whether offered by the prosecutor or whether remaining on the
658. See notes 638 & 639 supra and accompanying text.
659. Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976) (prosecutors asking single
improper question did not deny defendants their right to a fair trial).
660. Arizona v. Washington, 546 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
1643 (1977) (prosecutor's reference to defendant's "two prior proceedings" during voir
dire was not reversible error).
661. United States v. Pratt, 531 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1976) (prejudice created by prose-
cutor's reference to evidence not properly admitted cured by judge's charge to the jury).
662. FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(a) states: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
663. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
664. 545 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1976).
665. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
666. 545 F.2d at 682.
667. Id.
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record with the prosecutor's knowledge of its falsity, is unconstitu-
tional.068 Therefore, when the prosecutor becomes aware of such evi-
dence, he is under an affirmative duty to inform the court as to its
illegal nature. 6 9 At trial, this situation is most likely to occur when
a government witness, without prior warning, commits perjury.0,70 It
is not enough for the prosecutor to attempt to elicit the truth from such
a witness;67 the prosecutor must immediately inform the judge as to
the true nature of his witness' testimony.
6 72
3. Conduct of a Juror
In a criminal case, a private communication between a juror and a
party to the action is presumptively prejudicial.6 73  In such circum-
stances, the burden is on the Government to show that such contact was
harmless.6 74  Where the contact was public and obviously innocent,




As a general principle, all relevant evidence is admissible. 677 A vast
bulk of the law of evidence, therefore, is comprised of exceptions to this
rule. "Relevant evidence" has been defined as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact . . . more probable or less
668. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); United States v. Cervantes, 542 F.2d
773, 776 (9th Cir. 1976) (improper for prosecutor to present evidence known by him
to be false or unduly prejudicial).
669. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974) (prosecutor has affirma-
tive duty to inform the court that his witness has committed perjury).
670. Id.
671. United States v. Pope, 529 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1976).
672. Id.
673. United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1976).
674., Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
675. United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1976).
676. The Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates became
effective on July 1, 1975. The rules were enacted to bring uniformity to the conflicting
practices of the various circuits. Most of the cases discussed in this section were liti-
gated prior to the effective date of the rules; therefore, they were decided according to
Ninth Circuit precedent. However, the holdings of these cases are not necessarily in-
valid. Rule 102 states: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administra-
tion, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and de-
velopment of the law of evidence to the end that truth may be ascertained and proceed-
ings justly determined." Any Ninth Circuit precedent which furthers these goals should
still be viable provided it does not conflict with a specific rule.
677. FE). R. Evw. 402.
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probable than it would be without the evidence."67  The test is
whether a reasonable person might find the probability of the fact in
question to be different if he had knowledge of the offered evidence.
679
Once it is determined that the evidence is relevant, the focus shifts to
whether the Constitution, federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, or some other recognized authority prohibits its admissibility. 680
1. Privilege
The law of evidence recognizes that certain persons are exempt from
testifying about information they obtained by virtue of a "privileged"
communication.6 8' Although the law affords great protection to privi-
leged communications, no absolute privilege exists, absent specific stat-
utory designation. 8 2 That this is true of even constitutionally protected
privileges is evidenced in the Ninth Circuit by Caesar v. Mountanous.
68 3
Caesar, in upholding the constitutionality of California Evidence Code
section 1016,684 agreed with the California Supreme Court 8 5 that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is not afforded absolute protection.
The defendant in Caesar was a psychiatrist who refused to answer ques-
tions regarding his treatment of a patient who had filed a tort action.
The patient alleged that she suffered personal injury and pain and suf-
fering as a result of an automobile accident. However, she waived the
privilege against disclosure of her communications to the defendant
when she made her mental condition an issue in the case.
678. FED. R. EvID. 401.
679. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976). See United States
v. Navarro-Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976) (unidentifiable fingerprint does not
have any tendency to prove or disprove any substantial element of a crime); United
States v. Durcan, 539 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1976) (fact that smuggled items were obtained
during a burglary was not relevant to the crime of smuggling); United States v. Albu-
querque, 538 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976) (hotwiring tools not relevant to prove defendant
knew car was stolen).
680. FED. R. Evrn. 402. See United States v. Navarro-Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331 (9th
Cir. 1976) (admissibility of expert testimony requires that the jury receive appreciable
help from such testimony ); accord, United States v.. Pratt, 531 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.
1976). See also United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1976) (admissibility
of polygraph results requires that proponent lay proper foundation of reliability).
681. FED. R. EviD. 501.
682. Id.
683. 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976).
684. Section 1016 provides that "[tihere is no [psychotherapist-patient] privilege
under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the mental or
emotional condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by: (a) the patient."
CAL. EVm. CODE § 1016 (West 1970).
685. In re Lifschultz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
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The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is protected by the United States Constitution as a fundamen-
tal aspect of the right of privacy.686 However, interference with this
privilege is justified where a compelling state interest exists.6 87 The
state has a compelling interest in insuring that "truth is ascertained in
legal proceedings in its courts of law."68 Since Evidence Code section
1016 has been interpreted as allowing only the disclosure of informa-
tion which is directly pertinent to issues raised by the patient,""" the
Caesar court found that the state statute did not impermissibly invade
that area of privacy protected by the Constitution.690
2. Admissibility of Prior Acts
a. Impeaching the Credibility of the Witness
Normally, the credibility of a witness may not be impeached by
extrinsic proof of specific past conduct. 691 A general exception to this
rule is recognized where the conduct consists of prior criminal convic-
tions. Prior to July 1, 1975,692 the law in the Ninth Circuit was that
"any prior felony conviction [could] be given by the adversary to im-
peach any witness . ". .. , This practice has been changed by rules
609(a) and (b), which set forth detailed instructions regarding the ad-
missibility of convictions. 94
686. Caesar v. Mountanous, 542 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1976). The court felt
that this holding was required by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (doctor-
patient relationships fall within the zone of privacy existing as a penumbra of the Bill
of Rights).
687. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
688. Caesar v. Mountanous, 542 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1976).
689. In re Lifschultz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
690. 542 F.2d at 1070. The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the
statute violated equal protection because of an absolute clergyman-patient privilege
created by CAL. EviD. CODE § 1034 (West 1966). The court stated that the difference
between the services rendered by the two professions when coupled with the necessity
of the state's noninterference with the religious tenets of a large portion of the com-
munity justified the legislature's treating the two differently.
691. FED. R. Evm. 608(b).
692. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on this date.
693. United States v. Villegas, 487 F.2d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added);
accord, Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235, 235-36 (9th Cir. 1969). This rule is still
in effect for cases tried before July 1, 1975. United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279,
1283 n.1 (9th Cir. 1976).
694. FED. R. Evm. .609(a) and (b) provide:
(a) General rule., For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
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Rule 609(b) prohibits the use of any conviction for impeachment
purposes if more than ten years has passed since conviction or release
from confinement unless the trial court determines that the probative
value of the conviction substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect.698
If the witness' crime did not involve "dishonesty or false statement,
696
then evidence of that conviction is only admissible if "the probative
value . . . outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. '60 7
Therefore, felony convictions of witnesses hostile to the defendant
must be admitted.698 Convictions of witnesses favorable to the defend-
ant, on the other hand, are admissible only if the trial court determines
that their admissibility will not too greatly prejudice the defendant. 69
If the-prior conviction was for a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement, rule 609(a)(2) compels its admission regardless of whether
it was a felony or misdemeanor.700 The admissibility of such evidence
is not subject to the trial judge's discretion because it is especially pro-
bative of the witness' credibility.
70 1
A crime involving dishonesty or false statement is one which contains
"some element of untruthfulness, deceit, or falsification bearing on the
which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of ad-
mitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) in-
volved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more than ten years has elasped since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, which-
ever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that
the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction
more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the propo-
nent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of
such evidence.
695. FED. R. EviD. 609(b).
696. Id. 609(a)(2).
697. Id. 609(a)(1). This section codifies the "Luck doctrine" which makes the ad-
missibility of prior convictions dependent upon the judge's discretion. In determining
whether or not to admit the evidence, the trial judge is to weigh the nature of the prior
crime, its ripeness, and the circumstances surrounding its commission against any undue
prejudice or possible chilling effect oft fifth amendment rights. Luck v. United States,
348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
698. United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976) (reversing a conviction
for failure to admit evidence of past convictions of government witness).
699. Id.
700. See note 694 supra.
701. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976). In United States v.
Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit refused to decide whether the
trial court had any discretion in admitting such convictions. However,. it did state that
"we doubt that the trial court can ever exclude Rule 609 (a) (2) convictions as remote."
Id. at 1083.
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accused's propensity to testify truthfully. ' 70 2  Using this guideline, the
Ninth Circuit has found that convictions for conspiracy to issue unau-
thorized securities, 70 3 forgery,704 and bribery 7 5 must be admitted re-
gardless of the prejudicial impact to the defendant.70 6
b. Proof of Criminal Intent
Evidence of prior acts is usually inadmissible to show general
criminal disposition. 70 7  It is admissible, however, for the purpose
of showing an accused's criminal intent if: (1) the prior act is similar
and close enough in time to be relevant, (2) the evidence of the prior
act is clear and convincing, and (3) the trial court determines that the
probative value of the evidence outweighs any potential prejudice.
708
The Ninth Circuit has employed these factors in determining that rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence admits "all evidence of other
crimes relevant to an issue in a trial, except that which tends to prove
only criminal disposition. 70 9  Thus, evidence of certain convictions,
although inadmissible to impeach the defendant's credibility,710 may
properly be admitted to show criminal intent.71 '
702. FED. R. Evm. 609(a) (2), Notes of Advisory Comm. on Proposed Rules.
703. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976).
704. United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976).
705. United States v. Bryan, 534 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1976).
706. This is, of course, subject to the ten-year limitation imposed by FED. R. EvW.
609(b).
707. Id. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
708. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976). See FED. R. EVwD.
404(b), read in conjunction with Id. 403, which provides for the exclusion of relevant
evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by one of several factors.
709. United States v. Riggins, 539 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1976). In so holding, the
Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit rationale outlined in United States v.
Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973). Broadway held that similar offenses may be
offered to show intent only when the prior offense includes all of the essential physical
elements of the offense charged. Id. at 995. The Ninth Circuit considered this lan-
guage to be overly restrictive.
710. See notes 690-706 supra and accompanying text.
711. United States v. Hamel, 534 F.2d 1354, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1976); accord, United
States v. Grammer, 513 F.2d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 1975); Parker v. United States, 400
F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1097 (1969). There are cases
which discuss the use of prior acts under the "common scheme" concept as evidence that
the accused actually committed the crime for which he is charged. See United States
v. Oliphant, 525 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 972 (1976);
United States v. Webb, 466 F.2d 1352, 1353 (9th Cir. 1972).
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3. Hearsay
A hearsay statement 1 ' is a statement which was made out of court
and which is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
711
As the Supreme Court has stated:
Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the
conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath
or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of
his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination;
and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may
be assessed by the jury.
714
In criminal litigation, exceptions to the hearsay rule are closely scru-
tinized because of the accused's sixth amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him.71 ,5  The right to cross-examine a hostile witness
is implicit within the meaning of the confrontation clause 18 and funda-
mental to a fair trial.71 7 Since most hearsay statements are not subject
to cross-examination, an otherwise valid exception to the hearsay rule
in a civil trial will not be admissible in a criminal case if it violates the
confrontation clause. 718  However, the right to cross-examine is not
absolute 719 and the confrontation clause does not exclude all hearsay
statements. 72
0
Hearsay statements are admissible in criminal trials if they were
made "under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and thereby
compensate for the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-
examination .' 721 The requirements of the confrontation clause are
satisfied if there is sufficient "indicia of reliability" surrounding the
712. FED. R. Ev. 801(a) defines a "statement" as "(1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."
713. Id. 801(c). If the statement is offered only as proof that it was made, then
it is not hearsay and it is admissible if relevant. United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d
527 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 810 (1977); accord, United States v.
Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1976). This exception to the hearsay rule is re-
fened to as the "verbal conduct" doctrine.
714. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973). See FED. R. Evm. 802.
715. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."
716. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
717. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (41970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405
(1965).
718. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2 (the confrontation clalse).
719. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
720. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970).
721. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973).
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One recognized exception to the hearsay rule which has survived
constitutional attack is the admissibility of prior testimony given by wit-
nesses not available at trial.7 23  The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the vital-
ity of this exception in United States v. King2 4 by sustaining the con-
stitutionality of depositions taken to preserve testimony. In King, the
Government's case was predicated almost entirely on the testimony of
two unindicted co-conspirators who were unavailable to testify at trial
because they were imprisoned in Japan. The defendants and counsel
were transported to Japan where a video-taped deposition of the incar-
cerated witnesses was conducted. However, at one point, the Japa-
nese government interfered with the depositions72 5 and the defendants
refused to continue. The Government finished deposing the witnesses
and offered the testimony at trial. The Ninth Circuit found that be-
cause the depositions had fulfilled the requirements of the confronta-
tion clause, admission of the prior testimony into evidence did not
violate the defendants' rights. 726  The deponents were under oath and
the defendants could have conducted cross-examination had they re-
mained in Japan. In addition, the use of video-tape afforded the jury
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and thereby
assess their credibility. The circumstances surrounding these deposi-
tions, although imperfect, were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the confrontation clause.721' The court also held that the Japanese gov-
722. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
89 (1970). It is interesting to note that the co-conspirator exception can only be in-
voked by an adversary. The defendant may not use this exception to admit exculpatory
statements made by another conspirator. United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.
1976); accord, Wolcher v. United States, 233 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1956).
723. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 n.11 (1974); FED. R. EvwD. 804(b)
(1).
724. 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1646 (1977).
725. The Japanese government would not permit the defendants to leave their hotel
rooms, except to attend the depositions. Their rooms were searched and their access
to private consultation with counsel was restricted. The American consular officials at-
tempted to have the restrictions relaxed, but they were unsuccessful. Id. at 838.
726. Id. at 840-41.
727. Id. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit joined the Seventh and Second Circuits in
upholding the constitutional validity of 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1970). United States v.
Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367, 374 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974); United
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ernment did not interfere with the deposition proceedings to such an
extent that the defendants' constitutional rights were abridged. The
defendants' act of leaving the deposition constituted a "valid waiver"




The Ninth Circuit has upheld the use of "recorded recollection, ' 729
although this exception to the hearsay rule 30 is difficult to justify on con-
stitutional grounds. Recorded recollection is not subject to the tradi-
tional indicia of reliability,781 but its use is favored in both federal and
state courts. 732  The doctrine allows a witness to submit a writing as
a substitute for his testimony if he cannot recall the relevant events at
the time of trial. The doctrine applies where: (1) the writing offered
pertains to facts about which the witness once had personal knowledge;
(2) the witness can no longer remember those facts; and (3) the docu-
ment is shown to have been made by the witness while the facts were
still fresh in his mind.733  Meaningful cross-examination is precluded
by the witness' lack of memory. However, it is felt that satisfaction
of these three criteria insures that recorded recollections are as reliable
as "dying declarations"73 4 and those other hearsay exceptions which
apply when the declarant is not available.78
c. Statements of Co-conspirators
Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) treats the statements of co-conspirators not as
States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148, 1153-54 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984
(1973).
728. 552 F.2d at 844. The definition of a valid waiver was established in Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In that case, the Supreme Court held that a "waiver
is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or priv-
ilege." Id. at 464.
729. United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 1976).
730. FED. R. Evio. 803(5).
731. The "oath" and the ability to cross-examine help insure that evidence is reliable.
732. United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
947 (1966).
733. United States v. Edwards, No. 76-1483, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 1976)
(interpreting the requirements of FED. R. EVID. 803(5)).
734. United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2dCir. 1965), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
947 (1966). See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(2).
735. See FED. R. EvID. 804.
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hearsay, but as admissions by a party-opponent.78 As such, they are
admissible as evidence of the truth of the matter they assert. The justi-
fication for the admissibility of these statements is founded upon con-
cepts of agency. The law treats co-conspirators as "partners in crime"
and considers each member of the conspiracy an agent of the others.
Each "agent" binds his "principal" by his statements or the actions in
which he engages.7
87
For the statements to be admissible, the defendants need not be
charged with conspiracy provided there is evidence that the parties in-
volved were working in concert. 788 Essentially, the requirements of
the exception are met if there is substantial non-hearsay evidence that
a conspiracy existed (sufficient concert of action) ;719 that the statement
being offered was made during the course of the conspiracy;7 40 and that
736. Id. 801(d)(2)(E). Accord, United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 311 (9th
Cir. 1976).
737. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974).
738. United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1090 (1976); accord, United States v. Williams, 435 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
739. United States v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976).
740. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 (1974); United States v. Cruz,
536 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 733 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). See also FEn. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (E),
Notes of Advisory Comm. on Proposed Rules. In United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d
1218 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit asserted with virtually no explanation, that
"[s]tatements of a co-conspirator are not hearsay even if made prior to the entry of the
conspiracy by the party against whom it is used." Id. at 1230. The support for this rule
is found in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1947). Gypsum
involved a civil suit in which the defendants were alleged to have violated the Sherman
Act by conspiring to fix prices on gypsum products. Although not all of the defend-
ants had joined the conspiracy at one time, those who joined later had knowledge of
the actions of the earlier conspirators. Id. at 388-93. Once the Government established
a prima facie case of conspiracy, "the declarations and acts of the various members, even
though made or done prior to the adherence of some to the conspiracy, [became] ad-
missible against all . . . " Id. at 393. This rule is justified on principles of agency
law, that when a person joins a conspiracy, he ratifies all prior actions and statements
made by his co-conspirators. 4 J. WEINSTgIN & M. BEREo, WEINSEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-152 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WvINsTmm]. However,
the Advisory Committee has openly stated that "the agency theory of conspiracy is at
best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that already
established." FED. R. EviD. 801(d) (2) (E), Notes of Advisory Comm. on Proposed
Rules. Therefore, this rule should not be mechanically applied. Weinstein suggests that
the rule should not be applied at all unless, as in Gypsum, there is some basis for believ-
ing that the defendant was aware of the general nature of actions and statements made
by the conspirators before his entry. WEINSTEIN, supra at 801-153. While it would be
too much to ask the Government to prove that the defendant was aware of a specific
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the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.741 However,
in the Ninth Circuit, "[tlhe fact that evidence is admissible under the
co-conspirator exception does not automatically demonstrate compli-
ance with the Confrontation Clause. ' 72  The use by a declarant of his
fifth amendment protections against self-incrimination will deny the
other conspirators their right of cross-examination. 748  The test of ad-
missibility under the confrontation clause is whether the defendant's in-
ability to cross-examine the declarant has deprived the jury of a proper
basis on which to ascertain the truth of the out-of-court statement.
7 44
A proper basis is established if:
(1) the declaration contained no assertion of a past fact, and subse-
quently carried a warning to the jury against giving it undue weight; (2)
the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and role of partici-
pants in the crime; (3) the possibility that the declarant was relying
upon faulty recollection was remote; and (4) the circumstances under
which the statements were made did not provide reason to believe that
the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the
crime.745
Although the Ninth Circuit has questioned what effect the new
Federal Rules of Evidence will have upon the seemingly more restric-
tive requirements of Ninth Circuit precedent,74 6 the case interpretation
is based upon constitutional requirements and such requirements can-
not be superseded by federal statute.747
d. The HilImon Doctrine
Hearsay statements are admissible to prove the declarant's then-exist-
ing mental, emotional, or physical condition. 748  The Hilimon doc-
statement made by a conspirator prior to his entry, he should not be held responsible
for previous statements which were outside of his reasonable expectations. Id.
741. See authorities cited note 740 supra.
742. United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1090 (1976).
743. See United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 845 (9th Cir. 1976).
744. United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1090 (1976).
745. Id. (interpreting the requirements set forth in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-
89 (1970) ).
746. United States v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1976).
747. The fact that FED. R. Evm. 801(d) (2) (E) classifies co-conspirator statements
as "non-hearsay" does not affect the outcome. If the substance of a statute violates the
Constitution, its terminology will make no difference.
748. FED. R. Evw. 803(3).
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trine74 9 is one type of "state of mind" exception. The Ninth Circuit
has observed:
[U]nder the HilImon doctrine the state of mind of the declarant is used
inferentially to prove other matters which are iti issue. Stated simply,
the doctrifie provided that when the performance. of a particular act by
an individual is an issue in the case, his intention [state of mind] to
perform that act may be shown. From that intention, the trier of fact
may draw the inference that the person carried out his intention and
performed the act.750
In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon,7 51 a civil suit was filed to
contest an insurance company's refusal to pay the benefits of a life in-
surance policy to the wife of the "deceased." The insurance company
contended that the insured was still alive and that the body which was
discovered was really that of a party named Walters. The company
attempted to introduce letters written by Walters, shortly before his dis-
appearance, which stated that he was going with a man named Hillmon
to look for a site upon which to build a sheep ranch. The body was
found near the area where Walters' letters said he would be. The
Supreme Court held that the letters were admissible "as evidence that
...[Walters] had the intention of going, and of going with Hillmon,
which made it more probable both that he did go and that he went with
Hillmon than if there had been no proof of such intention.
'752
In United States v. Pheaster,753 the Ninth Circuit was presented with
a factual setting analogous to that'in Hillmon. On the night of his dis-
appearance, a Larry Adell told friends that he ,was going to meet
"Angelo" (later identified as the defendant) in a parking lot, and that
the latter was going to give him a pound of marijuana. The defendant
was charged with kidnapping. The prosecution introduced Adell's
statements as evidence that he did in fact meet the defendant at the
parking lot. In other words, Adell's statement of intent to do a future
act was admitted as proof of the defendant's conduct.754  This situation
is distinguishable from Hillmon because in Hillmon, the defendant's
statements were admissible on the issue of his own whereabouts. In
Pheaster the declarant's statement was used to prove that a third party,
749. The Hillmon doctrine is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
750. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F,2d 353, 376 (9th Cir. 1976).
751. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
752. Id. at 296.
753. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
754. Id. at 376.
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the defendant, was at a particular location at a certain time. Neverthe-
less, the Ninth Circuit upheld the admissibility of Adelrs statements as
evidence of the defendant's actions.7 55 The court felt that its holding
was mandated by Hillmon and state court interpretations of that case.756
Although Pheaster was litigated before the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence took effect, the court indicated that the decision would be the
same under the new rules. Rule 803(3) does not expressly recognize
the Hillmon doctrine. However, the court inferred from the Advisory
Committee notes that the Hillmon doctrine should be fully incorpo-
rated.
757
e. Hearsay Statements Made to Informants
In United States v. McClain,7 8 the accused made a hearsay state-
ment which showed his predisposition to commit the offense for which
he was charged. The statement was made to an informant. The Ninth
Circuit held that the statement was inadmissible where the informant
was unavailable at trial, his identity was unknown, and his reliability
had not been proven.759  The holding of McClain is inapplicable
where: (1) the source of the hearsay is identified; (2) the source testi-
fies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination; and (3) the matter




The defense of entrapment requires proof that: (1) government
755. The court recognized some conceptual difficulties with this holding. For ex-
ample, had Adell simply said that the defendant "is going to be in the parking lot to-
night," his statement would be hearsay and inadmissible to show that the defendant did,
in fact, go to the parking lot. Id. at 377. However, since defendant's conduct was in-
extricably tied up with Adell's intended conduct, Adell's statement was admissible as
proof of defendant's conduct.
756. See, e.g., People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944).
757. 544 F.2d at 379-80. The Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules states that
"Et]he rule of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, (citations omitted) allowing evidence of
intention as tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is, of course, left undis-
turbed." FED. R. EviO. 803(3).
758. 531 F.2d 431 (1976).
759. Id. at 435-36. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Fifth Cir-
cuit's rationale in allowing such statements. See United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1, 4-
5 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir.
1960).
760. United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 147
(1976).
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agents induced the defendant to commit the particular acts charged in
the indictment, and (2) the defendant's predisposition was such that
he was not otherwise ready and willing to commit the offense on any
propitious opportunity. 718 "Once these two elements are in issue, the
government has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that
the entrapment does not exist.1762  In United States v. Rueter,10 3 the
Ninth Circuit found without merit defendants' entrapment defense to
charges of possession of contraband with intent to distribute, given that
one of the co-conspirators had initiated contact with the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) informant.
764
In United States v. Hermosillo-Nanez,76 ' the circuit held that "[e]n-
trapment is an affirmative defense. . . . [in which] [tihe defendant
must come forward with evidence of his nonpredisposition and of
government inducement. '766  The conviction was affirmed on grounds
761. United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 941 (1974). See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (de-
fense of entrapment not available to defendant who sold narcotics supplied by govern-
ment informer to other government agents where defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973) (entrapment is limited
defense that only comes into play when government agent "implant[s] the criminal de-
sign in the mind of the defendant"); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932)
(defense available, not in sense that accused though guilty may go free, but that Govern-
ment not permitted to contend accused guilty of crime where government officials are
instigators of his conduct).
762. United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
US. 941 (1974). See also Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 174 n.6 (9th Cir.
1966) (issue of entrapment presented no matter how incredible evidence which raises
it appears to trial court). Cf. United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 147 (1976) (entrapment exists as a matter of law only when un-
disputed testimony makes clear otherwise innocent person was tricked, defrauded or per-
suaded into committing criminal act by government agent); United States v. Gibson, 446
F.2d 719, 721 (10th Cir. 1971) (must be "patently clear that an otherwise innocent per-
son was induced to commit the act complained of by trickery, persuasion or fraud of
a government agent" to find entrapment as matter of law) (emphasis added).
763. 536 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1976).
764. Id. at 298. In United States v. One 1974 Jeep, 536 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam), the court held that the conduct of DEA agents in sending a pickup notice
to the addressee of a package which custom agents had found to contain cocaine and
the subsequent arrest of the addressee after he took delivery of the package at the post
office was lawful, and did not provide any basis for an entrapment defense. Id. at 1286.
Cf. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (entrapment shown as matter of
law when undisputed facts indicated government informer had met petitioner at doctor's
office where both were being treated to cure narcotics addiction, and informer continually
sought to persuade petitioner to obtain narcotics for him until the petitioner finally sub-
mitted, supplying narcotics to informer and returning to the habit himself).
765. 545 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 763 (1977).
766. Id. at 1232.
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that the evidence before the jury was sufficient to support a finding
of predisposition to commit the crime. 
7 7
b. Confession and Avoidance
In 1975 the Ninth Circuit reversed its former rule that entrapment
constitutes a confession and avoidance defense which requires the de-
fendant to admit to all elements of the crime charged. 68 With the
decision of United States v. Demma7 9 a defendant may now claim en-
trapment without conceding that he committed the crime or any of its
elements.77 0  The circuit reaffirmed this position in 1976. 771  How-
ever, it remains to be seen whether it will apply the new rule retroac-
tively in habeas corpus proceedings in which a prisoner asserts error
in his pre-Demma trial. 2
767. Id. at 1233. See also United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1054
n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 323 (1976) (proper to instruct jury that entrap-
ment not available should they find defendant predisposed to commit the crime); United
States v. Pena-Ozuna, 511 F.2d 1106, 1107-08 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 850 (1975) (proper to instruct jury that lack of predisposition and government in-
ducement must be shown beyond reasonable doubt to sustain defense).
768. See Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954). Accord,
United States v. Gibson, 446 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir. 1971) ("entrapment is an af-
firmative defense in the nature of confession and avoidance; as such the defendant must
admit to the acts constituting commission of the crime charged but, in avoidance, seek
relief from guilt on the ground that the criminal intent or design was not his, but rather
that of the government agent .. ").
769. 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
770. Id. at 982 (court expressly overrules Eastman and its progeny).
771. See United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1155 (1977); United States v. Stagg, 540 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th Cir.
1976) (per curiam); United States v. Mejia, 529 F.2d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam).
772. United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 1155 (1977) (retroactive application of Demma to appellant's new trial, even though
appellant had not asserted error at original trial); United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d
at 988 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (one of defendants was allowed to assert absence of
entrapment instructions on appeal though he did not assert the defense at trial since he
did not wish to admit elements of alleged crime).
In a habeas corpus proceeding there are four possible categories of prisoners applying
for relief on the basis of Demma: (1) those who requested an entrapment instruction,
which request was denied because they refused to admit the elements of the alleged
crime; (2) those who admitted the elements of the crime and received the entrapment
instruction, but objected to the required admission at trial; (3) those who admitted the
crime and made admission at trial; (3) those who admitted the crime and received the
entrapment instruction, but failed to object to the required admission at trial; and (4)
those who contested the elements of the crime at trial, but now assert that they should
have a retrial on the entrapment issue despite the fact that they failed to request the
instruction. There is language in Hart indicating that relief may be in order for prison-
ers falling within categories one and two. 546 F.2d at 803.
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c. Due Process
In United States v. Russell,773 the Supreme Court indicated that there
is a possibility that the conduct of law enforcement agents could reach
a level that is "so outrageous that due process principles would abso-
lutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction. 7 74  However, a plurality of the Court in Hampton v. United
States,775 appeared to take the position "that the concept of fundamen-
tal fairness inherent in the guarantee of due process would never pre-
vent the conviction of a predisposed defendant, regardless of the out-
rageousness of police behavior .... -776 The Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Gonzales77 7 interpreted Hampton as leaving open the possibil-
ity of a due process violation given outrageous government conduct.77 8
But the court held that the involvement of government agents in print-
ing similitudes of United States currency fell short of the outrageous
standard, and therefore found no violation of due process. 770
773. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
774. Id. at 431-32. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (conduct of gov-
ernment agents in extracting evidence by force from defendant's stomach with emetic
solution held to violate fourteenth amendment due process clause).
In Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), the Supreme Court stated that due
process "has to do . . . with the denial of that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice.'" Id. at 246 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462
(1942)). The Ninth Circuit's statement of the rule can be found in United States v.
Lue, 498 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974). The court there in-
dicated that the due process defense was "not an exception to entrapment law which
focuses on a defendant's predisposition," but rather an independent protection afforded
defendants by the due process clause of the fourteenth or fifth amendments. Id. at 534.
775. 96 S. Ct. 1649 (1976).
776. Id. at 1651 (emphasis added) (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
777. 539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
778. Id. at 1239 (relying upon Justice Powell's concurring opinion and Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion in Hampton). In Hampton, Justices Rehnquist and White, to-
gether with Chief Justice Burger seemed to indicate that the predisposition of the defend-
ant is the sole issue. Justice Rehnquist stated that the remedy for outrageous police con-
duct "lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police
under the applicable provisions of state or federal law." 96 S. Ct. at 1650 (plurality
opinion, Stevens, J., taking no part in decision).
779. 539 F.2d at 1238. See also United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 (9th
Cir. 1976) (government's conduct could not be characterized as so outrageous as to con-
stitute due process violation); United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1055
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 323 (1976) (providing contraband to defendants does
not result in per so violation of due process). Cf. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d
783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971) (where special investigators established contact with de-
fendants shortly after their arrest on former bootlegging charges, offered to supply still
to defendants, supplied sugar to be used, urged bootleggers to resume production, and
finally acted as defendants' only customers. It was held that the government was
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2. Insanity
In United States v. Sullivan,'780 the defendant, who had been con-
victed by a jury of using false identification documents in connection
with firearms purchases, attempted to defend himself on the ground
that he was legally insane at the time of the purchases. 78 ' The test
for legal insanity in the Ninth Circuit is as follows: "A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a re-
sult of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the . .. [wrongfulness] of his conduct or conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law. '782  The defendant's expert witness
had testified that while the defendant did have the intellectual ability
to appreciate the criminality of his actions, he did not have the capacity
to appreciate their moral wrongfulness. 78 3  The trial judge had refused
to give a clarifying instruction suggested by defense counsel that "[f]or
purposes of the insanity defense, wrongfulness means moral wrongful-
ness rather than criminal wrongfulness. ' 784  The Ninth Circuit reversed
the trial judge and remanded the case for retrial, holding that since it
enmeshed in the criminal activity taking place so as to be barred from prosecuting de-
fendants). Greene is cited with approval in Hampton. 96 S. Ct. at 1651 n.3 (Powell,
J., concurring).
780. 544 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1976).
781. Id. at 1053-54 (citation omitted).
782. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Final Draft 1962) (emphasis added). See, e.g.,
Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-74 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc) in which the
Ninth Circuit adopted the ALI formulation of the test for legal insanity, substituting the
word "wrongfulness" for "criminality," and rejecting § 4.01(2) as a restriction upon
what constitutes a mental disease or defect.
783. 544 F.2d at 1054.
784. Id. at 1055 (emphasis added). "The trial court refused to issue ... [the
clarifying instruction] on grounds that there was no evidence presented upon which to
submit the factual issue to the jury that the defendant had suffered from a delusion that
his activities were morally justified." Id. In United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758
(9th Cir. 1975), the court had stated: "[A] defendant lacks substantial capacity to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of his conduct if he knows his act to be criminal but commits
it because of a delusion that it is morally justified." Id. at 760 (emphasis added). See
also, Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1970). In Sullivan, the Ninth
Circuit disclaimed any "talismanic focus on the word 'delusion,'" holding that "it is a
word of clarification, not of limitation." 544 F.2d at 1055 (footnote omitted). Under
Wade the test for legal insanity requires that when "Someone ...commits a criminal
act under a false belief, the result of mental disease or defect, that such act is morally
justified, [such person] does indeed lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his conduct, irrespective of whether he can be correctly diagnosed, medically, as
'delusional.'" Id. at 1056. The trial judge was therefore in error for attaching legal
significance to the word "delusion" -announced in the Wade and McGraw decisions.
Id. at 1055 (holding that the word "delusion" adds no additional element to sustain
an insanity defense).
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appeared from the record that the jury had been exposed to differing
views of the proper legal meaning of "wrongfulness," a clarifying in-




The matter of sentencing has traditionally been left to the discretion
of the trial court and is not reviewable where the sentence falls within
the bounds prescribed by statute. 70  The Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the problems inherent in the sentencing process with less fre-
quency than might be expected,787 the result of a conscious decision
to leave the trial judge's ruling undisturbed and his discretion unchal-
lenged whenever possible. Nonetheless, because the decision to deprive
a member of society of his or her freedom is a serious one, the circuit
courts of appeals are often faced with the task of balancing the judge's
exercise of discretion against the possible deprivation of a defendant's
equal protection and due process rights.
781
An obvious requirement of due process is that the trial judge must
impose a sentence which is worded with clarity and precision. 78  The
terms of the sentence must be clear as to the defendant's length of im-
prisonment, his chances for parole and probation and the revocations
thereof, and the effect that non-payment of a fine will have on con-
current sentences.790
In Tate v. ShortP7 1 the Supreme Court held that a sentence is invalid
785. 544 F.2d at 1054-56.
786. United States v. Thompson, 541 F.2d 794, 795 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Ramirez-Aguilar, 455 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. James, 443 F.2d
348, 349 (9th Cir. 1971).
787. Although the Supreme Court seems to avoid reviewing issues involving the
sentencing procedure, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals must take the case when the
defendant exercises his appeal of right. In the absence of Supreme Court guidance
there is more room for discrepancy between the circuits.
788. The due process issue generally arises when the defendant is sentenced according
to misinformation in the presentence report which the defendant had no opportunity to
rebut. See United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1975). The equal protection
question frequently arises where two defendants accused of the same conduct receive sub-
stantially different sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973).
789. United States v. Dixon, 538 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
383 (1976).
790. Id. at 814.
791, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
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if, under the terms imposed, the defendant's financial inability to pay
a fine will result in a longer imprisonment than that given to someone
who has the ability to pay the fine. The reliance upon a prisoner's
financial status as justification for an enhanced jail term is invidious dis-
crimination barred by the equal protection provisions of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. 792 The Ninth Circuit follows the view ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in Tate.793 In addition, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has decided that equal protection rights are violated "whether the
result of longer imprisonment is brought about by the operation of 18
U.S.C. § 35697", or by the fact that the nonpayment of a committed fine
would adversely affect the defendant's parole status."795  The federal
court judge still retains discretion whether or not to initially impose the
committed fine.79
When the defendant is convicted of more than one type of criminal
act, the judge must analyze the nature of the crimes and the various
statutes involved in order to determine if the sentence is within the pur-
view of the law. A problem arises when a conviction is obtained for
lesser included offenses. In United States v. Pulawa,79 7 petitioner had
been convicted of three counts of tax evasion and three counts of per-
jury in the preparation of his income tax returns.798 The district court
had imposed consecutive three-year sentences for each count of perjury
and consecutive five-year sentences for each count of tax evasion. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit recognized that perjury is a lesser included
offense of tax evasion, 799 and that the sentences given for the lesser
included crimes should have been merged into the greater offense.
792. Id. at 399. Accord, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970). For a per-
spective of how indigence affects the defendant's right to an appeal, see Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But cf. Ross v.
Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (indigent defendant has no right to counsel for preparation
of petition for discretionary review).
793. United States v. Estrada de Castillo, 539 F.2d 583, 584 (9th Cir. 1976).
794. "Under 18 U.S.C. § 3569 an indigent unable to pay a fine may serve his release
from a committed fine only after he has served thirty days solely for the nonpayment
of the fine." Id. at 584 n.2.
795. Id.
796. Id. at 585 (Hufstedler, J., concurring). See, e.g., Hill v. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460,
463 (1936); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 737 (1877); United States v. Callahan,
371 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1967).
797. 532 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1976).
798. Violations of I.R.C. §§ 7201 and 7206(1), respectively.
799. 532 F.2d at 1302. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349 (1965);
United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912
(1970).
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The Ninth Circuit held that the maximum sentence prescribed by law
is that imposed by the statute governing tax evasion.800
When a sentence is attacked as being in excess of the maximum
period of time applicable under a given statute, the record should be
scrutinized to see if the prisoner's claim is meritorious. In order to fa-
cilitate this task, the trial judge is required to state which penalty is
attached to which count.8s0 It is not reversible error when the penalty
given is clearly within the maximum available for one of several crimes
for which the defendant is convicted, and the sentences imposed on all
counts are concurrent. 
02
The standards applicable to a hearing at which sentence is imposed
are'enumerated in federal rule 32.803 It is often difficult to comply
with rule 32(c)(3), the provision requiring disclosure to the defendant
of the contents of the presentence report.80 4 This rule gives the de-
fendant and his attorney an opportunity to read the report subject to
the court's discretion to disallow this right under certain conditions.
The Ninth Circuit has held that, at a minimum, the rule requires dis-
closure of the defendant's criminal record contained in the presentence
report; moreover, the defendant must have an opportunity to "'refute
or explain any record disparagement of his earlier deportment.' "805
800. 532 F.2d at 1302. Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a maxi-
mum penalty for tax evasion of "not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more
than five years, or both." Therefore, the maximum sentence the petitioner in Pulawa
could receive was three consecutive five-year sentences for a total of fifteen years.
801. United States v. Wilson, 535 F.2d 521; 523 (9th Cir.) (by implication), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976).
802. Id. at 523. Thus, in Wilson, defendant was charged in a five count indictment.
In count one, it was alleged that he conspired to commit a felony and a misdemeanor.
The defendant was convicted of the charges on several counts, including count one. The
sentence prescribed for count one was in excess of the maximum allowable if the convic-
tion was for conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor. The judge's failure to distinguish
whether the count one conviction was for a felony or a misdemeanor was not reversible
error, since the sentence imposed was within the allowable term for conviction on one
of the other counts, and the sentences imposed were concurrent.
803. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32.
804. Id. 32(c) (3) provides as follows:
Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the defendant, or his
counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the presentence investigation
exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence, but not to the extent that in the
opinion of the court the report contains diagnostic opinion which might seriously
disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of information obtained upon a promise
of confidentiality, or any other information which, if disclosed, might result in
harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other persons; and the court shall
afford the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon and, at the
discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any
alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the presentence report.
805. United States v. Read, 534 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1976). This view conforms
NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
This interpretation of the rule is applicable to both oral and written pre-
sentence reports.""°
Many sentencing appeals arise from a defendant's attempt to with-
draw his guilty plea after receiving a sentence which is harsher than
the one he expected to receive. The general rule is that a plea may
only be withdrawn before sentence is imposed. 80 7r  However, when
"manifest injustice" is evident, courts may allow withdrawal at a later
date.80 8  Thus, the manner in which a court chooses to define "mani-
fest injustice" becomes the critical issue. In United States v. Harris,0
while the trial judge had attempted to explain the consequences of the
plea to the defendant in compliance with rule 11,810 the judge had
neglected to disclose that a special six-year parole term would be
appended to the sentence. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
federal rule had been violated and that it would be manifestly unjust
to disallow withdrawal of the plea after sentencing. 81n
The prisoner's due process rights are violated when his sentence is
based on material misinformation which he has had no opportunity to
refute. 812 The Ninth Circuit has held, nonetheless, that the judge need
not state in open court the factors he considered in making his deter-
mination.813  This practice'indicates a deference to the wide discretion
afforded the trial judge in matters involving the sentencing process.
There are times when a hearing should be held to determine
whether the court considered improper information. The Ninth Circuit
has held that the court may consider a prior conviction which was ob-
with the position taken by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States v.
Powell, 487 F.2d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d
931, 933 (4th Cir. 1968)).
806. United States v. Read, 534 F.2d at 859.
807. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
808. Id.; United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1976).
809. 534 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1976).
810. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11.
811. 534 F.2d at 142. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that the imposition
of a special parole term should be explained to the defendant when his plea is accepted.
See Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Myers, 451
F.2d 402, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1972); Combs v. United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1968); Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1964).
812. United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 573 (9th Cir. 1975).
813. United States v. Thompson, 541 F.2d at 795. Accord, United States v. Horsley,
519 F.2d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976); United States
v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1173 (2d Cir. 1973). But cf. United States v. Carden, 428
F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970) (always advisable for trial judge to state factors on which
he relied in sentencing defendant).
1977]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
tained despite an alleged fourth amendment violation,114 reasoning that
this type of prior conviction is probative of past criminal conduct. In
fact, this holding has been used to justify the elimination of federal
habeas corpus review of an alleged state violation of the defendant's
fourth amendment rights.815 If, however, the prior conviction is consti-
tutionally invalid because the petitioner was denied right to counsel
under Gideon v. Wainwright,s1 6 the procedure followed is of a vastly
different nature.
In Farrow v. United States,11 7 the court agreed on a comprehensive
procedure to assure that constitutionally invalid priors were not consid-
ered by the sentencing judge. In Farrow, the petitioner had filed a
section 2255 Tucker-type motion.8 18  The district court, adopting a
procedure followed by the Fifth Circuit," 9 had disposed of the claim
by declaring that "even if all challenged priors are disregarded the sen-
814. Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976). In Tisnado, the court
stated:
Accordingly, it now appears that it may be an unwarranted extension of Tucker's
holding-which concerned a prior conviction that had been declared invalid due to
a denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel-to suggest that prior convictions
which are invalidated on fourth amendment grounds are also to be excluded from
the consideration of the sentencing court.
Id. at 458. See also United States v. Vandermark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1021-25 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
983 (1971); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 961 (1971).
815. See Stone v. Powell, 429 U.S. 465 (1976).
816. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
817. No. 74-2429 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976).
818. The Tucker-type petition derives its name from United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972). The petition is filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) and seeks relief from
a sentence imposed under conditions whereby the trial judge considered a prior convic-
tion which was invalid since the defendant was not afforded his right to counsel under
Gideon.
819. From Lipscomb v. Clar, 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972), it can be implied that
a sentencing judge may end the inquiry into whether a prior illegal conviction enhanced
the present sentence by merely disclaiming that he did not rely on the priors. Most
circuits in the United States accept a mere disclaimer. See, e.g., United States V.
Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1973); Wilsey v. United States, 496 F.2d 619 (2d
Cir. 1974); United States v. Janiec, 464 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1972); Stepheney v. United
States, 516 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Trice, 412 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.
1969); Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1975); McAnulty v. United
States, 469 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973); United States
v. Green, 483 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 469 (1973). However, in
the Fifth Circuit, where Lipscomb was decided, the court has begun to question the "dis-
claimer" approach. See, e.g., United States v. Rollerson, 491 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th
Cir. 1974); Thomas v. United States, 460 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1972).
NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
tence would be the same in this case. 's 0 The Ninth Circuit ruled that
a judge's informal disclaimer is dispositive only where the files and
records "conclusively" show non-reliance on the invalid prior convic-
tions.821  If the records are not conclusive, the defendant is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing which, whenever practicable, should be held
in front of a judge other than the one who originally imposed the sen-
tence. 22 Where a hearing is required, there is a rebuttable presump-
tion that the invalid priors were considered.
8 2 1
In Farrow and in a companion case, 24 the Ninth Circuit held that
the procedure for determining the merits of a Tucker-type petition
should be applied when the defendant alleges that his sentence was
made longer on account of materially untrue information in the pre-
sentence report.8 28 In so holding, the court had to distinguish Williams
v. New York.8 21 In Williams, it was held that a sentencing judge may
consider extra-judicially obtained evidence. 27 The apparent justifica-
tion for the Williams holding was the belief that once the defendant
was convicted, the judge had to consider all relevant information in
order to prescribe the correct penalty. The Ninth Circuit, however,
held that Williams is determinative only when the evidence being con-
sidered is uncontested. When the prisoner casts doubt on the validity
of facts material to fixing sentence, it would become "incumbent on the
district court either explicitly to disregard the potentially false infor-
mation, or, if the court wishes to- rely on it, to adopt some procedure
to reconcile the factual dispute.828
As a general rule, it is not error for two people convicted of the same
offense to receive different sentences. 2 ' It has been the accepted
practice in at least one circuit that a judge may consider varying degrees
of guilt in prescribing different sentences to co-defendants. 8 30 There
is a fine line between an acceptable exercise of discretion and a viola-
820. Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976).
821. Id. at 5.
822.'Id. at 11.
823. Id. at 8.
824. Leano v. United States, No. 74-2640 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976).
825. Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976).
In Townsend v. Burke, 344 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948), it was held that it is a violation
of due process to increase a prison term on the basis of materially untrue information.
826. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
827. Id. at 250-51.
828. Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976).
829. Williams v. Illinois, 299 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
830. United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 225-26 (8th Cir. 1974).
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tion of the defendant's equal protection rights. For example, a sen-
tencing judge may not lengthen a sentence solely because the defend-
ant chose to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial.8 31 The
Ninth Circuit has ruled that judicial integrity requires the sentencing
judge to explain his reasons orally or in writing832 when the disparity
between sentences given co-defendants is substantial. 888
If a defendant is convicted and sentenced to a term less than life
imprisonment, it is not unusual for the person convicted to attempt to
have the time spent in jail awaiting trial applied to his sentence. There
is no absolute right to have the waiting time so credited unless the sen-
tence, plus the waiting time, amount to a greater punishment than that
prescribed by law.8 4  In Makal v. Arizona,135 a case in which the de-
fendant had been committed to a mental institution for a length of time
before trial, the court held that such commitment is not the equivalent
of confinement in prison, and therefore there was no need to credit
this time against the term of the sentence.
880
B. Revocation of Parole Status
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 87 the Supreme Court established guidelines
to safeguard the rights of any convicted criminal whose status as a
parolee is threatened by revocation proceedings.88 8  Subsequent deci-
sions have made it clear that a prisoner must actually be on parole to
take advantage of the enumerated rights set forth in Morrissey.8 9 The
831. United States v. Harlin, 539 F.2d 679, 681-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
362 (1976); United States v.. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973).
832. United States v. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1976).
833. Id. See United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 986-87 (4th Cir. 1974). In Flores, the defendants, hus-
band and wife, were found guilty of the same criminal conduct. The judge gave the
wife a substantially lighter sentence because, as he admitted, she had one child at home
and she was pregnant. The .Ninth Circuit affirmed. In Maples, the defendants, one
male and one female, were both found guilty of one count of bank robbery. The judge
gave the woman defendant a lighter sentence because of her "age and sex." 501 F.2d
at 986. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit remanded, holding that the portion of the male's
sentence given him solely because of his sex should be reduced.
834. Hook v. Arizona, 496 F.2d 1172, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Corley v.
Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976).
835. 544 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1976).
836. Id. at 1035.
837. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
838. Id. at 488-89.
839. See, e.g., Bailleaux v. Cupp, 535 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant not
on parole when offer of parole revoked). See also Bean v. Nevada, 535 F.2d 542 (9th
960 [Vol. 10
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Ninth Circuit considers parole as the functional equivalent of imprison-
ment;8 40 therefore, the granting of a parole term must comply with the
provisions of any statute under which the defendant is sentenced. For
example, where a defendant is sentenced under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act,"4 the simultaneous imposition of a special ten-year
parole term is void on its face.8 42
In Atwood v. Nelson8 4 defendant was charged with drunk driving s44
while still on parole for the commission of a prior offense. His parole
officer used his guilty plea to the drunk driving charge as grounds for
revoking the defendant's parole.848 The prisoner claimed that, under
Morrissey, he was entitled to a prerevocation hearing.8 46 The Adult
Authority denied his request. The defendant also claimed error in the
denial of his right to produce witnesses in his behalf at the revocation
hearing. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendant on both
counts. 84 7  The court held that, although a guilty plea constitutes prob-
Cir. 1976) (no Morrissey rights when defendant's death sentence commuted to life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole).
840. United States v. Myers, 543 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1976).
841. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1970).
842. Section 5017(c) of title 18 provides as follows: "A youth offender committed
under section 5010(b) of this chapter shall be released conditionally under supervision
on or before the expiration of four years from the date of his conviction and shall be
discharged unconditionally on or before six years from the date of his conviction."
(emphasis added). In United States v. Myers, 543 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1976), the district
court tried to augment a sentence under the Youth Act with a special ten-year parole
term. Since section 5017(c) provides that the youth must be unconditionally released
before six years from the date of his conviction, the parole term was held to be invalid.
843. No. 74-2260 (9th Cir. May 14, 1976).
844. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102 (West Supp. 1977).
845. In Atwood one of the terms of defendant's release on parole was that he not
consume alcoholic beverages. The parole officer also charged the prisoner with possess-
ing firearms and failing to obey state laws, both in contravention of the conditions of
his parole. Atwood v. Nelson, No. 74-2260, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. May 14, 1976).
846. Under Morrissey, the defendant is entitled to a prerevocation hearing, the pur-
pose of which is to ascertain the existence of probable cause to revoke parole. 408 U.S.
at 485-87.
847. Under Morrissey, the defendant is entitled to the following rights:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee
of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present wit-
nesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not al-
lowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a tradi-
tional parole board . . . ; and (f) a written statement bylthe factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489. The court in Atwood concluded that the prisoner was afforded each of
these rights with the exception of those enumerated in (c). Therefore, the revocation
hearing was held to be invalid.
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able cause for a revocation hearing under the Morrissey test, the pris-
oner was entitled to a prerevocation hearing to determine whether the
plea was taken under circumstances in which his procedural due proc-
ess rights had been safeguarded.8 48  The court invalidated the revoca-
tion hearing on the grounds that the defendant should have been per-
mitted to. call witnesses in his behalf. 849
C. Revocation of Probationary Status
Many of the procedural standards applicable to parole revocations
are also applicable to revocation of probationary status. 810 For ex-
ample, the exclusionary rule has been held inapplicable to both pro-
bation and parole revocation hearings. 851 The trial judge has wide dis-
cretion to impose any condition upon a grant of probation which he
feels will aid the defendant's process of rehabilitation. 5 In exercising
his discretion, the judge is not bound by the recommendation of the
probation officer.8 53
In Nicholas v. United States,8 54 the Ninth Circuit held that a judge
may impose a new term of probation upon the successful revocation
of the defendant's prior probationary status. In Nicholas, the prisoner
had received a suspended sentence and had been placed on five years
probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970). He moved to
Nevada during this five-year period without informing his probation
848. Ordinarily, a guilty plea would constitute probable cause to revoke parole. How-
ever, the Adult Authority should have permitted a prerevocation hearing to determine
if the plea in this case was accepted in violation of the defendant's due process rights.
The defendant was not informed at the time of the plea as to the "dual" purpose for
which it would be used. The California Supreme Court has held that a drunk driving
conviction upon a plea of guilty in a California municipal court, in a proceeding that
was not intended to serve a dual purpose, does not meet Morrissey's due process standards
where there is neither notice to the parolee nor agreement between the parties. In re
Lo Croix, 12 Cal. 3d 146, 151 n.1, 524 P.2d 816, 820 n.1, 115 Cal. Rptr. 344, 348 n.1
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975).
849. Atwood v. Nelson, No. 74-2260 (9th Cir. May 14, 1976). The defendant was
not entitled to an attorney's presence at his revocation hearing because Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli, 411 U.S. 788 (1973) is not to be applied retroactively. See Sloan v. Nelson, 512
F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1975); Gardner v. McCarthy, 503 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974).
850. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972).
851. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970).
852. United States v. Miller, 549 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Conseuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975).
853. United States v. Miller, 549 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir. 1976) (by implication).
854. No. 75-2411 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1976).
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officer as to his whereabouts. Defendant's probation term was revoked
and he was given a five-year jail sentence. The district court was
willing to reinstate a new probation period but ruled that it lacked
jurisdiction to do so.855  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and held that
the district court judge had the authority to decide what penalty is
appropriate upon revocation of probation. Where, as in Nicholas, the
warrant for arrest was issued within the initial probationary period and
a hearing was held within a reasonable time after the warrant was
executed, the court could execute the remainder of a sentence even
if the probationary period had expired. 56 The probationary period
imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 is tolled during the period in which
a probationer has voluntarily left the jurisdiction or has concealed
himself to avoid service of process. 85 7 In revoking the original proba-
tion term, the court can reinstate any sentence which might have
originally been imposed. 58
D. Appeals
The federal circuit courts have jurisdiction "of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States."8 59  While the
"final judgment" rule is not a difficult one to state, the practical diffi-
culties encountered in applying the rule are varied. 60  For example,
if a trial judge refuses to grant a defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss
the indictment, such denial is generally not a final judgment within the
meaning of the statute.8 "1 Several circuits have found an exception to
this rule where the motion is framed in the setting of a double jeopardy
855. The district court relied on the following words of 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970)
to reach its conclusion: "The period of probation, together with any extension thereof,
shall not exceed five years."
856. Nicholas v. United States, No. 75-2411, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1976).
857. Id. at 3. The five-year limitation is tolled during the time that the probationer
is imprisoned for another offense. Ashworth v. United States, 391 F.2d 245, 246 (6th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Gelb, 269 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1959).
858. Nicholas v. United States, No. 75-2411 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1976). This would in-
clude imposing a new probation term.
859. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
860. See, e.g., DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) (pretrial ruling
on motion to suppress is not final judgment); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 330 (1940) (denial of motion to quash subpoena duces tecum is not final judg-
ment); United States v. Carey, 475 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1973) (denial of motion
for acquittal is not final order).
861. Guam v. Lefever, 454 F.2d 270, 270 (9th Cir. 1972); Kyle v. United States,
211 F.2d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1954). See also Young v. United States, 544 F.2d 415,
418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 643 (1976).
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appeal. s62  The Ninth Circuit, in a case of first impression,83 held that
a claim of double jeopardy does not transform the ruling on a pretrial
motion into a final judgment.88 4 Therefore, the ruling on the motion
to dismiss is not immediately appealable. The court noted that "delays
and disruptions caused by intermediate appeals are especially detrimen-
tal to the effective administration of the criminal law."8865
The defendant is required to voice objection to the introduction of
all improper evidence at the trial level.8°6 Failure to make the objec-
tion deprives the defendant of an appeal unless the introduction of such
evidence rises to the level of "plain error. 811 7  There are certain rules
followed in the Ninth Circuit that demonstrate a marked preference for
preserving the trial judge's ruling whenever possible. In United States
v. Houston,s8 the court reiterated its position that it will not notice error
in the judge's charge to the jury unless the charge "may have resulted
in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial."
8 69
The Ninth Circuit, in another 1976 case, also decided that where the
correct ruling is made during the trial but for an erroneous reason, the
case will not be reversed unless the defendant can demonstrate
prejudice.
87 0
The United States Supreme Court has held that judicial review of
an administrative ruling should not be precluded unless clear and con-
862. United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 172 (4th Cir. 1972). The Lansdown
decision has been adopted in three other circuits. See United States v. DiSilvio, 520
F.2d 247, 248 n.2a (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905, 907 (2d
Cir. '1975); United States v. Barket, 503 F.2d 181, 185-86 (8th Cir. 1975). The Second
Circuit questioned its earlier acceptance of the Lansdown rule in United States v. Alessi,
544 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1976). The Lansdown rationale is derived from the Supreme
Court decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
863. Young v. United States, 544 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
643 (1976).
864. Id. at 418.
865. Id. at 419. To prevent disruption of the trial, the United States Supreme Court
has adopted a rule that "[flinal judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The
sentence is the judgment." Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937).
866. FED. R. CRiM. P. 30.
867. Id. 52(b). See also United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974).
868. 547 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1976).
869. Id. at 108 (citations omitted).
870. United States v. Castillo-Felix, 539 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1976); Egan v. Teets,
251 F.2d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 1957). The Ninth Circuit also follows the rule that, when
a defendant escapes while his appeal is pending, the court does not have to consider the
merits of the appeal. United States v. Villegas-Codallos, 543 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir.
1976). See also Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970).
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vincing evidence discloses that Congress both considered and pro-
hibited judicial review of the agency action in question.871  The Ninth
Circuit elaborated further on this test in Kitchens v. Department of the
Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.s72  In Kitchens,
the defendant pleaded nolo contendre to a charge of possessing a ma-
chine gun. 7 3  Upon successful completion of a probation term, he
applied to the Treasury Department for relief from federal disabili-
ties.87 4  The director denied petitioner any relief. The Ninth Circuit
held that a director's decision is reviewable but is limited to considera-
tion of the purported reasons for the denial.878 The director's state-
ment need only list the grounds for his decision and give essential facts
in support thereof.
8 76
In all appeals, the defendant is required to file a notice of appeal
within ten days after the entry of judgment. 77 Compliance with the
ten-day deadline is mandatory. Failure to satisfy this requirement de-
prives the appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeil.8 78  There
are, however, a few exceptions to this rule. For example, if the de-
fendant makes a motion for a new trial, his ten-day period does not
begin to run until the judge has ruled on the motion. In United States
v. Stolarz,87 9 the petitioner had filed a notice of appeal within ten days
after his motion for a new trial was denied.88 0  The petitioner had
failed, however, to file his first motion, the motion for a new trial,
within the statutory period. The earlier failure to file a timely motion
made petitioner's subsequent notice of appeal ineffective and un-
timely 88'
871. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975).
872. 535 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976).
873. Id. at 1198. Possession of a machine gun is a violation of CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12220 (West Supp. 1977).
874. 535 F.2d at 1198. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1970), the defendant made
his application to the Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms.
875. 535 F.2d at 1199-200. See also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572
(1975).
876. 535 F.2d at 1199-200.
877. See FED. R. App. P. 4(b), which reads as follows:
Appeals in Criminal Cases. In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant
shall be filed in the district court within 10 days after the entry of the judgment
or order appealed from. . . . A judgment or order is entered within the meaning
of this subdivision when it is entered in the criminal docket ....
87.8. Smith v. United States, 425 F.2d 173, 194 (9th Cir. 1970).
879. 547 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1976).
880. Id. This exception is sanctioned by FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
881. 547 F.2d at 112. Rule 4(b) of the FED. R. App. P. states, in pertinent part,
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The petitioner may circumvent the ten-day time limit by asking the
district court to grant a thirty-day extension. The extension is available
only upon the showing of "excusable neglect."' 8 2  Mere acceptance by
members of the clerk's staff at the district court does not amount to
an acceptance by the court of petitioner's application for an extension.
The district court must specifically rule on the application.88 a
In 1976 the Ninth Circuit affirmed its earlier determination that the
trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a defendant's
motion for a new trial.8 4  The court made it clear that its scope of
review in this instance is narrow and that, absent demonstration of sev-
eral factors, 85 the trial court ruling will be upheld.
E. Habeas Corpus
Ordinarily, constitutional claims are subject to federal habeas corpus
review even though they were fully litigated in a prior state proceed-
ing.8 " However, in Stone v. Powell,8 87 the United States Supreme
Court held that an exception to this rule exists when the alleged ille-
gality involves petitioner's fourth amendment rights. Where a state has
provided full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim, a state
as follows: "If a timely motion ... for a new trial on any ground other than newly
discovered evidence has been made, an appeal from a judgment of conviction may be
taken within 10 days after the entry of an order denying the motion ... " (Emphasis
added).
882. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b). See Felix v. Cardwell, 545 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Nichols, 534 F.2d 202, (9th Cir. 1976).
883. United States v. Stolarz, 547 F.2d 108, 111 (9th Cir. 1976). The Eighth Cir-
cuit has adopted a rule that the district court's acceptance of a notice of appeal filed
after the tenth and up to the fortieth day after judgment is construed as a grant of addi-
tional time to file the notice under rule 4(b). United States v. Williams, 508 F.2d 410,
410 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mills, 430 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971). The Ninth Circuit rejects this rule in Stolarz, 547 F.2d
at 111.
884. United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1976); Lindsey v. United
States, 368 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1025 (1967).
885. The Ninth Circuit has listed the following elements as necessary to show an
abuse of the judge's discretion in denying a motion for a new trial:
(1) The evidence must have been discovered since the trial; (2) it must be material
to the factual issues at the trial, and not merely cumulative nor impeaching the
character or credit of a witness; (3) it must be of such a nature that it would prob-
ably produce a different verdict in the'event of a retrial.
United States v. Diaz-Rodriguez, 478 F.2d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dis.
missed, 412 U.S. 964 (1973) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Durgin,
444 F.2d 308, 309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 945 (1971).
886. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
887. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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prisoner is precluded from seeking federal habeas corpus review under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).88 In Stone, the defendant argued that judi-
cial integrity and the deterrence effect of federal review require the
court to consider the search and seizure issue."8 9 The Court rejected
this argument. The Ninth Circuit, demonstrating that it is prepared
to follow the new rule, has declined to review fourth amendment
claims.8 90 In addition, the rule has been given retroactive effect 8 1 and
it has been expanded to include those petitions filed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.892
Where the state provides alternative methods of judicial review, fed-
eral habeas corpus is proper even though the defendant has not ex-
hausted both alternatives.893 Moreover, the state can require the peti-
tioner to pursue one method or the other, "so long as the right to re-
view is not foreclosed or unduly limited." 94  It is sometimes difficult,
however, to determine at what point the defendant has satisfactorily
dealt with state remedies. The state court must have ruled on the
merits, and it will be presumed that the State did reach the merits if
the record is silent.8 95
888. Id. at 481-82. To the extent that Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217
(1969) purports to hold contra on constitutional grounds, it has been overruled, 428
U.S. at 481 & n.16.
889. Even before Stone v. Powell, at least one source noted that these grounds are
not persuasive when fourth amendment rights are involved. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 259-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
890. Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976); Corley v. Cardwell, 544
F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 757 (1977); Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d
1019 (9th Cir. 1976).
891. Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1976).
892. Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 456-59 (9th Cir. 1976). Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) a state prisoner may petition the district court for federal habeas
corpus relief. Section 2255 is employed by a criminal defendant convicted in federal
court. Under this latter section the defendant claims that the sentence given him by
the district court is invalid. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). The "Tucker-type motion"
under section 2255 is a charge that the sentence was enhanced by consideration of a
prior conviction obtained in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to coun-
sel. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
893. Thompson v. Procunier, 539 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). This rule is in conformity
with the practices of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. Leftwich v. Coiner, 424 F.2d 157
(4th Cir. 1970); Buchanan v. United States, 379 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1967). Therefore,
if the petitioner exercises his right to direct appeal in state court, he is not required to
initiate a state collateral attack even if the state would provide the opportunity.
894. Thompson v. Procunier, 539 F.2d 26, 28 (9th Cir. 1976). The state has a legit-
imate interest in maintaining a uniform and orderly procedure for review.
895. Id. See also Gardner v. Griggs, 541 F.2d 851, 852 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Federal courts will refuse to consider applications for habeas corpus
relief unless the prisoner can be said to have exhausted available state
remedies. 896 This rule is predicated upon notions of comity rather than
the notion of inherent limitations upon federal power. 897 The Ninth
Circuit has held that a federal court must decline to decide any of the
petition's issues until the available state remedy for every issue is ex-
hausted.898 Thus, in Gonzales v. Stone,899 defendant's petition alleged
false imprisonment, ineffective assistance of counsel and lack of sub-
stantial evidence to support his conviction. Only the last two issues
were raised and exhausted in state court. Therefore, the court held
that the petition could not be considered. 90 Moreover, if the defend-
ant has failed to exhaust his state administrative remedies, the district
court may not consider the merits of the petition.90 1
Once the defendant has exhausted the available state remedies, he
may petition the federal court in the district of incarceration 0 2 for
habeas corpus relief. Once the district court has considered the peti-
tion and has ruled on the merits, the defendant can appeal the ruling
896. Fayv. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419 (1963).
897. Id. at 420. There is a general trend towards denial of federal habeas corpus re-
view in the interest of preserving federal/state comity. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
898. Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1976). See also James v. Reese,
546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976); Seawell v. Rauch, 536 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.
1976). This rule is in conformity with the practice of the Fifth Circuit. West v. Lou-
isiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1034 (1973), aff'd on rehearing, 510 F.2d 363' (5th Cir. 1975).
Several other circuits have considered the issue and have adopted a different view:
unless the exhausted and unexhausted claims are interrelated, a federal court will decide
the exhausted issues even though the petition contains several grounds for relief that
have not been exhausted in state court. See Johnson v. United States Dist. Court, 519
F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1975); Hewitt v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th
Cir. 1969); Levy v. McMann, 394 F.2d 402, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Myers, 372 F.2d 111, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1967). The position of the Ninth Circuit on
this issue was uncertain. See Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965) (court
dismissed habeas petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims). But cf.
Phillips v. Pitchess, 451 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972)
(petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief must exhaust available state remedies). See gen-
erally Davis v. Dunbar, 394 F.2d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1968); Schiers v. California, 333
F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1964).
899. 546 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1976).
900. Id. at 810.
901. Seawell v. Rauch, 536 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1976).
902. Pursuant to a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), the
post-conviction review is accomplished by the federal court in the district of incarcera-
tion. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), the court which originally imposed
the sentence conducts the review.
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but cannot file another petition with the district court.9 0 3  The complex
case is one in which it is difficult to ascertain if the first ruling was on
the merits. In Sanders v. United States,'0 4  the Supreme Court
announced a general rule that a denial is on the merits only if the files
and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief.90 5 In Mayes v. Pickett,906 the district court had dismissed with-
out a hearing two prior petitions filed by the defendant. However, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the records and files did not "conclusively
show that [the prisoner was] entitled to no relief." '  Therefore, the
court reluctantly vacated the judgment below and remanded "for what
is obviously a meaningless waste of time hearing." 09
An awkward problem arises when a case is originally tried in federal
court, since a petition for habeas corpus requires the trial court to con-
sider issues which it has already fully litigated. In Polizzi v. United
States,909 it was held that a court may exercise discretion in refusing
to reconsider an issue based on the "identical grounds" already liti-
gated. 10 The court adopted an expansive view of what constitutes
903. Tucker v. Gunn, 541 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976); Mayes v. Pickett, 537 F.2d
1080 (9th Cir. 1976).
904. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
905. Id. at 16. It should be noted that, under certain circumstances, the district court
is required to at least hold an evidentiary hearing to settle unresolved issues of fact. The
following elements must be present:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2)
the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3)
the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford
a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evi-
dence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hear-
ing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Founts v. Pogue, 532 F.2d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976)
(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963)).
906. 537 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1976).
907. Id. at 1083. The court indicated a desire to follow the Fourth Circuit rule an-
nounced in Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975). In Craw-
ford it was stated that, where a plea is accepted in compliance with FED. R. ClUM. P.
11, the desire for uniformity and finality renders habeas corpus inapplicable although
the record is not "conclusive." The Fifth Circuit follows the Crawford rule. Johnson
v. Massey, 516 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1975). However, in Mayes, the Ninth Circuit felt
compelled to follow its own precedent. See also Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S.
213 (1973); Reed v. United States, 441 F.2d 569, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1971); Lopez v.
United States 439 F.2d 997, 1000 (9th Cir. 1971); Diamond v. United States, 432 F.2d
35 (9th Cir. 1970); Jones v. United States, 384 F.2d 916, 917 (9th Cir. 1967).
908. 537 F.2d at 1084-85.
909. 550 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1976).
910. Id. at 1136 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963)). The
Supreme Court has announced that a district court may refuse to entertain a repetitive
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"identical grounds." 91' It is clear that identical grounds may be proved
by different factual allegations and supported by different legal argu-
ments. 912 However, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the appli-
cant.913
In 1976 the Ninth Circuit was forced to decide the delicate question
of whether, in reviewing a state prisoner's petition for relief, the district
court is bound to apply the state procedural rule or the corresponding
federal law.91 4  The case arose in a setting where the defendant ad-
ritted at his arraignment that he had three prior convictions. The
prosecutor used this admission to convict the petitioner under the Cali-
fornia "habitual criminal" statute.915 The California Supreme Court
had ruled prior to this time that the prosecutor did not have to inform
the prisoner of the significance of admitting his prior convictions at the
arraignment. 916 The federal rule was contra." In reversing a district
court determination, 918 the Ninth Circuit held that federal constitutional
law must be interpreted in accordance with the federal habeas corpus
statute.919 Therefore, the federal rule should have been applied in this
case and the defendant should have been informed as to the signifi-
cance of admitting his prior convictions.
F. Prisoners' Rights
The Supreme Court has never defined the scope of a prisoner's first
amendment right to send letters from jail without government interfer-
ence.920  The Ninth Circuit, however, has indicated in at least two re-
petition absent a showing of manifest injustice or a change in law. Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 226-27 & n.8 (1969); Clayton v. United States, 447 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir. 1971).
911. Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d at 1136.
912. Id.
913. Id.
914. Sesser v. Gunn, 529 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1150
(1977).
915. CAL. PENAL CODE § 644 (West 1970) (repealed 1976).
916. This rule was changed by the state supreme court in In re Yurko, 10 Cal. 3d
857, 519 P.2d 561, 112 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1974). However, Yurko could not be applied
in Sesser v. Gunn since the California court refused to give the rule retroactive effect.
917. Wright v. Craven, 461 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit decided
to apply the rule prospectively only. The facts in Sesser v. Gunn arose nine months
after Wright. See also Bernath v. Craven, 506 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1974).
918. The district court in Sesser v. Gunn ruled that the California Supreme Court is
"clearly the final expositor of state law." 529 F.2d at 934.
919. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
459 (1953).
920. The Court did affirm a lower court decision on point in Procunier v. Martinez,
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cent decisions that a prisoner retains his constitutional right to free ex-
921pression. Therefore, prison officials do not have absolute authority
to censor letters or to deny an inmate the privilege of corresponding
with the outside world.922
In Navarette v. Enomoto,923 the petitioner complained that his right
of free access to the courts was denied by prison officials on unconsti-
tutional grounds . 24  He alleged that his employment as prison librarian
and his enrollment in a law school visitation program were terminated
solely to punish him or to hamper his legal activities. The Ninth Cir-
cuit acknowledged that while it has "traditionally been reluctant to in-
terfere in matters of state prison administration, '925 such interference
was justified when necessary to protect a prisoner's rights. The court
held that if the petitioner's contentions were true, then his constitutional
rights had been violated. 26
The Ninth Circuit, in a 1976 case,927 established procedural guide-
lines for prisoners who desire judicial review of the government's deci-
sion to take away accumulated "good time." The Circuit recognized
that forfeiture of good time is not "the same immediate disaster that
the revocation of parole is for the parolee,"9 28 and therefore established
416 U.S. 396 (1974). The district court found that the prisoner retained a substantial
first amendment right which forbids prison officials from censoring mail. However, on
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on a narrower basis, holding that the censorship
of an inmate's letters is violative of the non-prisoner recipient's first amendment rights.
Id. at 408-09.
921. McKinney v. DeBord, 507 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir. 1974); Seattle-Tacoma
Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1973).
922. Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
783 (1977).
923. 536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 783 (1977).
924. See Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
862 (1961). In Hatfield, it was decided that right of access to the court means:
the opportunity to prepare, serve and file whatever pleadings or other documents
are necessary or appropriate in order to commence or prosecute court proceedings
affecting one's personal liberty, or to assert and sustain a defense therein, and to
send and receive communications to and from judges, courts and lawyers concerning
such matters.
Id. at 637. The prisoner has a right to the assistance of knowledgeable inmates (John-
son v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1969) ), and the right of access to a reasonably
good set of lawbooks (Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 111 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd
sub nor. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) ).
925. Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 281 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 793 (1977) (quoting Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1016 (1970)).
926. Id.
927. Seawell v. Rauch, 536 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1976).
928. Id. at 1284 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974)).
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a specific procedure. First, the inmate must apply to the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons for a recommendation that any forfeited good
time be restored. Then, if the Director offers such a recommendation,
the Attorney General can reinstate the good time.2 9 The prisoner may
petition for judicial review only if the Director has been given an oppor-
tunity to act on the prisoner's behalf but has refused to do so.0
30
G. Double Jeopardy
The double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment is made ap-
plicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.93 1 A problem arises where, for purposes of ascertaining
the point at which jeopardy attaches, a state court applies a standard
different than the one enunciated by the United States Supreme Court.
The need for a uniform test applicable to both state and federal pro-
ceedings is especially acute in areas such as double jeopardy, since the
violation of this provision requires that the accused automatically be set
free. 32  The Ninth Circuit has decided that federal and state courts
should apply the same test9 83 and that the appropriate standard is the
Supreme Court's "interpretations of the fifth amendment double
jeopardy provision." ' 4
929. 18 U.S.C. § 4166 (1970).
930. Seawell v. Rauch, 536 F.2d at 1285. See also Williams v. United States, 431
F.2d 873, 874 (5th Cir. 1970); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d 386, 387 (10th Cir.
1966).
931. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
932. The violation occurs when, after the defendant is expressly or impliedly ac-
quitted, the prosecutor attempts to try the defendant again for the same offense. See
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957). However, where the first trial ends in conviction, retrial will not be barred
upon reversal. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). The Ninth Circuit has
also acknowledged that, where the case is reversed, the prosecutor may file wholly differ-
ent charges. United States v. Poll, 538 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 486 (1977).
933. Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1976), appeal filed sub nom. Crist v.
Cline, 97 S. Ct. 1676 (1977). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the same
constitutional norms are to be employed in assessing conduct in state and federal cases.
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (sixth amendment confrontation clause
applied to states under same test which protects against federal encroachment); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (same standards must determine whether accused's
silence in either federal or state proceeding is justified); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
33 (1963) (standard of reasonableness same under fourth and fourteenth amendments).
934. Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) ). The circuit courts have adhered strictly to this rule. See,
e.g., Gibson v. Ziegele, 479 F.2d 773, 776 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973);
Smith v. Mississippi, 478 F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973);
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In United States v. Finch3 5 the Ninth Circuit held that, although
jeopardy attached when the district judge received an agreed statement
of facts while considering defendant's motion to dismiss the informa-
tion, 36 appeal by the prosecution was not barred because no additional
facts were required to be found. The only determination to be made
was a legal one. 3 7  In reaching its decision the court distinguished
United States v. Jenkins,938 where the Supreme Court held appeal was
barred since it was unclear whether the district court action turned on
an issue of fact rather than law.
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and reversed. 39
The Court stated that since dismissal was ordered without any declara-
tion of guilt or innocence by the district court, there was no basis to
simply reinstate a general finding of guilt should the prosecution's ap-
peal prove successful. 940 The appeal was therefore barred by the
double jeopardy clause.
If a defendant exercises his right to a jury trial, jeopardy attaches
when the jury is sworn and impaneled. 4' Therefore, if an indictment
is dismissed before the case reaches the trial stage, the prosecutor
is not prohibited from filing a subsequent indictment on the same
charge. 42  Once the case has reached the trial stage, however, the
judge must exercise caution in employing his authority to declare a
mistrial. The traditional rule is that a mistrial will bar retrial of the
defendant unless motivated by "manifest necessity,"943 or when the
ccends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." 944  The deter-
Somerville v. Illinois, 447 F.2d 733, 735 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 410
U.S. 458 (1973).
935. 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2909 (1977) (per curiam).
936. Id. at 824-25.
937. Id. at 826-27.
938. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
939. 97 S. Ct. 2909 (1977) (per curiam).
940. Id. at 2910.
941. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975); Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458, 467-68 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971); Downum
v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1963). See also United States v. Olson, 504
F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1974); Alexander v. Fogliani, 375 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.
1967).
942. United States v. Castillo-Felix, 539 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1976).
943. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824). See also, United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461 (1973);.
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971).
944. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824).
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minative issue is always, given the facts of a particular case, was there
a "manifest necessity" to declare a mistrial?
In Bretz v. Crist,945 trial by jury had commenced when it was dis-
covered that the indictment contained a typographical error. The
judge declared a mistrial to enable the prosecutor to correct the mis-
take. On appeal, it was held that there was no manifest necessity for
a mistrial under these circumstances, since the judge could have per-
mitted an amendment to the indictment and allowed the trial to con-
tinue."' Therefore, retrial of the defendant was barred by the double
jeopardy clause.
When a mistrial is declared because the jury is unable to reach a
decision, the Supreme Court has ruled that retrial is not barred by a
claim of double jeopardy. 47  However, there are differing views as to
how long the judge must wait before he concludes that the jury cannot
reach a decision and declares a mistrial. 948 The Ninth Circuit decided
last year that the trial judge has broad discretion in choosing how long
the court must wait for a jury to reach its decision.9 40 The judge's de-
cision will be reversed only upon a clear abuse of discretion. 9 0
It is clear that the trial judge must consider alternatives before he
can declare a mistrial.9 51 In Arizona v. Washington,05 2 the court
demonstrated the harsh consequences of failure to consider the op-
tions. Defendant's murder conviction had been reversed as a result of
prosecutorial impropriety.953 During the retrial, the defense attorney
informed the jury as to the prosecutor's actions at the first trial. The
judge declared a mistrial. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that there
945. 546 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1976), appeal filed sub nom. Crist v. Cline, 97 S. Ct.
1676 (1977).
946. Id. at 1349.
947. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824). See also Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 688-89 (1948).
948. See United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 992 (1975) (mistrial proper when jury deadlocked after ten hours of deliberation).
949. Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 757
(1977).
950. Id. at 351. See also Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976).
This ruling is in conformity with Oelke v. United States, 389 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
951. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971). This certainly accounts for
the result in Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1976), appeal filed sub nom. Crist
v. Cline 97 S. Ct. 1676 (1977).
952. 546 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1643 (1977).
953. Id. at 830. The prosecutor had failed to disclose "Brady materials" upon rc-
quest by the defense attorney,
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was no "manifest necessity" for a declaration of mistrial since the trial
court did not indicate and the record did not reflect that the judge con-
sidered any alternatives.95 4  Reprosecution of the defendant was
barred.
Assuming that a trial is properly terminated because of manifest
necessity, there arises an issue as to when jeopardy attaches in the event
of future disposition ending in the defendant's favor. In United States
v. Sanford,955 the district court dismissed an indictment prior to retrial.
The Ninth Circuit considered the case on two occasions. The first
time, it was held that jeopardy had attached when the indictment was
dismissed before retrial. The Supreme Court remanded "for consid-
eration in light of Serfass v. United States."956  On remand, the trial
court and the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that Serfass altered the
prior ruling and, once again, ruled that reprosecution was barred. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that jeopardy has not attached when,
after the first trial results in a hung jury, an indictment before retrial
is dismissed. 9
57
The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit a second trial in a
different court on the identical charge where the respective courts are
not of the same "sovereign." 958  The Ninth Circuit has declared that
an Indian tribal court and a federal district court constitute parts of
the same sovereign.9 59 Thus, once the defendant is tried before an
Indian Tribal Court on the charge of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor, a district court is barred from bringing charges amounting
to a lesser included offense stemming from the same incident.9 60
It is manifest that a juvenile court is considered part of the same sov-
ereign as that to which a state court belongs, since double jeopardy pre-
954. Id. at 832. The court specifically suggested that the judge should have consid-
ered cautioning the jury to disregard the defense attorney's statements.
955. 429 U.S. 14 (1976).
956. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
957. 429 U.S. 14 (1976), rev'g United States v. Sanford, 536 F.2d 871 (1976).
958. Abbate v. United States, ,359 U.S. 187 (1959) (no violation when state guilty
plea followed by federal charge stemming from same incident); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959) (no violation when federal acquittal followed by state conviction). Cf.
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (local and state prosecutions for same offense
is violation of double jeopardy prohibition).
959. United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1225, 1258 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
98 S. Ct. 53 (1977).
960. Id. at 1258. See also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932);
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911); Henry v. United States, 215 F.2d
639, 641 (9th Cir. 1954).
1977]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
vents a minor defendant first subjected to an adjudicatory hearing in ju-
venile court from being subsequently tried as an adult. 61 This is the
case whenever the juvenile ruling is on the merits. However, where
a hearing in juvenile court is solely to determine whether to try the
minor as an adult, there is no ruling on the merits."0 2 Double jeopardy
does not prevent the state from bringing charges subsequent to a deci-
sion to transfer the case from juvenile court.
VII. JUVENILE OFFENDERS
A state court hearing to determine whether a juvenile offender
should stand trial as an adult does not constitute a proceeding on the
merits.9 63  The double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment,
therefore, does not bar prosecution of the case in federal district court
after a transfer.964
Even if the youth offender is tried as an adult, the district court may
still impose sentence pursuant to the provisions of the Youth Correc-
tions Act.965  Under that act a minor defendant convicted of a criminal
offense may be sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General rather
than to imprisonment; 966 and the requirement that such a sentence be
"in lieu of imprisonment" prevents the judge from adding any term
of prison, parole or probation.967 However, the fact that an accused
may be sentenced as a youth offender does not alter the constitutional
requirement that the Government proceed by indictment and not by in-
formation if the case is tried in federal court.9 68
In United States v. Martin-Plascencia,9619 the defendant appealed
from an adjudication of juvenile delinquency on the grounds that he was
961. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). The "dual sovereignty" status of juvenile
courts and federal courts has been abolished by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1970).
962. United States v. Martinez, 536 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
907 (1976).
963. Id. If the juvenile court proceeding had been a hearing on the merits of the case,
then reprosecution would be barred. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
964. United States v. Martinez, 536 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
907 (1976).
965. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5006, 5010(b) (West Supp. 1977).
966. Id. § 5010(b).
967. See United States v. Myers, 543 F.2d 721, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1976) (parole is
functional equivalent of imprisonment for purpose of 'sentencing under Youth Correc-
tions Act).
968. United States v. Ramirez, No. 15-1395 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1976).
969. 532 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1976).
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denied his constitutional right to a jury trial9 7° While the Supreme
Court has held that a minor is entitled to representation by counsel in
any juvenile delinquency proceeding which may result in commitment
to an institution,97' juveniles have never been afforded the right to a
jury trial. In Martin-Plascencia, the Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's
claim to such a right, holding that neither the Constitution nor recent
amendments to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act afforded him










970. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5032, 5033 (Supp. V 1975).
The Ninth Circuit has consistently denied the defendant a right to a jury trial when
charged under this act. See, e.g., United States v. Salcido-Medina, 483 F.2d 1,62 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. James, 464 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1972).
971. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
972. 532 F.2d at 1318. Note that sections 5032 and 5033 were amended in 1974.
Martin-Plascencia, therefore, is an interpretation by the Ninth Circuit that the amend-
ments have not changed the prior rule with respect to a juvenile's right to a jury trial.
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